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Table No. 5/9
V-44
Proposed Industrial Units for the N IS (Plastics)
PRODUCT Technology Investment 
US$ M
PVC wiring and cables High 30.0
Polyethylene Bags I.t >w 3.6
Plastics Medical Articles Modi uni 6.6
Flexible laminates of PVC Low 31. 3
PVC sheeting and flooring Low 4.9
HD— Polyethylene Furniture Low 0.6
Domestic items for Polyethylene Medium 1.5
Polyothylone k Polypropylene tubes k connections Modi um O. 5
Sheet and film made of PVC for packaging l.i >w 6.0
Agglomerated tanks & laminates of polyester High 8.9
Grinding wheels, emery clothes, abrasives. High 1.0
brake linings k clutch discs
Phenolic k melamine laminates bow 2.0
Flexible foams High 2.5
Source: Potroguisn.
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METHOD
There are two distinct parts of this work. The first one is the 
theoretical background which began with a course on "Corporate Planning" 
and "Business Policy" at the University of Warwick in 1977. The Second 
Part is the field research that was made in Brazil in discontinuous 
periods in 1977, 1978 and 1979. The first period was dedicated to the 
coverage of literature on topics relating to the subject, together with 
the development and regional development plans in Brazil, documents and 
papers about the petrochemical industry, legislation, new projects of 
industrial plants in this field and a visit to petrochemical companies 
in Brazil. There was an intensive collection of data from the Federal and 
State Government Departments, and companies about the subject. At one 
stage a questionaire was produced and given to a small sample of companies. 
However, in the presence of other similar researches • being made at the 
field by renowned institutes (SENAI, CEPED and afterwards NAl/PB and 
ABIQUIIi), I decided to drop the questionaire in favour of interviews (a 
guide is attached to this thesis.) These interviews were made specially 
in the last period when I travelled throughout Brazil, especially the 
North East region, interviewing local entrepreneurs and Government officials 
involved with the planning and management of petrochemical industries
and its segments.
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SUMMARY
This thesis deals about the organization and planning of the petro­
chemical industries in Brazil with a special emphasis on the North East 
petrochemical'pole' (see 2.2), an industrial project whose core industries 
are settled in the Municipality of Camacari.
That pole is the leading industrial development project in the region, 
headed by the government and having specific social and regional objectives. 
The thesis examines the policies adopted to attain those objectives and 
the progress made so far.
The effects of the pole on the whole region being very limited, the 
thesis makes an analysis of the changes which occurred at Camagari after the 
implementation of the pole and relates those changes to the overall needs 
of the region.
The main findings give a credit to the planning efforts in making a 
pole fully integrated with the use of regional feed-stocks, but point to 
failures in the policies designed to turn that pole into a catalyst of 
regional development. The policies adopted were more suited to create 
an industrial enclave, rather than develop an industrial pole.
■Sm
Two views of the petrochemical industrial 
complex at Camaçari


2INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about the planning and organization of an industrial 
petrochemical pole located in the North East of Brazil with its core 
industries settled at the Municipality of Camagari in the State of Bahia 
within that region (see diagram 1.4 and 1.6). Among the main objectives
of that complex were the industrial decentralisation from the South East 
to other parts of Brazil, the provision of jobs for the North East area, 
regional development and the strengthening of the Brazilian private sector. 
(Pres, da República (1971) - Exposicao de Motivos No. 2/3).
Following the extensive literature in this field (see Chapter Four), 
we assume that an implementation of an industrial pole is not sufficient 
to attain any of the above objectives. There are, however, some character­
istics of the petrochemical industries (see Chapter Three) and peculiarities 
of the region that can turn such an industrial pole into a more effective 
tool for regional development.
For reasons stated throughout the work (Chapter Five), we 
have chosen to deal with human resource policies as one of the most important 
fields for a study of the impact of the pole on the region. These facts, 
then, have guided the two main lines of the research, that is, the character­
istics of petrochemical industries and the effects of the human resource 
policies adopted by a pole built almost from scratch. We may sum up our 
thinking in two sets of propositions we will discuss throughout the next 
chapters:
(a) Propositions saying that the petrochemical industries do not favour 
explicityly the requirements of the regional development of the North 
East (NE):
a.l. The petrochemical industries favour a policy of intense
concentration due to their technological characteristics. They 
are capital intensive, operating with a high interconnection
3in respect of the individual units of production so that 
each must be geographically integrated with the other and 
using small amount of labour except at highly skilled 
levels (Chapter Three).
a.2. The regional development of a vast region such as the NE
cannot depend on the growth of an industrial complex built 
at a single point of its territory (Chapter Two).
a. 3. The NE is a large and expanding supplier of low skilled
labour, having high rates of unemployment, of migration 
from the hinterland and a fast pace of urbanisation, 
therefore a policy for the creation of decentralised labour 
intensive industrial units is theoretically more appropriate 
for its developments. In particular, we think that success 
in achieving regional objectives can be measured by the impact 
on the social structure of the region, by the provision of 
jobs, by the increase in the level of entrepreneurship, by 
the creation of new skills, knowledge and know-how, in summary, 
by the impact on the human resources structure.
(b) Propositions saying that after the political decision to locate a
petrochemical pole at Camaçari had been taken, proposals to link the 
pole to the regional needs can still be made by:
b. l. The development of a broad linkage of industries all over the NE
to consolidate and strengthen the industrial complex at Camaçari 
and taking advantage of the existing human resources in the area.
b.2. The creation of the right atmosphere for the development of those 
human resources; and here, policies favouring the initiative of 
new entrepreneurs are a vital step.
4(national and foreign) and government as a secure way to 
guarantee adequate technology and regional participation.
The thesis examines progress made so far, the relationship between this 
progress and the regional needs, the effects of the industrial complex on 
the whole region and the human resource policies being pursued by the various 
levels of government and private institutions and organizations, to establish 
how far it will be possible to attain the objectives set out for regional 
development and whether new initiatives are now required to pull the develop­
ment back on course. Camagari is taken, then, as a thermometer of the human 
resource policies undertaken by the North East Petrochemical Pole (NPP).
Note that human resources here are taken in the broadest sense to cover 
the whole community beginning with the entrepreneur who will be needed to 
start up business and moving right through the population with a detailed 
study on the macro-structure of the pole itself (Chapter Four). This is, 
then, organised in six chapters, Regional Background, Industrial Planning in 
the NE, The Petrochemical Industry, Structure and Organization of the Pole, 
Human Resource Policies and the Local Community.
b.3. A high level of cooperation between the private sector
CHAPTER ONE
Our study begins with am analysis of the environment where the petro­
chemical industrial complex has been set up, with the solid objectives of 
defining the real problems facing that industrial project. An introduction 
to the Brazilian Regional problem is made and afterwards an analysis of 
the socio-economic variables that may influence the solcial policies of 
the pole. The analysis is made by breaking the region into its States, 
its major Metropolitan Areas and Municipalities from which we give special 
emphasis to the area that shelters the majority of the NPP industries, that is, 
the Municipality of Camacari in the Great Metropolitan area of Salvador
5(RMS) , State of Bahia. This study is necessary to show the way in which 
the pole is related to the three levels of government in Brazil (Federal, 
State and Municipal). After all, the Government (especially the Federal 
Government) is the promoter of this industrialisation effort, besides 
being its main stakeholder. As the Federal Government intervention was 
directed to the regional development among other aims, it should adopt 
policies not only to increase the industrial output, but also to raise the 
standard of living, to promote employment, and provide a better distri­
bution of income and related social benefits.
The conclusion of this first chapter points to important facts for 
the understanding of this thesis.
(i) There are sufficient raw materials, including hydrocarbons to 
make the region a natural location of chemical industries.
(ii) There is no strong linkage between the petrochemical industry 
and other major economic activities of the region which are 
traditionally based mainly on agriculture, which puts tied 
restrictions on the complementarities of its economic benefits 
and on its economic impact.
(iii) The quality of the human resources of the region in terms of 
industrial skills is very low which may affect negatively the 
performance of the pole.
(iv) While being served by the RMS (Metropolitan Area of Salvador) 
the pole will affect specially the local community of Camagari 
where the main complex of heavy chemicals is located.
CHAPTER TWO
After the knowledge of the environment in which the pole is settled, 
the first topic is an understanding of the reasoning behind the principal 
promoters of the policy. Chapter Two - "Industrial Planning in the North 
East" - puts us straight into this picture. We have made an analysis in
6the evolution of regional industrial forms till arriving at the present 
stage which emphasises the implementation of growth pole in Perroux's 
sense (see 2.2). In effect, the data collected indicate that the
petrochemical industry can well perform the task of a growth pole in 
general. They demonstrate the conditions of large size (and economic 
dominance) , of a rate of growth faster than that of the economy in which it 
is embedded and a high degree of interlinkages with other sectors. This 
third characteristic, however, is not fully developed in the NE. At this 
stage, a list of the terms to be considered in this study is produced 
together with additional diagrams showing their linkages among all the firms 
in the pole, their main products and the principal applications of their 
output. We finish the chapter showing that:
- The new industrial plans have not yet reversed the unbalanced 
growth of Brazil, though they are playing an important role in 
the growth of the NE.
- The strength of the NE pole would lie in its ability to attend 
to the third condition set up for the consolidation of a growth 
pole: its local linkages.
- Being set in a low consumption market, in terms of both industrial 
and consumer-end goods, the present and future prospects for an 
increase in the down-stream economic linkages of the NPP (North 
East petrochemical pole) looks very gloomy. This is, however, a 
field where efforts should be concentrated for the final consolid­
ation of the pole.
CHAPTER THREE
Chapter Three shows how the nature of petrochemical industry poses 
some serious threats to the feasibility of attaining the social objectives 
of the NPP. A study is made of the evolution of petrochemical companies 
in the World and in Brazil to see how it could fit with the planning
7requirements of the NE. Due to the large number of petrochemical products, 
the choice of a particular kind of product that would suit the require­
ments of regional development is more difficult them in most other manu­
facturing sectors. The selection, however, cem be directed to those 
segments of the transformation industry based on petrochemical products 
which seem most appropriate to the job in hand.
These transformation industries even those presenting characteristics 
most suitable for the regional development, pose some problems for 
effective planning. These are the tendency to break up into miniscule 
units, the low income and low consumption of the local NE markets, the 
prices of the basic petrochemicals and the lack of experienced regional 
entrepreneurs . We conclude chapter three showing that:
- The characteristics of the petrochemical industry favour its 
organisation in the form of a pole.
- Its nature (capital-intensive sophisticated technology) is not 
in line with the social objectives of the pole, which gives 
reasons why the initial aims of the pole to help in the solution 
of the gross social problems of the region should be taken with 
caution.
- And priority should be given to the establishment of medium-
and long-term policies for selected segments of the transformation 
industry based on petrochemical feedstocks.
CHAPTER FOUR
Having this background on the regional problem and on the character­
istics of petrochemical industries, chapter four focuses on the organisation 
of the pole. Who's who there? What are the main functions of all the 
public and private bodies inside it? The aim is to verify if the pole 
as it is structured and managed has been an effective tool for the attainment
of the social and development goals of the region and also to analyse 
the macrostructure in which the corporate strategy of the sub-plan for 
the human resources is made. Hiis study of the corporate strategy set* 
up the path for the next two chapters on the internal (chapter five) and 
external (chapter six) aspects of the human resources policies.
SKELETON OF NEXT CHAPTERS
In fact, all these preceding four chapters led us straight into one 
of the main subjects of this thesis. Actually, the Regional Background, 
the Industrial Planning for the NE, the Petrochemical Industry and the 
Structure and Organisation of the Pole build the skeleton of the subjects 
in chapter five and six. The reason is that the human resource policies 
at Camagari at least are entirely dependent on the nature and organisation 
of petrochemical industries that are by far the biggest economic activity 
in the area. Human resources include not only people working in the pole, 
but also those affected by the installations of the industries without 
having any straight relationship with them. In this sense, chapter five 
- "The Human Resources Policies" - and chapter six - "The Local Community" 
are exactly two sides of the same coin. The local community is an 
extension of the human resources policies that will have been discussed 
in the preceding pages. This means that we firmly believe that the man­
power problem cannot be treated separately from its environment or from 
the community. Moreover, as each person should take responsibility for 
the problems he creates, so should the enterprises. They have a solid 
task of putting order in the whole of an underdeveloped area where this 
large industrial complex is set up. Unfortunately, these new interactions 
between the pole and the community are only very stiong and evident at 
Camagari and not throughout the NE. For this reason the last chapter is 
restricted to that Municipality only.
8
9There have been some researchers on the North East Petrochemical 
Pole which have tried to analyse industrial complexes from quite narrow 
angles. They are related to financial, or economic or managerial aspects 
of certain progresses. This present work has, of course, a wider range.
It covers social policies employed by the petrochemical companies, plus the 
effect those policies have on the indigenous population and vice versa.
It is not only a managerial, a technological or a manpower approach. A 
narrow approach such as those described above would make no sense at all at 
this stage, since we cannot distinguish managerial, social, .political 
impacts received by any community due to an industrialisation process.
That is the reason why we have chosen the expression "Human Resources" 
which has a broader meaning than labour or manpower. Has the region 
benefitted from the coming of the NPP? What are the objectives behind 
the industrialisation of the North East? Are the policies developed by 
the managers in line with the initial objectives stated by the Government? 
These questions imply some connotations beyond the strict field of an 
industrial relation plan, or even, beyond a corporate manpower sub-plan.
We are looking at a business-government corporate experiment in solving 
the problems of planning and of implementing human resources policies in 
large industrial estates.
This approach raises additional problems in our work. From a pure 
capitalistic point of view, an industrial organisation is set to produce 
a given amount of certain goods with the highest possible profitability. 
That is not the case in the NPP (*) , by its very nature and origin. There 
are a number of characteristics which make the management of the whole 
complex essentially different from the simple administration of a big 
corporation. From the outset, the NPP is much more concerned with social 
values than any normal private company, regardless of its social approach 
to business, because the NPP results from government intervention addressed 
directly to the regional development.
(*) North East Petrochemical Pole
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CHAPTER FIVE
In dealing with chapter five, we have discussed initially the problems 
regarding demand and supply of human resources for the pole and then we 
have divided them into different categories, namely:-
- The Entrepreneurs.
- The Managerial staff;
- The Professionals and the Technicians;
- Skilled workers.
Our aim was to produce policies in the long- medium- and short-run 
for each one of those categories. We have found that the pole has a role 
to play in encouraging the arrival of new entrepreneurs. It is fair to 
say that entrepreneurship has to face the difficulties of lack of capital, 
experience and knowledge of the proper technology to build new industries 
in this field.
The performance of the NPP in fostering new entrepreneurs can be 
much more effective if policies intended to back regional efforts of 
entrepreneurship are taken. These policies are in the field of financial 
credit, technical cooperation and specific incentives for those firms 
already settled at the area, as well as those others who must be attracted 
if development is to proceed.
As far as managers are concerned, we have studied a long-term strategy 
to fit the needs of the industry. For the professionals and the technicians, 
we have defended the idea of a Federal rather them a strictly regional 
strategy for them. Those people form the front line of the nation's
efforts to develop its own petrochemical Industries. RMS (*) then, has a 
very first responsibility to make a way for the consolidation of a scientific 
infra—structure of knowledge in petrochemicals and its transformational segments.
(*) Metropolitan Area of Salvador
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For the skilled workers, however, the strategy is regional, since 
it implies quite a lot of work with on the job training programs. More­
over, this is the kind of worker equally needed all over North East not 
only for petrochemicals but also for every other kind of industry.
CHAPTER SIX
Unskilled workers are dealt with in chapter six on "The Local 
Community”. Being a small community and prime receiver of the first impact 
of the pole, Cama^ari can be a thermometer of the socio-economic effects 
of the petrochemical industrial complex. As a government-business venture 
with strong social implications, the development of Cama^ari is an initial 
guide to find out the committment of the authorities to reach the desired 
goals. A study showing the impact of the pole is, then, made with 
successive headings on decentralisation and concentration of industries, 
infrastructure, migration, different aspects of the local government social 
policies, regional likages and a comparison between the traditional activities 
of the town and the employment of unskilled workers. We have detected that 
the human resources have not received proper priority up to now in the 
planning and management of the pole, despite a significant growth in the 
revenue of Camacari and of the State of Bahia derived from taxation onI
the goods produced at the pole. Based on these facts, we turn, then, to 
propose an overall strategy for the enlargement of the benefits of this 
industrial complex for the whole region and for Brazil. This strategy 
points mainly on the strengthening of the planning process of the Metro­
politan Area of Salvador, a better distribution of functions and responsibilities 
among all the private and public units operating at Camaipari and the backing 
of those segments of the petrochemical industries with strong regional 
linkages for which the NE shows natural advantages.
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BASIC CONCEPTS
To arrive at these conclusions, we had to work with some concepts 
which deserve an initial explanation, since there are wide controversies 
about their exact meaning and we need to show the reasons why we have 
brought them in. We refer specially to (i) employment; (ii) business 
policy; (iii) manpower planning; (iv) human resources; (v) regional 
linkages; (vi) industrial pole and industrial complex and (vii) social 
objectives.
I. EMPLOYMENT
We were not concerned with the concept and definition of an employed 
person* but with the fact that the growth of industry and of economic 
activity as a whole has not provided sufficient jobs to balance the growth 
of the population or even to compensate for the annual entry into the 
market of thousands of young people leaving school. As the most prominent 
industrial investment in the region, the NPP has to show multiplier effects 
in terms of jobs. Otherwise, it will not meet its objective of making a 
substantial contribution in reducing the growing unemployment problems.
* The census in Brazil considers that 'a employed person comprises all 
persons working during the survey week and those who although not working 
had a job or an enterprise from which they were temporarily absent for 
some reason, such as sickness, vacations, strikes etc'(FIBGE - (1971). 
This is very similar to the criteria adopted in USA census (Ross, 1967).
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It is worth realising that the creation of employment was closely 
related to the initial decision to locate the pole in the North East.
Bearing this in mind we must look for policies to reach that objective - 
the creation of many jobs - in the implementation of the project. A 
hierarchy of industries with strong employment potential, for instance, 
must be established. Other measures to reach the same objective range 
from establishing criteria to select labour intensive industries for 
the region, to the substitution of labour for technology every time that 
it is possible in the petrochemical process. We have checked these 
criteria.
We must keep in mind two facts throughout this work. The first one 
is that a good business enterprise must benefit from the natural advantage 
of its location: abundant and cheap labour is theoretically an advantage 
of the North East. The second one is that the petrochemical industries 
are organised in form of growth poles whose great advantage is the linkage 
grid they establish in a given area. The question is whether the manangement 
will be able to put those theoretical advantages into practice, because 
these same factors, if they are not managed properly, can bring serious 
damage to the regional firms already established in the area. The arrival 
of new industries might only create inflation of salaries and prices, 
and by disturbing other economic activities, due to its linkage grid, lead 
the whole of the ancient and incipient industrial organisations into 
bankruptcy.
II MANPOWER PLANNING
We have taken a "macro" view of this concept which sees manpower 
planning as a set of activities and decisions related to the use of 
people to work or to prepare them for future work needs. There is a vast 
literature on business, such as Levitan, (1976), Council (1979) Strans & Sayles 
(1972) ftnBell (1974) that can back this approach. We have dLvided this heading
into different
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categories (see Chp. 4) including entrepreneurs and managerial staff. 
Our intention has been to analyse if the labour market was prepared to 
supply the pole with those workers and also to find out the extent to 
which the arrival of the petrochemical industries has affected that 
market. After this overall study of the characteristics of the general 
supply and demand in the regional market, we passed on to analysing 
the specific requirments of each one of those categories.
III. BUSINESS POLICY
This research is about Business Policy in the first place, despite 
having topics such as human resource policies as sub-headings. Business 
policy here means the "key long- and short-term implications" of the 
establishment of the NPP (Rodgers, p.l). We are concerned with the 
overall strategy of that government headed scheme for the whole region 
and its components parts.
IV. HUMAN RESOURCE PLANNING
With this expression, we mean all those measures that directly affect 
people in close relation to the industrial pole. It comprises both the 
internal and external plan as defined in section 5.2. In this way 
we agree with Levitan's concept that jobs, manpower, education, training 
and welfare are all components of humain resources development programs 
(Levitan, p.537).
V. REGIONAL LINKAGES
As was first envisaged by Perroux (1950), the theory of the growth 
pole relies heavily on industries with high growth potential and regional 
linkages. The leading industry should buy its feed stocks from and sell 
its output to other industries within the same region. This creates a
In an underdeveloped area, where the manufacturing sector is very weak 
the management of the NPP might not find an easy task to fulfill this 
goal. There is a national tendency for industries to offer their products 
in the Sao Paulo market first, leaving other areas of very low income per 
head for marginal sales. If this tendency prevails, the whole philosophy 
of the pole breaks down.
It is a challenge for managers, the creation and finding of regional 
linkages for the output of the NPP. As in this research we are very 
concerned with the human resources policies, our intention is to show how 
those policies can affect for better or worse the formation of a regional 
grid of industries to support the NPP.
The direction of a growth pole requires much more from managers than 
a simple set of industries. First, they will need to have a twofold effort 
to run the business well - a scientific approach to manangement and a 
regional approach to development. How far can managers from areas other than 
the North East turn their backs on their original regions and behave properly 
in the management of the NPP?
The NPP is a planned, not a spontaneous pole, where managers are brought 
up within the community, know its values and problems, exert natural leader­
ship and are already linked to its social network system. In a planned 
pole, managers have to be trained for it, they are commonly recruited out­
side the area, are strangers to the local community. They must be above 
all professionals. How far can these professionals absorb the values and 
needs of the local community?
VI. INDUSTRIAL POLE AND COMPLEX
regional grid of industries..
"Industrial pole" here implies the whole complex of petrochemical
industries in the region plus other industries depending on it, hence we
generally refer to it as the NPP - North East Petrochemical Pole. On the
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pole, managers have to be trained for it, they are commonly recruited out­
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VI. INDUSTRIAL POLE AND COMPLEX
regional grid of industries..
"Industrial pole" here implies the whole complex of petrochemical
industries in the region plus other industries depending on it, hence we
generally refer to it as the NPP - North East Petrochemical Pole. On the
other hand, we reserve the expression "industrial complex" to designate 
the petrochemical industry settled at Camagari and surroundings. The 
complex is the core of those industries, which process the basic and 
intermediate petrochemical products (see chapter three) and are settled 
at the COPEC (see chapter one) which is also at Camagari.
VII. SOCIAL OBJECTIVES
"Business is not created in a vacuum". The discussion of the social 
objectives of industries are very often imprecise and subjective. We 
have restricted the limits of this heading to those quantitatively measur­
able aspects. The first limit is related to the geographical area. As 
the basic omplex is settled at Camagari, this research has concentrated 
its efforts on social changes which have taken place in Camagari. At this 
stage, it is virtually impossible to assess the effects of the pole in 
the whole region. However, we have tried to work on the perspective of 
increase in tax revenues, since they can be a useful instrument of social 
policies for the years to come. At least, it is possible to know whether 
the arrival of new industries will give the local community funds enough 
to tackle its new problems of immigration, housing, education, training, 
urbanisation and pollution to quote only a few of the whole range of social 
objectives.
We can hardly talk about business as being socially responsible if these 
problems are not solved. Our assumption is that an industrialisation 
project is worthless, if it is not capable of solving, at least, these 
problems it creates by its own presence.
Finally, we find that this is an open-ended research, as the less-than- 
three year old pole does not offer sufficient material for convincing 
conclusions. Nevertheless, this research has explored several points where
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the present policies can be criticised and new alternatives are proposed. 
Anyway, as the purpose of manangement science is not to give the last 
word on any subject, but to propose better solutions for specific problems, 
that is what we have tried to do.
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I.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with those characteristics of the North East that 
are important for the development of the petrochemical pole. The study of 
the region made us particularly concerned with the following pointss-
2(i) The North East with more that 1.5 m Kn seems to be too big an 
area for an industrial complex localised in a single point of 
its territory to have a major impact on all its territory;
(ii) A population around 33 million with a high rate of urbanisation 
and three major (each over 1 million inhabitants) metropolitan 
regions (including the metropolitan region of Salvador which 
includes the municipality of Cama^ari) does not indicate 
necessarily great economic advantages for the pole. Even the 
abundant supply of unskilled labour can only be an advantage 
when it is adequately combined with the skilled labour available;
(iii) Low consumption, low income per head, low level of literacy and 
poor quality of education, impoverished urban areas, the absence 
of straightforward linkages between the petrochemical industries 
and the traditional economic activities of the North East are 
prominent factors which militate against the success of the pole; 
whereas, the presence of hydrocarbons, other mineral feedstocks, 
the possibilities of establishing new economic linkages, the 
processing of raw materials in the North East are factors which, 
if well exploited, could bring enormous advantages for the 
regional development.
By breaking up the region into its component parts (see next page),
we have analysed the extent to which those environmental variables work 
against or in favour of the pole, which will help us in the building up 
of a strategy throughout this thesis for all those petrochemical segments
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that can well be adapted to the realities of the North East.
1.2. THE NORTH EAST
In geographical and administrative terms, Brazil is divided into 
twenty-two states (Estados), four Territories under the Federal Govern­
ment Jurisdiction and a Federal District, which are in their own turn 
subdivided into Municipalities. Those states and territories are 
grouped according to geographic, political and socio-economic similarities 
to form five distinct regions: the North, the North East, the South East, 
the South and the Centre West (see map). The petrochemical industry is 
settled mainly in the South East, North East (the recently built complex 
at Camacari) and in the South (Porto Alegre). From those regions, we 
are particularly interested in the North East region - and inside that 
region, the state of Bahia with its metropolitan region of Salvador, 
that includes the municipality of Camagari. In summary, we may present 
the following scheme:
Brazil Federal Government
States State s' Governments
Municipalities Municipal Governments
Regions No Regional Government.
(The States are grouped according to their geo­
graphical proximity and economic similarities to 
form regions - 5 in total - that have a Federal 
Government department for planning affairs gene­
rally. The first of those departments was 
'SUDENE' - the superintendence for the development 
of the North East.
North East 9 states, including Bahia
Salvador Capital of the state of Bahia
(Salvador together with another 7 municipalities, 
including Camagari, form the metropolitan region of 
Salvador)
Metropolitan Regions No metrolpolitan government, but different government
bodies or public enterprises with planning functions 
or with a role to coordinate government policies for 
the area.
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Brazil is approximately 8,511,965 km country, from which area the
2North East shares around 18% - 1,542,711km and contributes with 30% to 
the Brazilian population (see table 1.1).
Table n.1.1. Evolution of Brazil and North East Population since 1872.
2
Year Brazil North East
North East/ 
Brazil (%)
1872 9,930 4,539 46.7
1890 14,334 6,002 41.9
1900 17,438 6,750 38.7
1920 30,636 11,246 36.7
1940 41,236 14,434 35.0
1950 51,944 17,973 34.6
1960 70,967 22,427 31.6
1970 94,509 28,675 30.3
1975 * 107,145 32,032 29.0
1980 * 123,032 36,251 29.5
Source: FIBGE - Anuarios Estatiisticos do Brazil 
* Estimates
Having almost one-third of the Brazilian population, the North East 
shares less than 15.0% of the Net National Product. It is considered a 
problematic and extremely poor region, compared with the South East, 
a nearly developed area with good infrastructure, communications, roads, 
services and a well established industrial basis. By any index we use to 
compare the North East with the South East, the first appears as a poorer 
area. Its income per head is smaller; in immigration terms it is a net 
loser of population; the primary and secondary sector of its economy has 
more weight than in the South East etc.
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Diagram Mo. l/2 Growth of the Population of Brazil and worth East 
(Period 1^72 - 198G)
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The first point of colonial settlements, and, at the beginning of 
colonisation, the most developed part of the country, that region was 
stagnant for the most part of the last few hundred years. Furthermore, its 
economy has had a slower pace of growth than other parts of Brazil in 
the last years - 6.9% between 1960 and 1978 for the North East and 7.5% 
for Brazil.
Table n. 1.2. Growth rate of the GNP of the North East and of Brazil in 
in the period 1949-1978.
Year North East Brazil
1949-59 7.0 6.6
1961-62 5.0 CDr*
1963-67 6.4 3.2
1968-74 7.4 11.2
1975 7.4 5.6
1976 6.7 9.0
1977 8.2 4.7
1978 6.0 6.3
Source: Revista Economica do Nordeste, v.lO (2), 195.
That average rate of growth does not classify the North East as a 
stagnant region anymore, but as one growing poorer in relative terms. 
The North East is growing, but losing ground and position in relation, 
to the whole nation. In effect, recent studies by the Banco do Nordeste 
do Brazil (BNB), using data from FGV and FIBGE, has emphasised the con­
tinuous decline of the North East position in the Brazilian economy.
Diagram No. l/3 Growth Rates for 3raz.il and the north Hast
(a) Net Product - Indices: i960 = ICO
(b) Yearly Growth Rates
Source: Revista Economica do iiordeste, v. 10(2)
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Table n. 1.3. Domestic Income, Population and Income per head of the NE
as a percentage of the total for Brazil.
Variable 1949%
1959
%
1970
%
1978
%
Domestic Income 13.9 14.4 11.6 10.4
Population 34.6 31.6 30.3 29.6
Income per head 40.2 45.6 38.3 35.1
Source: Revista Economica do Nordeste, v.lO (2), 198.
This decline is due to several reasons that determine a pattern of 
economic behaviour in the North East very different from other Brazilian 
regions for a long time. This problem, however, was only really realised 
after the Second World War, according to Albuquerque (1976). Notwith­
standing this, efforts to bring under control one of the most serious 
sources of that stagnation go back to the last century with the attempt 
to counteract the effects of the long droughts which affect the traditional 
agriculture of the region (section 2.1).
1.2.1. SPATIAL ASPECTS AND COMMUNICATIONS
The diagram n.1.3. shows that the most important towns of the North 
East are just on the coast. Salvador, Recife and Fortaleza are the three 
major conurbations with population over 1 million people each. These are 
the three main markets and they are responsible for almost the totality 
of the industrial production. All but one of the nine States has its 
capital - that is also the most important town -on the coast. The exception
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- Teresina - a town of about 500,000 inhabitants in the poorest state 
of the region.
Transport is basically by roads. Being that the main cities are 
on the coast, shipment is also an open option for the transport of petro­
chemicals. There are ports at the main towns of all the states. The 
bottleneck of the transport system is the railways, that have old and 
narrow tracks and serve only a small number of towns through twisting 
routes. If there were better rail linkages between the main towns in 
the North East and also good connections with other regions in Brazil, 
many problems derived from the transport of goods could be abolished.
Apart from the cost of transport itself, there is also the problem of 
oil fuel used by trucks that contributes also to make hydrocarbons 
feedstocks even more expensive. For an initial estimate of the dimension 
of this problem, road distance from Salvador (second petrochemical pole) 
to Porto Alegre (third pole) is 3,065 km, to Sao Paulo 1,950 km, to 
Recife 835 km and to Sao Luis 1,645 km. All the states also have regular 
connections by flights of the Brazilian airlines, and the telecommunication 
system and the telephone network is of good standard in the main towns.
1.2.2. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
This extensive region, as we may expect, is not homogeneous in its 
physical and economic aspects. It represents a variety of climates and 
cultures, but the arid areas of its hinterlands from which periodical 
droughts have expelled millions of its inhabitants to other places in 
Brazil has assumed a major role in the planning process of the North 
East. We will return to this point in the next chapter, when discussing 
the Government policies in the area.
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In a variety of climates and soils, a development of distinct 
agricultural crops has been the economic basis of the area. Sugar 
cane, cotton, cocoa, tobacco, coconuts are among other important 
products in the export activities of the North East. Cattle have 
also had a major but less important function than the above commodities.
The extractive activities have acquired a prominent role after 
the discovery of oil in the State of Bahia. There are other mineral 
materials in the area which give these primary industries a bright 
prospective in the future. The existence of hydrocarbons and copper 
in Bahia, potassium and chloride in Alagoas, potassium in Sergipe and 
other minerals in the nearby states has given strength to the argument 
that this is a region with a natural base for the chemical industries 
and the most suitable location for the heavy chemical companies. It is 
a problem of defining if the best location of the petrochemical industry 
is near the consumer markets or the production areas. Due to the 
characteristics explained in chapter three, it is clear that the advantages 
of being near the production and refining areas are bigger than at the 
consumer markets, (section 1.2.4 and chapter 3).
In the 60's and 70's, agriculture remained static, while industry 
underwent a significant growth. The main efforts of State and Central 
Government were also directed to the manufacturing sector, the main 
reason why it experienced a disproportionate increase.
Despite its poverty, the export/import balance has been showing for 
a long time a positive result. Furthermore, the tourism industry brings 
each year thousands of people to the North East towns, beaches and 
festivals, especially Carnival. Despite these facts, the North East is 
always seen as a problematic area. People react saying that the truth 
is a continuous transfer of income from North to South. Moreover, the
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North East exports its products with an artificial rate for the dollar 
- low rates to allow industries, settled mainly in the South East, to 
import machinery - while it has to buy Brazilian manufactured goods 
that are much more expensive than similar products abroad. Regional 
development in this way is more complex them the economic development 
of a country. The latter can put barriers, tax the imports and even 
ban certain goods that are produced internally. This is not the case 
for the regions. It is not an usual practice to create customs between 
regions of the same country. Here a free competition benefits the region 
where industrialisation first takes place, in this case the South East.
It is in this background that the petrochemical pole of the North 
East was developed and against these poor economic performance that it 
is supposed to work.
1.2.3. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Notwithstanding the climatic adversities, agriculture is still a 
very important sector in the North East, responsible for about 20 to 
30% of the regional net income and two thirds of its labour force (BNB 
1978, p.243). If the importance of this sector has been declining in 
terms of income and of productivity, agriculture continues to be very 
important for its share of the labour force it employs.
Table n.1.4. Structure of Regional Income in North East and In Brazil
in 1949, 1959, & 1970. (%)
Area and year Agriculture Industry Services Total
North East 49 36.6 15.3 48.1 lOO
59 40.2 14.4 45.4 loo
70 19.4 15.1 65.5 lOO
Brazil 49 26.6 22.0 51.6 loo
59 20.8 27.7 51.5 lOO
70 11.2 30.4 58.4 lOO
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Source: FGV - Contas Nacionais in Revista Economica do Nordeste, 
v.10/2), 244.
Agriculture is the main source of the regional exports accounting 
for approximately 94% (BNB 1979, p.249) in the period 1960-75. Researchers 
are agreed that this is a crucial problem. Agriculture has low productivity 
because it is traditional and not mechanised and there is a lack of inte­
gration between it and the regional industries. Agriculture and industry 
have been developing with no attempt to build complementary links between 
a major agricultural commodity and an industrial sector, for instance,
between the culture of sugar-cane, tobacco, cocoa and cotton on one side and 
fertilizers, tractor industry on another.
(a) Linkages to the petrochemical industry
There is also no straight tie-up between petrochemical industry and 
a local agricultural crop, except to a possible development of a fertiliser 
complex based on oil feedstocks. In this respect, an alternative project 
to the petrochemical industry shows a stronger link. It is the alcohol 
chemical complex that can be settled in the North East based on the 
traditional sugar cane industry.
(b) Alcohol based chemical industry
An ethylene plant based on alcohol would revitalize the sugar cane 
industry, promote the creation of jobs on rural areas avoiding the 
traditional expelling of peasants and exerting a strong pressure for more 
productivity of this agricultural sector. There is a very slow movement 
towards these alcohol chemical industry with even close-down of some old 
plants of this industry in the South East to favour the petrochemical 
industry before the oil crisis of 1974. Even today the steps toward the 
alcohol chemistry are very weak and do not proceed on a steady basis.
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In effect, there are some comparative problems that deserve an initial 
solution for a more stable development of this industry - comparative costs 
with the petrochemicals, scale of the plants, and capacity of the agro­
industry to supply the chemical plants with the required amount of alcohol. 
The problem is that Brazil has no control on the price of oil, notwith­
standing the national production of gas and oil for the petrochemical pole 
in the North East (see 1.4). The main argument is based on the employment 
aspects as a result of the development of the alcohol-chemistry. That could 
compensate for eventual disadvantages.
The scale is the following problem. While the ethylene plant at 
Camacari is for 360,000 ton/year, the highest capacity plant based on 
alcohol in Brazil is 60,000 ton/year, which requires 60,000 x 1.72 tons 
of alcohol approximately. Could the agro-industry provide alcohol for 
higher capacities? At the short run, it is very difficult, but the country 
has sufficient land and the possibility to produce much more alcohol in 
the medium term. In a study about the expansion of alcohol production, 
the North East is said to be able to produce more them 2.1 thousand tons 
per year, which would result in 170,000 new jobs. Today, this estimate 
is considered pessimistic (SUDENE, 1976). As alcohol is being reserved 
for energy to replace oil for the reduction of the national import bill, 
there is no immediate need of a replacement of the petrochemical industry 
by alcohol-chemistry at any aspect. The road is open, however, for 
incentives and encouragement to this industry to adapt its technology to 
build alcohol ethylene plants with higher capacities, to provide alternative 
feed-stocks for the chemical industry in Brazil in the long run.
1.2.4. HYDROCARBONS
The main oilfields in Brazil are located in Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas 
and more recently new wells were discovered in the South East. Other 
oilfields were discovered in Rio Grande do Norte, also in the North East.
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In summary, the North East is responsible for more than 99% of Brazilian 
production of oil. Bahia is the main producing area with 86.5% in the 
period 1970-75, followed by Sergipe 12.5, Alagoas, 0.6% and Espirito 
Santo 0.4%. That production, however, important for the Brazilian economy 
is not sufficient for the internal consumption and the iiation is heavily 
dependent on the external markets importing about 2/3 of its needs. But 
the nation is self-sufficient in terms of refinery capacity.
Natural gas, the other important raw material for petrochemicals is 
found mainly in the North East that represents about 99% of the national 
production. Bahia and Sergipe are again the most important producing states. 
Taking the presence of the raw materials in the region and the national 
imports of these products, the logical economic location of the heavy petro­
chemical industry is naturally near the oilfields (see Chapter 3) . The so- 
called regional development flag as a political strategy to convince the 
Government to install the second petrochemical pole in the North East and 
not in Sao Paulo was only an euphemism to locate the pole where it should 
logically be. The regional objectives of that decision, however, are even 
more important in the face of this economic advantage and should be discussed 
to the fullest as we intended to do with some aspects of it in this thesis.
1.2.5. DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS 
(a) Relation between Brazil and the North East
In general terms, the whole picture of the North East population can 
be considered either as a problem or as an economic resource. As a problem, 
because it represents a population with low literacy, poor state of health, 
uneven distribution of wealth, low income and consumption and very weak 
productivity. As an economic resource because it can be converted into labour
for the market.
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Diagram No. l/5 - Urbanization Process of Brazil, the North East Region and
the State of Bahia, (proportion of the urban and rural
population).
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As a proportion of the Brazilian total, this population has been steadily de­
clining, but in absolute numbers it has grown from 18 mil. in 1950 to 32 mil. 
in 1975. The cities are the convergent points of that increase. The urban 
population is estimated to be around 47% against 34% in the Census of 1960.
The growth of these urban areas require extraordinary efforts to create jobs 
for thousands of men and women that enter the labour market each year.
Specialists on employment recommend measures towards the change of the 
social structure of rural areas, the creation of massive labour intensive 
industries among other policies.
(b) Urbanisation
The urbanisation affects not only the capitals of the states, but also 
many other cities around the coast, where the urban network of the North 
East has been developing. Even so the increase in population of the three 
metropolitan areas of the region has been abrupt. In approximately thirty 
years, all the North East capitals have trebled in population. Today the 
participation of the capitals in the urban and total population of its 
respective states is shown in table n.1.5. Fortaleza and Recife share more
than 60% of the urban population in their respective states and Salvador is
2responsible for 37.8 % in a state with 559,451 Km .
At first sight, it seems that this urban population is a favourable 
consumption market for an industrialisation program. This first impression 
vanishes when we analyze how this population is increasing, the infra­
structure problems, income per head and the general socio-economic conditions 
prevailing in these areas.
(c) Migration
Migration lies at the root of any serious study about population growth 
in the North East. Using data from demographic Censuses, a BNB paper has 
shown the net losses of the regional population. This migration is mainly
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from rural areas and small villages and towns to larger cities, inside or
outside the region, (see table n.1.6.).
Table n.1.5. North East: Share of the capitals in the urban and total 
population of their respective states 1975.
Total population 
in abs. numbers OOO's
Share (%)
Capitals State
population
Urban State 
population
Sao Luis 330 19.9 34.9
Teresina 290 14.5 41.3
Fortaleza 
Metropolitan area 1,317 25.8 60.4
Natal 344 18.2 37.5
Joao Pessoa 288 11.0 24.3
Recife -
Metropolitan area 2,153 36.8 63.3
Maceio 324 18.1 42.8
Aracaju 226 22.8 46.2
Salvador - 
Metropolitan area 1,401 16.6 37.8
Source: FIBGE - Anuario Estatistico do Brazil - 1978
That means that the region is losing population relative to Brazil as a 
whole even so it continues to grow. These facts must be considered at 
any program of regional development. Employment and new jobs are again
the dominant issue
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(d) Regional Income
Regional income is also running behind the national average. Income 
per head was Cr$ 634,58 in 1970 against, Cr$3,385.30 in Sao Paulo and 
Cr$ 1,644.02 in Brazil (BNB 1979, p.229). Furthermore, around 70% of the 
economically active population of the region had earnings equal or less 
than the minimum allowed in Brazil,(including those without earnings), that 
is inferior to U$100 a month. Other indicators of health, level of education, 
nutrition also point to a precarious picture of the socio-economic situation 
of the region.
(e) Literacy
In 1976, roughly half of the population five and more years old was 
illiterate; if we take the 15-39 year old age group that rate of illiteracy 
falls down to 36%, which is still high for a group of working age. A hope 
is that the enrolments in all the levels of education is increasing. In 
1974, there were 143,816 school leavers of the first level (9 years),
62,515 of the second (11 years) and 13,939 of the third level (University). 
These school leavers came from a network of 79,578 units of first level,
1,978 of the second level and 90 institutions of higher education, including 
14 Universities. These figures show an extremely low proportion of school 
leavers in relation to school units, and that a great proportion of students 
did not finish their courses. Apart from the.thousands of people who do not 
complete the basic level of education, the figures for higher levels, though 
a low proportion of the total population at schooling age, is theoretically 
sufficient for an area with few jobs for skilled labour. We will discuss this 
topic fully in the chapter on human resources. We are conscious that these 
global figures must be taken with caution since that qualification and the 
break-down of those numbers into the specialities of the school leavers are 
essential for an accurate understanding of the problem. For an introduction, 
however, these data are sufficient to show the environment where the petro­
chemical pole of the North East was settled.
(*) In 1970, US$ 1.00 = Cr$ 4.6 approx.
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(f) Economically Active Population
A quick analysis of the economically active population will give more 
light on the situation of the human resources in the North East (1970).
Table n.1.7. Economically Active Population of the North East in relation 
to earning levels (%)
Earnings Levels North East Sao
Economically ^ 
Active Population Total Rural Urban Paulo
Brazil
Those without earnings or 
with less than the official
% % % % «
minimum in Brazil 68.1 76.7 88.2 20.6 45.2
★Min. x 1 to min x 5 27.6 19.0 11.0 60.2 43.9
Min x 5 to min x lO 2.6 2.6 0.5 11.6 6.4
Min x lO to min x 20 1.2 1.1 0.2 5.2 3.0
More than 20 'minima' 0.4 0.5 - 2.3 1.3
Unknown 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Sub-total (?o) loo loo lOO lOO lOO
Total Economically Active
Population
(A) 11.6 m 8.8 m 39.8 m
Abs. Numbers
Total Population (B)
Abs. Numbers 22.9 m 16.9 m 78.1 m
a /b (%) 50.6 52.1 50.8
* Minimum The official minimum an employer can pay in Brazil.
Source: FIBGE. Anuario Eslatistico do Brazil - 1978
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That is a sad picture of poverty. The North East has more them /3 
of its economic active population without earnings or with less than the 
official minimum (around US$ 80.00 per month) in Brazil. Summing this 
group with those in the range of 1 to 5 'minima', we would get more than 
85% of the Economic Active Population.
Table n.1.8. Economically Active Population in relation to the total 
population of the North East, Sao Paulo and Brazil.
9
Area
Economically Active 
Population 
(A)
Total
Population
(B)
Relation 
A/B (%)
North East 11,591,000 22,879,000 50.6
Sao Paulo 8,791,800 16,875,000 52.1
Brazil 39,717,900 78,147,000 50.8
Source: FIBGE - Anuario Estatistico do Brazil - 1978.
1.3: BAHIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NORTH EAST
The state of Bahia is the frontier between the poor North East and 
the more wealthy South East. It is the biggest state of the North East, 
and most populated state in area and population. These points together, 
its wealth of natural resources and its tradition in Brazil as an important 
political, cultural and economic centre in the past reserve for that 
state a relevant role to play in the development of the North East. Although 
the state economy has until recently been based on the export of primary 
goods and on secondary activities - a situation that is common to the region
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as a whole - there are certain characteristics that are peculiar to Bahia 
alone. One of these is the fact that Bahia, thanks to the diversity of 
its climates and ecological conditions was able to develop several agri­
cultural products on a full scale. Examples of those are sugar, tobacco 
and more recently cocoa which helped to compensate for the decline of the 
sugar industry. As a consequence, Bahia became the leading exporting 
state in the region, and still retains this leadership with a current 
share of some 35% of the total value of exports from the North East.
Farming principally for the export market is still the mainstay of 
the states economy, in spite of the fact that many new industries have 
arisen.
1.3.1. Industrial Concentration in Bahia
An important aspect of the development of Bahia is the concentration 
in the Métropolitain area of Salvador (RMS) of population, investments, 
financial resources, employment auid income. Not only has the number of 
inhabitants of the area consistently grown at rates twice those of 
Bahia as a whole, accounting for 15% of the whole state at 1975, but most 
large companies in the secondary sector are situated there, accounting for 
over two-thirds of all urban employment calculated for the whole state in 
1970. The RMS, then, has been the^focal point for investments and develop­
ments since Petrobras*moved into its area and even more so since an industrial 
district was established in it. This may be explained by the following 
factors : -
(i) The size of Salvador with its market, population, urban services etc.
(ii) The availability of valuable raw materials such as oil, natural 
gas and others.
(iii) The presence of Petrobras, with its prospecting, production and 
refining activities.
* Federal Government owned oil company
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(iv) State Government investment in infrastructure (see 1.4 and 
1.5) .
(v) The policy of tax incentives (see 2.1)
Apart from these aspects of concentration, the recent industrial 
development of Bahia indicates a pronounced tendency towards the 
specialisation of the secondary sector established in RMS. The investments 
are, for the most part connected with the production of intermediate goods, 
and to a lesser extent, with capital and consumer goods. In the case of 
intermediate goods, chemical products are the most prominent.
1.4: THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF SALVADOR (RMS)
The RMS is composed of eight municipalities: Salvador, Lauro de Freitas, 
Simoes Filho, Sao Francisco do Conde, Itaparica, Vera Cruz, Candeias e Camacpari 
(diagram n.1.6). Together these units cover an area of 2.183 square 
kilometres and had a population of 1,147,821 inhabitants in 1970 (see table 
n.1.9). Their per capita income would be around US$ 400 about twice the 
average for the state, according to an estimate of an agricultural project 
developed for the region. The RMS has suffered a process of unequal 
development and still has marked disparities in its population services and 
socio-economic infrastructure. The municipality of Salvador, the fifth 
largest city in Brazil (with a population of 1,3 million inhabitants according 
to the 1975 IBGE estimate) is the most developed area. The establishment 
of industrial districts, however, has speeded up the development of the 
infrastructure services in other municipalities, notably Cama^ari. It has 
been shown that 50% of the places of employment and 70% of the urban jobs 
registered in Bahia are concentrated in this area. Seventy per cent of 
the industrial investments made in Bahia during the last few years(1976 - 
1979 approximately) were also made there.
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This concentration means that the RMS is expected to be able to offer 
infrastructural support, general services and an industrial environment 
to the new activities which are being created as a result of the Camacari 
Petrochemical Complex. Indeed, the area not only possesses to a 
sufficient degree of modern means of transport, basic services, communi­
cation facilities and electric power, but it also receives constant support 
from the urban centre of Salvador.
This vast metropolitan area is at an early stage of development, 
which can be seen as a two-fold problem. There is not a clear inter­
connection and interdependence in the services or planning process of its 
municipalities. In a technical sense, then, Salvador is hardly a metropolitan 
area. On the other hand, we can admit that this early stage of development 
gives room for a more rational planning in the long run. Salvador does 
not have the congestion, pollution, and other bottleneck problems common 
to these large urban areas. It has also a greater potentiality for future 
expansion, with large areas of land available, that makes feasible an 
orderly organization of its economic functions.
1.4.1. Industrial Districts in the RMS
The first attempt at integrating planning in the RMS was the Aratu 
Industrial District (CIA), covering a part of the municipalities of 
Salvador, Lauro de Freitas, Candeias and the whole of the municipality of 
Simoes Filho (diagram n.1.6). This Industrial Centre is of great 
importance to the newcoming petrochemical pole. The industries already 
settled within its boundaries can be a powerful factor in attracting 
other firms, thus contributing to the setting up of new plants, as to 
process the petrochemical output of the pole or to supply it with services 
or even eventual feed-stocks. The CIA is therefore a locational option 
for industries directly connected with the petrochemical centre.
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1.4.2. Petrobras Units
A further factor of special significance in the system of industrial 
support to the Camagari Petrochemical Complex is the Landulpho Alves 
Refinery (RLAM) of Petrobras, located in the RMS (Sao Francisco do Conde), 
35 km from the pole. With a capacity of 135,000 barrels a day, it is 
able to become the sole supplier of naphtha to the pole. RLAM has also 
an industrial complex composed of 16 units producing gasolines, kerosene 
(including aviation spirit), diesel, fuel and lubricator oils, paraffins, 
asphalt, solvents and propylene.
That refinery can pipe naphtha and gas oil to industries of the pole, 
and receive the petroleum derivatives, such as gasoline, oils, aromatics 
residues, pentane and others, which have their origin in the change­
processing section of the petrochemical industries and which are not 
consumed by them.
Finally, the part played by RLAM in training specialised personnel 
in petrochemical processes must be emphasised, for it has put at the 
disposal of the petrochemical pole facilities for recruiting and training 
labour for the construction and operation of its plants.
1.5. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAMACARI
The area of the petrochemical pole is wholly situated within the
2municipality of Camagari, the largest in the RMS (962 Km ; diagram n.1/6).
According to the 1970 Census, Camagari had at that time 33,273 
inhabitants, with 60% of them living in the urban zone. The administrative 
district had 15,625 and Dias D'Avila, its biggest district, 5,187 people.
With the exception of these two centres, the rural population was spread 
in other parts of the municipality, where the activities belong preponderantly 
to the primary sector. In 1974, however, nine large scale industrial plants 
were operating in the municipal area. They employed 4,225 persons and made
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up a total investment of (225 million dollars): two belong to the chemical 
industry, four to petrochemical, two to the beverage and one to non- 
metallic minerals.
The primary sector has a significant proportion of the population in 
the area, whereas services depend almost entirely upon Salvador. Locally, 
services are concentrated in the urban areas of Camagari and Dias D'Avila. 
The equipment for the social infrastructure of the municipality is at a 
low stage of development, especially in the domains of health and housing. 
Education is provided by the municipality and state. As for the health 
system, there are some medical and maternity clinics, although more 
serious cases are dealt with in Salvador. There are no National Health 
Service doctors or clinics, which means that these who have the right to 
public health benefits are obliged to go to Salvador to obtain them.
The low income level of the local community in contrast with the 
better financial situation of the floating leisurely population, mostly 
coming from Salvador, is reflected in the clear-cut differentiation 
in the type of housing and even of social habits. Thus, middle and 
lower-class housing predominates in the case of occupants settled in the 
municipality, while the better built and more comfortable houses which 
stand out as being of the middle and upper-class type are, as a rule, 
those built for seasonal occupation by summer visitors, specially in Dias 
D'Avila. This town also has a fair number of hotels, including some of a
high standard.
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Table n.1.9. Population of the North East, Bahia, the RMS and the 
Municipalities that comprise the area in absolute 
numbers (OOO's).
Population
Area
1970 1975
North East 28,112, 32,032
Bahia 7,493 8,448
RMS 1,147 1,401
Salvador 1,007 1,237
Camaqari 33 40
Candelas 34 41
Itaparica 8 9
Lauro de Freitas io 12
S.F. do Conde 21 25
Simoes Filho 22 26
Vera Cruz 12 11
Source: Census of Population - 1970, Anuario Estatistico do Brazil - 
1976 - FIBGE.
Having discussed the general characteristics of the North East, Bahia, 
the RMS and Carnapari, let us look more specifically on the existing 
conditions of the population around Cama^ari to analyze the quality of the 
human resources available to the industrial complex.
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1.6. HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE RMS
According to the data available, the population of the RMS show 
the following characteristics
a. Fast growing metropolitan population;
b. Young population on average;
c. Low level of education;
d. High centralisation in Salvador;
e. Low percentage of the economically active population.
1.6.1. A fast growing metropolitan population
The 1,147,821 inhabitants of the RMS in 1970 represent less than 4% 
of the total population of the North East and less than 15.3% of that of 
Bahia. Compared to the population in 1960 (734,076), there is an increase 
of 59.38% (62.92% for the urban population). Salvador has grown at an 
average rate of 4.9%. If this trend continues that region will double its 
population in less than 15 years time. Theoretically, Salvador will 
have more than 2.2 million inhabitants in 1985. The estimated population 
in 1980 is around 1,800,000.
The total population however, is not the best indication for the study 
of the labour force potential in a region. Data for the economically active 
population, the age groups of the population, the level of education,
migrations etc., should be brought in for a better explanation.
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Table n.l.lO. Residential Population of Brazilian Metropolitan Areas in 1970.
Resident Population
Metropolitan Absolute (OOO's) Relative (%)
Areas Total Urban Rural Urban Rural
Belem 656 606 50 92.4 7.6
Fortaleza 1,037 876 161 84.5 15.5
Recife 1,791 1,650 141 92.1 7.9
SALVADOR 1,148 1,077 71 93.8 6.2
Belo Horizonte 1,605 1,501 104 93.5 6.5
Rio de Janeiro 7,080 6,838 242 96.6 3.4
Sao Paulo 8,140 7,867 273 96.6 3.4
Curitiba 821 657 164 80.0 20.0
Porto Alegre 1,531 1,408 123 92.0 8.0
Source: FIBGE - Anuario Estatistico do Brazil - 1976.
Table n.1.11. Relative Growth of Brazilian Metropolitan Areas in the period 
1960-1970.
Metropolitan Areas
Relative Growth of Population (%)
Total Urban Rural
Belem 60.61 60.70 59.47
Fortaleza 60.90 76.12 9.15
Recife 47.04 55.29 - 9.50
SALVADOR 59.38 62.92 6.98
Belo Horizonte 83.36 92.84 6.98
Rio de Janeiro 42.77 52.23 - 48.15
Sao Paulo 71.27 97.86 - 64.86
Curitiba 63.45 73.95 31.28
Porto Alegre 50.96 66.13 - 26.50
Source: FIBGE. Censuses of Population 1960/1970
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Salvador does not have the highest growth rate for metropolitan areas 
in Brazil. Even so, an increase of 59.38% is very high for any city. 
Furthermore, the growth of the metropolitan area is extremely high if it 
is compared to the growth of the population of Bahia. During the period 
1960/1970, the city of Salvador had a populational growth of 53.6%; the 
RMS - 62% and the municipality of Camacari 12.3%. These growth rates 
are sufficient to create a lot of economic problems such as housing and 
employment shortages. This dynamism is due particularly to the balance 
of rural - urban migratory movements (table n.1.11 and 1.11.a). As the 
factors which attract the influx of migrants, who have been forced to 
leave the rural areas due to gross changes in production patterns or to 
droughts, are intensified in the present and near future, these strong 
growth rates tend to be kept up or even increased, notably with the imple­
mentation of the petrochemical pole at Cama^ari.
Table n. 1.11a Persons born outside the RMS by periods of living in the area
Census 1970
Time Living 
in the Area
TOTAL MEN WOMEN
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
Less them 1 yr 42. 12.6 19. 12.7 23. 12.6
1 year 22. 5.4 8. 5.6 io. 5.2
2 years 22. 6.8 io. 6.8 12. 6.6
3 years 18. 5.4 8. 5.4 10. 5.4
4 years 14. 4.0 6. 4.0 8. 4.1
5 years 15. 4.2 6. 4.1 8. 4.4
6/10 years 55. 16.5 25. 16.6 30. 16.4
11 years 152. 45.1 68. 44.8 84. 45.3
Not known 1 “ “ -
Source: Sinopse Estatistica do Brazil 1971
1.6.2. Age Groups
Census data of 1970 and estimates for 1975 point out that the population 
of the Bahia State and that of its RMS is predominantly of young people.
In effect, in 1970, out of the total population of the RMS 59.9% represented 
the under 25 bracket and 7.8% the 25-29 bracket. Thus, 70% of the population 
was under 30 years old. On the top of the age group pyramid, those above 
60 bracket share only 4.7% of the total population. Approximately, one- 
third of the population is in the group 25-59, which is an encouraging 
figure for an industrial complex which employs highly skilled technicians. 
Even with more than 40% of the population out of the labour market, we 
have more than 550 thousand people within the working age, what is theore­
tically more than sufficient for any industrial programme at the proportion 
of that being built at Camagari.
Table n.1.12. Resident Population of the RMS - 1970 by age groups.
ACE GROUPS MEN WOMEN
TOTAL
ABSOLUTE %
O - 4 88. 86. 174. 15.1
5 - 9 80. 79. 159. 13.8
lO - 14 66. 71. 137. 11.9
15 - 19 59. 71. 129. 11.3
20 - 24 54. 61. 115. 10.1
25 - 29 41. 48. 89. 7.8
30 - 34 35. 39. 74. 6.4
35 - 39 29. 34. 63. 5.6
40 - 49 43. SOI 93. 8.2
50 - 59 26. 31. 57. 5.0
60 - 69 14. 19. 33. 2.9
70 + 7. 13. 20. 1.8
Not known 1. 1. 2. 0.2
Total 544. 604. 1.148 loo %
Source: FIBGE, Census of Population 1970
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The data available confirm that there is a potential labour force at 
the RMS, but only a study of other characteristics of this population such 
as its level of education, health etc. can indicate the real state of that 
labour force.
1.6.3. Level of Education
Tables n.1.13 discriminates the total RMS population by its level of 
education. According to the 1970 Census, the most disappointing figure
was the 57.9% for illiterate and those with incomplete Primary School
(first level of education). Table n.1.13a shows the figure for illiteracy
(those who can neither read nor write) as being 26.5% which is still very
high. Now if the population in the age group 12-14 is taken, only 29.1%
has completed their primary school. Going up to those more than 25 years
old only 13.4% has finished high school (second level) and 3.2% has
achieved more advanced education. This percentage is even worse if the
whole population above 5 is taken into consideration. Thus, less than 2.0%
of this group has gone through a University course. These percentages
are very low, notwithstanding representing 14,778 University leavers and
105,452 people with high and upper-high school certificates.
The master plan of the NPP found that the increase in educational 
opportunities in the period 60/70 was a relevant fact for an assessment 
of the labour force and training needs for any major industrial program 
at Salvador. In fact as the industrial basis of the RMS is very weak 
everthing suggests that its qualifications and training of labour has 
kept up with the demand on the labour market. The manpower survey conducted 
by the Secretariat for Labour and Social Welfare (SETRABES) in 1967 showed 
that only an insignificant proportion of the economically active population 
engaged in industry had been recruited outside the state. Those recruited
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outside were generally people with advanced qualifications. In the chemical 
industry, the manpower recruited in Bahia represented 99.4% of the total 
number of employees with only 0.6% coining from other states. This infor­
mation, however, does not allow conclusions to be drawn about the present 
situation. It is possible that during the last years, the situation has 
changed with the advent of the large number of modern industrial plants.
An analysis of the educational network system will put further light on 
the understanding of the capabilities of the region to supply the labour 
force necessary for the pole.
Table n.1.13 .Resident Population with 5 years of age or more by age 
groups and level of instruction in the RMS. (1970)
TOTAL
Age Groups
Level of Instruction
Absolute
Numbers
within | 
the age j 
group % |
%lin relation 
[to total
All Ages Sub-TotalIlliterate 258,076 lOO 33.5
12 - 14 years
Sub-total
With Primary Instruction 
(completed)
78,768
22,908
lOO
29.0
10.5
3.0
27 years or Sub-total 431,020 lOO 56.0
more With Secondary school i]
With Secondary school II 57,729 13.4 7.5
With University (or 
similar ) degree 13,904 3.2 1.8
TOTAL 767,864 ioo% 100.0
Source : Censo Demografico 1970
Table n.1.14. Resident Population of the RMS over 10 years of
age by levels of instruction. Census 1970.
Total Men Women
Level of instruction
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
Total School leavers 343,619 42.1 167,222 44.4 176,397 40.2
Primary 4 years 223,389 27.4 107,422 28.5 115,967 26.4
Secondary I 4 years 56,775 6.9 29,060 7.7 27,715 6.3
Secondary II 3 years 48,677 6.0 20,810 5.5 27,867 6.4
University 14,778 1.8 9,930 2.7 4,848 1.1
Illiterate or with
uncomplete Primary 472,001 57.9 209,553 55.6 262,448 59.8
Instruction
Total 815,620 ioo% 376,775 ioo% 438,845 ioo%
Source: Sinopse Estatistica do Brazil
1.6.3. (a) Educational Network System
Salvador has several centres for the training and qualification of 
that industrial labour with an output of 1,318 school leavers in 1970, 
including 1,075 skilled manual workers, 95 technicians of the secondary 
school and 148 professionals with University courses. By 1976, the output 
of the secondary school went up sharply to 1,100 while the number of those 
who reached more advanced courses remained steady. It should be noted 
here that these figures include only those professions directly related 
to the petrochemical complexes in its operation and maintenance needs, 
such as chemists, electro-, chemical- and mechanical engineers (SME).
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Table n.1.15. Resident Population of the RMS with more than lO years of 
age by levels of education in 1970 (OOO's).
Level of Education
Total
Abs. %
Illiterates or with unfinished 
first level of education - (5 
years schooling) 472. 57.9
Persons with complete Primary 
School (first level) 223. 27.4
Persons with the 2nd level of 
Education (9 years) 57. 6.9
Persons with the 2nd level of 
Education (12 years) 49. 6.0
Persons with University degrees 15. 1.8
Source: FIBGE - Sinopse Estatistica do Brazil
As the pole was projected to create more than 15,000 direct jobs from 
which 70% (Waddams, Mercier and Delorme 1976) should be related to posts 
of operation and maintenance of the industrial plants, the output of the 
educational system network will not be very short of that figure if we 
consider the stock of unemployed people in the area. This latter group, 
however qualified they are, would require more training. There are hopes 
that the availability of jobs would increase sharply the number of people 
wanting to finish their formal education. The rate of drop-outs - in many 
courses it is around 90% - plus the continuous process of narrowing down 
the number of school leavers as we advance in the education pyramid are 
still a serious problem for the development of a suitable labour force in
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the RMS. A suggestive example is described below:
Total population of the RMS in 1970 
Persons who finished the Primary School
1,147,821
(5 years) 343,619
Persons with 9 years schooling 
Persons with 11 years schooling
56,775
(secondary school) 48,677
Persons with University or similar degree
School leavers with technical qualifications 
related to the operation and maintenance of
14,778
the petrochemical pole 243
Source : FIBGE - Census - SME
1.6.4. Economically Active Population
The 1970 Census shows that from the total economically active population 
of 355 thousand, over 55.5% had earnings less than CR$200,00 and 20% earned 
less than Cr$400,00 a month. This means that over three quarters of Salvador 
economically active population had very low wages.
Table n.1.16. Resident Economically Active Population with 10 years of age 
or more by monthly earnings (1970).
Monthly earnings 
Cr$ (cruzeiros)
up to 200 
201 - 400 
401 - lOO 
1,000  +
Total including those 
without earnings and 
with no declaration 
of earnings
Total
Absolute (OOO) Relative (%)
197.2 55.5
72.9 20.2
45.0 12.7
21.8 6.1
355.1 100 %
Source: Anuario Estatistico do Brazil, 1976 and Master Plan
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(a) Job Ratios
The RMS population is mainly employed in the services sector (tertiary) 
and the number of jobs in the primary sector is negligible. The study on 
the distribution of jobs by the different sectors showed that the ratio 
of secondary plus tertiary sector jobs to total jobs was 95.57%, that is 
almost the totality of the employed people in Salvador is in these two 
sectors. The ratio of secondary to tertiary sector jobs was 41.62% which 
indicates the dominance of the service industry in the area.
(b) Skilled/Unskilled Labour Ratio
At first glance, it looks that the labour supply of unskilled workers 
in Salvador wculd offer no difficulty at all. Considering similar problems 
Hirshman (1958), Myint (1964), Baer (1974) suggest that shortage has 
influenced businessmen to opt for a capital intensive approach in the 
industralisation program in developing countries. For instance, "the choice 
depends not only on two selected factors (labour and capital), but on a 
variety of other things, notably the third main factor - skilled labour.
Many underdeveloped countries suffer from a greater shortage of skills than 
of material capital, so that they sometimes prefer more expensive machinery, 
which reduces repairs and maintenance, to cheaper or second-hand machinery 
which, although it might reduce the ratio of capital to unskilled labour, 
requires a larger amount of the scarcest factor, skilled labour" Myint (1964). 
Baer argues that the facilities to transform raw (unskilled labour) into 
skilled labour are limited (e.g. possibilities for on-job-training, 
vocational schools, etc), which makes the supply of skilled labour inelastic 
in the short run (Baer 1965).
Furthermore, skilled and unskilled workers alone are unproductive.
What makes them efficient is the exact proportion skilled/unskilled labour 
any industry requires, that is to say that some skilled workers are needed 
for a given unit of unskilled workers.
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Baer's argument was that in the supposition that for 10 unskilled 
workers we need 1 skilled worker and "if we have lOO unskilled workers 
in the economy and 5 skilled workers, the effective supply of unskilled 
workers is not lOO but 50" (Baer, 1965,p.99). On the other hand, if 
the number of skilled workers exceeded lO, the effective supply of un­
skilled workers would be lOO.
Following those arguments, the effective supply of unskilled labour 
will probably be noticeably smaller than the absolute supply due to the 
scarcity of skilled labour. This would lead again to higher unemployment.
As in the petrochemical industry the proportion skilled/unskilled labour 
is very high, this will reduce considerably the very demand of unskilled 
labour for the petrochemical units of Camacari. This means that if the 
petrochemical industries could not manage to get skilled workers, they 
would not employ unskilled labour either. Thus, the effective employment 
of unskilled workers is also a function of the absolute number of skilled 
workers employed in the industries.
We can resume our arguments saying that the size of the unskilled 
population in the RMS does not mean effective labour for the pole, since 
the needs of the pole are for skilled labour and the ratio skilled/unskilled 
labour in petrochemical is very high (see chapter 3). As substitution of 
unskilled for skilled labour is difficult in petrochemistry and the tendency 
is for the substitution of technology for labour it is likely that the 
presence of this huge unskilled population will not affect the manpower 
structure of the industries. The employment of unskilled labour will 
surely depend on the amount and quality of skilled manpower for the pole.
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1.7. CONCLUSION
The extension of the region together with its infrastructure charact­
eristics lend support to our claim that the North East is too big an area 
for an industrial complex localised at a single point in its territory to 
have a major impact on the whole region.
Even admitting that the North East is a logical location for the 
petrochemical industries due to the presence of raw materials and other 
mineral resources also used in petrochemicals, these industries are not 
complementary to the traditional economic activities of the area, the 
reason why their linkage network in the region is very weak.
Despite having around 32 million inhabitants, the North East has a 
population with low literacy, low income per head, low consumption and 
productivity, what is not an encouraging factor for large scale industrial 
projects. This population is having a process of fast urbanisation, specially 
with the growth of its three major metropolitan regions, making, then, 
employment and the creation of new jobs a dominant issue in the planning 
efforts. These facts will also exert pressure on the implementation of the 
basic petrochemical complex and on the transformation industry, based on 
petrochemical feedstocks.
In effect, the concentration of population and services seem to turn 
the RMS into an area theoretically capable of absorbing the establishment 
of a large scale industrial project. Furthermore, the presence of hydro­
carbons on the spot makes this argument even stronger. More profound study 
of the available human resources, however, indicates that those supposed 
advantages are not so strong as they could appear at first sight. The RMS 
having little experience in this huge industrial developments, with more 
than 50% of its population under 20 years of age, a rate of illiteracy over 
50% of the economically active population and less than 2% of it with 
higher education (University degrees), the prospects are for some difficulties
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in relation to the human resources policies for that industrial complex.
These insights into the economic background of the region indicate 
that the pole must overcome these present weaknesses related to the poor 
supply of jobs, to its poor linkages with the regional economic activities 
and to the quality of the regional human resources, if it wants to be an 
effective tool for regional development and to attain its social objectives.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, we were concerned with the environmental issues 
capable of having a straightforward influence on the development of the pole. 
Here we are dealing with successive attempts made by the region to coordinate 
those environmental issues, overcome the difficulties for its development 
and set a pace for industrial growth, which means that this chapter deals 
with the North East experience of regional planning.
When discussing this topic the following points have come out:-
(i) First of all, we have introduced a discussion on growth pole
theory to find out if the petrochemical industries are properly 
fitted to exert the role of a catalyst for the development of 
the North East. Can they create that wide network of linkages, 
an industry needs to become a pole?
(ii) There have been different attempts for the industralization of 
the North East, whose economic results are usually accepted as 
not being good enough to change the nature of the regional 
economic structure, notwithstanding having raised substantially 
the regional industrial output. Can these new policies for 
large scale projects make a break-through? On analyzing the 
'Government action in the North East' our aim is to verify 
whether the present stage of large scale industrial project 
is a logical step derived from the development experiments in 
the region or an entirely new kind of venture?
(iii) What kind of contribution can this new pole make to the regional 
development? How can it fit into its social objectives in 
practical terms?
Here comes the classical controversy over the role of business in society 
and its so-called social responsibility, a concept very often negatively
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defined. It is thought, generally, that the social duty of business is not to cause 
further trouble to the community in which it is established, such as not 
to produce any kind of pollution, not to waste local resources with unfair 
use, not to bring more social or economic disruption into the community.
A positive approach would state that social responsibility deals with 
"the respect the" companies must show to the local community, and also 
with the provision of an effective contribution to the community and its 
standard of living. Writing about a well-known case of planning for an 
industrial growth pole — the iron-steel complex of Guayana - Friedman was 
very careful in advocating policies which could not only raise the economic 
production of the area, but also its general standard of living, its structure, 
customs, education etc (Friedman, 1976, p.210). The same is valid for 
Camacari. We firmly believe that a major contribution the pole could 
make to the region is an improvement in the structure of human resources 
such as the raising of an entrepreneurial class in the area, an improvement 
in the general educational levels as well as the crafts and skills which 
could provide the population with wider employment opportunities. As these 
are major problems of the region, it follows that a defeat of those obstacles 
can be in fact a major achievement. The point is to verify if the pole is 
managed in that direction.
We are very conscious that these questions of social objectives are an 
endlessly discussed subject. We also acknowledge the existence of those 
who advocate that social objectives are for government not for business 
(Elliot,1975). Even on this hypothesis, the NPP is a government headed 
project, whence we stress again our belief that the pole has social committ­
ments which must be fulfilled, and must have a strategic priority.
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2.2. Growth Pole Theory
The expression was introduced by Perroux who defines growth pole as 
"centres from which centrifugal forces emanate and to which centripetal 
forces are attracted. Each centre being a centre of attraction and 
repulsion has its proper field which is set in the field of all other 
centres" (Perroux,1950, p.27).
Later, geographers, economists and other social scientists have 
given the expression a geographical conotation. The initial concept, 
however, did not imply all these new variations of sense. As Darwent put 
it "poles are best regarded simply as sectors of an economy represented 
by an input-output matrix in which growth effects can be transmitted across 
the rows and colums" (Darwent,1969). Growth in the matrix is directly related 
to the activity of the poles themselves, and also the degree of interconnection 
between them. A condition of 'dominance' of many firms by one firm (or of 
many industries by one industry) is an important feature of the growth pole 
•»notion. 'Dominance' is said to occur when the flow of goods and services 
from industry J to industry X is a greater proportion of J's output than 
is the flow from I to J of I*s output. (Darwent). There is also 'dominance' 
when 'I has to buy raw materials to sell its products to J with no other option.
'The dominance is directly related to the size of the industry, since 
the bigger it is, the larger will be its field of dominance over other 
industries which sell to it or buy from it' (Darwent, p.6). Growth poles, 
then, are characterised by (a) larger size firm(s) that has (ve) a dominant 
role; (b) high degree of interaction with other firms and (c) a high level 
of innovations (Darwent 1969, p.6; Hermansen 1972). The rate of growth or 
change is directly related to the size of the industry. Perroux used the 
word 'propulsive' to express this dominance and leading role. This term 
indicates that the dominant industry is also capable of giving rise to 
other peripheral units to be placed under its shade.
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A simplified scheme of the pole idea:
IC - Industrial Complex based on the propulsive industry 
* * Other industries
<----♦ Flow of Goods.
As it is shown the propulsive industry is not designed to 
export its production, or to import raw materials, but to buy raw materials 
locally and sell it3 output to other industries, which can transform them 
for the local markets or for exports
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There are industries which lie perfectly on the Perroux's concepts.
A good example is the chemical industry that buys its inputs mainly from 
other industries and sell> its output to different manufacturers. The 
industry versus industry matrix relates the relationships between six 
kinds of chemical industries (General Chemicals, Dyestuffs and Fertilisers, 
Synthetic resins. Plastics Material and Synthetic Rubber, Pharmaceutical 
chemicals, detergents, toilets preparations, soap, other chemicals, plastic 
products) to all other industries in a developed economy. That gives a 
clear idea of all the linkages that can be drawn from a chemical industry.
As petrochemicals account for over 90% of the chemical industry we can 
interpret that industry x industry matrix as an indication of the value of 
the petrochemical pole idea. Petrochemical industries can in fact form 
a growth pole in Perroux's sense (tables n.2.1. and 2.5.).In fact, Perroux finds 
that petrochemical industries had the required characteristics to be a 
growth pole in France at the time of his studies (Perroux 1968, p.243).
2.2.1. Literature on Growth Poles
An advantage of the large literature on growth pole is that it covers 
both developed and underdeveloped economies, industrial and non-industrial 
projects. In fact, Perroux used the chemical dye industry and its close 
relation to textiles in Lyon to explain the development of peripheral units 
in small towns and rural areas in France with the appearance of new petro­
chemical industries as well. Aydalot commentated that the gas resources in 
Lacq in South West France created an expectation of development, but no 
major change occurred since the gas was used basically for heating and 
for other uses outside the area. There was, however, an industrial enclave 
around the gas prospective area. A relatively successful experience with 
growth poles one of which is based on the petrochemical industry can be seen 
at Huelva in Spain (Lasuen 1967, 1969, 1973).
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Many researchers point out, however, poor results of growth poles in 
different areas throughout the world: Mosely (1976) - rural areas 
of East Anglia/England and Britanny/France; Misra (1973)/Indi'i. Katzm°ri 1976) & 
Boudeville (1957)/Brazil, ISabogunje (197lYliigeria & Frisdman(l966) proposes a 
different but similar model (Centre-Periphery) in Venezuela, while Coraggio 
sees a need to revise the theory.
Anyway, by the time the Brazilian petrochemical poles were founded, 
studies on growth poles had already achieved an advanced stage. What is 
left to be known is the extent to which the policies adopted could turn the 
NPP in to a real spring of development for the whole North East region.
2.3. GOVERNMENT ACTION IN THE NORTH EAST
2.3.1. The North East and Brazil Development
The North East has been running behind Brazil in terms of growth and 
development, as it was explained in the previous chapter. This may be 
attributed to several reasons, and efforts of different kinds were endeavouring 
to solve that problem. Besides the respective actions of each one of the 
State Governments, the Federal Government had also adopted a series of 
measures to counterattack that unbalance. Those measures can be summarised 
by the specific behaviour of the government bodies, specially created for 
that purpose. They are the DNOCS, a national agency for works against the 
droughts - the CHESF - the hydro-electric company of the River Sao Francisco, 
the CODEVASF - the Development Company of the Sao Francisco Valley, the 
SUDENE - a federal agency for the development of the North East.
2.3.2. Drought Control
Since the last century, the Government took action directed to control 
the effects of the droughts, with policies of supporting to those scourged 
by their effects. Afterwards, they began the building of engineering works,
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such as dams, wells, roads to retain water at the area and 
to improve communications. These works had, at least, the effect of 
providing jobs for thousands of unemployed peasants left without jobs as 
a consequence of the long droughts. These government actions remained 
through the years and the government used to open several works, generally 
roads and dams, to provide jobs for those people up the present time. The 
DNOCS, then, the Government Agency responsible for the implementation of 
those policies, is frequently identified as a body of large projects, 
that seldom produced important results as to control the effects of droughts 
which still occur. Its works, however, provide temporary relief for the 
sufferings of thousands of people, that, otherwise, would probably join 
other migrants to the littoral towns.
2.3.3. CHESF and CODEVASF
The next two Departments - CHESF and CODEVASF - are an attempt to 
develop the River Sao Francisco, that cross the State of Bahia just on its 
arid region and also to build an hydro-electric dam (Paulo Afonso) to 
produce energy to the whole North East. Many people, today, attributed 
to Paulo Afonso the start of industrialization in the North East. In 
fact, Paulo Afonso is a hugh dam, built on rocks of a waterfall, producing 
electricity and serving together with other small hydro-electrics the 
whole of the North East region and other places. It solved the problem of 
energy making possible the implementation of industrial plans at the region. 
The RMS receives its energy from Paulo Afonso that has a special line to 
Camagari. CODEVASF was responsible for all other works at the San Francisco,, 
apart from energy, with a role of functions very similar to that of the TVA 
in the United States. However, both CHESF and CODEVASF due to their large 
scale projects have had indirect effects on Camacari. We will come back
11-10
to this point again later on when dealing with migration to Camagari.
The most influential bodies for the North East development are, 
however, the BNB (the Bank of the North East) and SUDENE. These are units 
founded with the specific purpose of promoting development.
2.3.4. The Barnk of the North East (BNB)
The BNB (Banco do Nordeste do Brazil) was also an Institution created 
to control and to manage a national fund against the droughts, but with a 
philosophy that went beyond the limits of engineering works to make a whole 
economic appraisal of the region. That is one of the reasons why it grew 
to be a leading bank in Brazil today. At the beginning, it used funds 
coming from the Central Government - the Constitution of 1946 reserved at 
least 3% of its tax income for socio-economic assistance investment in the 
North East. That was abolished and the bank was, then, object of different 
policies of the Central Government. Today, the main source of funds come 
from the Central Government and from a system of tax incentives given to 
companies wanting to settle at the region and also to individuals wanting 
to apply part of their income tax - that otherwise they would be obliged 
to pay to the Government - to projects located in that region. This system 
is called 34/18, named after the number and paragraph of Law and afterwards 
FINOR. Some companies of the pole and other consumer-end industries 
received funds from that system.
2.3.5 SUDENE
Sudene (Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), created in 
1959, was the logical result of all the economic development efforts made 
before. In fact, the Government had already perceived the enormous problems 
of the North/South gap in Brazil, and much more than an agency to fight 
drought effects and an official bank to transfer Government expenditure at
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the region was needed.
(a) GTDN's Proposals
By the end of the 50's, the first global and persistent attempt to 
analyze the peculiar relations between the North East and the rest of 
Brazil was made. A group (GTDN) produced a paper where the whole North 
East problem was discussed, its origins identified and solutions proposed. 
The GTDN searched for possible solutions to the stagnation of the region 
and proposed a package of policies in which the role of planned industrial­
ization was stressed to counterface the inefficiency of the indigenous 
and traditional industries. It suggested the creation of an autonomous 
centre for the expansion of industries tnrough the increase of industrial 
investments. The stated objectives of those industrial policies were the 
absorption of great number of unemployed and underemployed people in the 
newly created manufacturing jobs. The strategy to achieve those objectives 
was the reorganisation of the whole industrial sector of the region, the 
rationalisation of business methods and the creation of new companies with 
modern management techniques. The GTDN work, however, did not specify the 
means to achieve the new managerial power necessary for that task. The 
installation of an industrial park by its own would not have been sufficient 
for the upsurge of a new managerial class, well suited for the management 
revolution the region needed.
(b) SlIDENE's Master & Development Plans
To deal with the proposals put forward by the GTDN study, the Federal 
Government reorganised the structure for the North East, created the SUDENE 
and gave it the responsibilities of carrying out GRDN's suggestions and 
of producing general plans for the social-economic recovery of the region. 
During the sixties, Sudene produced four Master Plans and two development 
plans (table n.2.2) but where the policies defined by GTDN were never fully 
observed, according to Albuquerque (1976) Goncalves (1978).
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Table n .2.2. Use of Resources in Sudene's Master and Development Plans (%)
PROGRAMS & SUISENE'S MASTER PLANS DEVELOPMENT PLANS
SUBPROGRAMS 61/63 63/65 66/68 68/70 1972/74 1972/79
Infrastructure 60.9 49.4 37.4 37.5 28.9 8.8
Social Services 
& Community 13.5 22.0 29.9 23.3 19.8 41.7
Natural Resources 7.9 9.3 7.8 9.6 1.7 0.2
Primary Activities 14.4 14.1 17.9 20.5 17.5 9.8
Colonisation 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.9 28.5 0.4
Industry 1.4 3.0 5.4 5.4 3.3 29.7
Others - 0.5 - 1.8 0.3 9.4
TOTAL loo% loo% ioo% loo% ioo% ioo%
Source: Sudene - Pianos de Desenvolvimento em Albuquerque, p.73.
Ever since the first plan, Sudene has come through many difficulties 
especially the lack of sufficient funds to carry out its mission, particularly 
after the reorganization of the Federal system of planning. The funds 
originally destined to Sudene were progressively diverted to other purposes 
with the respective losses for the NE regional programs. That means that economic 
resources that should be normally be used at the North East were applied in 
other areas. This technical problem has been constantly denounced at all 
levels, but it seems that there is no political will to solve it.
(c) Appraisal of SUDENE'S Performance
The proposals made by the GTDN - industrialization, reorganization of the rural
sector, and training and formalism of skilled labour are well believed to lx? valid
up to now. That leadr. us to think that the problem of the NE is not exactly
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a lack of knowledge of effective technical solutions to the problems of the 
region, but the inability of the Government to take the right decision 
What happens is that Sudene is only an Agency dependent on the whole 
structure of the Government. A lot of criticisms that were made of its 
performance in the North East can be understood in the light of the whole 
government structure. The criticisms were made at many grounds:
(i) that it overstressed the role of industries at the 
expenses of agriculture;
(ii) that it helped the swelling of the two biggest North East 
conurbations - Recife and Salvador;
(iii) that the industries it created did not provide many jobs for 
the unemployed and underemployed workers as was envisaged 
in the GTDN plan.
2.3.6. New Approach to Planning in the 70's
(a) New Planning Policies
In the seventies, the Federal Government opted for different approaches 
for the development of the North East. The Secretaria do Planejamento 
(Secretary for Planning and Economic Coordination, a national body at the 
Ministerial level) centralised all regional plans in Brazil. The decline 
of SUDENE at that time was evident. It continued to exist, but with less 
power and responsibilities than hitherto. This shift of policies was 
intended to centralise in only one Agency all the decisions of regional 
development, its main programs and investments. The regional Agency became 
an operational unit to carry out the policies decided by the central 
government. The autonomy of SUDENE and other similar Agencies was removed. 
Planning was again back to the Central Government, releasing SUDENE from
its main tasks for which it was created.
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(b) Large Scale Projects
Two factors of particular importance for the region were introduced 
in that change of policies. The first was the reorganisation of the whole 
Brazilian Planning System, with centralised units (Secretaria do Plane- 
jamento) and Regional Agencies for the implementation of Central Plans.
The second one was a new association of the Government with large scale 
project ideas. It was thought that the concentration of economic resources 
into special sectors would promote the regional development plan. The 
second PND (National Development Plan) is full of references to those programs 
and the government again gives priority to the industrialization of the 
North East. The NPP is only a part of the Federal Government strategy for 
the North East.
At the time of the first Master Plan of the pole, beginning of the 
Seventies, there were hopes that the region was recovering from that long 
decline due to the new government industrialisation plans. The region has 
benefited from the mechanism drawn to the transfer of industrial investment 
into the area. The economy had an average rate of growth of 6.82% from 
1960 to 1970, which was a little better than the Brazilian performance as 
a whole. That growth has been attributed to the development of the 
industrial sector, which has grown much faster than the nearly stagnant 
agriculture. Since 1968, however, the pace of growth of the North East had 
slowed again (Table 1.2, diagram 1.3). The new idea at that time was to 
give industries with strongly vertical and horizontal linkages, such as 
petrochemical, top priority to settle down in the area.
(c) Appraisal of Industrialisation Policies
There is no doubt that the arrival of those industries has brought new 
blood to the industrial sector in the North East (see 1.2.2 and 2.4). The 
problem now seems to be the ability of the present magnagement to expand those
plants and to set up the broad linkages the government want to create.
There is also no doubt that the tax on the output generated by those 
industries will boost the regional budgets (see Chapter 6.5). The availa­
bility of financial resources, on the other hand, will not be sufficient 
for the social objectives of the installation of the North East pole.
The presence of industries about does not mean development. Development 
requires a reduction in the level of poverty, better distribution of 
wealth, while these new industries may result only in the increase in 
production and productivity due to its nature. Large scale industrial 
projects do not lead necessarily to a self sustained manufacturing economy 
and the growth of the revenue derived from tax collection has proved an 
inefficient instrument to tackle the problems of inequality between different 
regions of a country.
A parallel project on the development of the local human resources 
is an essential task to drive those industrial projects into a healthy 
business structure. That would require much more effort from the Government 
than the single establishment of the pole.
In the Master Plan of the NPP, it was emphasised that the way to close 
the regional gap in Brazil could be achieved only if "the industrial sector 
continued to expand and if it achieved the necessary transformation of its 
production structure". Concern with employment or with other socio-economic 
conditions are not as strong as the emphasis on production. At that time, 
the objective was to keep an overall economic growth rate above 10% for the 
region, while Brazil was running at a 9% increase. It argued also for a 
fast urbanisation process in the region which will certainly require a 
broader development of industries.
The Master Plan did not mention how the complex could be of benefit to 
that fast regional urbanisation, especially, realising that the pole would 
be settled at a single point of a vast region. Anyway, the option for those 
big projects were made and based on the hopes of a major contribution for
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2.4. INDUSTRIALISATION POLICIES FOR THE NORTH EAST
(a) Periods
The industrialisation process of the North East according to Gongalves 
(1978), can be divided in four periods.
(i) Traditional industries that precede the planned industrial­
isation program of BNB and SUDENE; before 1960.
(ii) Modernisation of the traditional industries - just after the 
creation of Sudene; 1959 - 1965.
(iii) New industries - small and medium units in tneir majority; (1965-70).
(iv) Large scale industrial complexes that is the present program: present
The evolution of North East industries from 1949 to 1974 is given at 
table n.2.3. There we can see very easily the dynamic sector of industries 
had grown faster than the traditional one. That indicates a little success 
in terms of bringing new industries into the area. In our case, it is of real 
importance the growth of the chemical industries from 5.6% in 1949 to 18.6% 
in 1974. Their growth after 1974 is even higher due to the installation
of the complex at Camagari.
(b) Industrial Complexes
Some of these new industries came in just to take advantage 
of the incentives, but did not have any other linkages with the area, 
being completely dependent on the will of their parent companies in other 
regions. It is not surprising that their rate of close-downs was quite 
high. That is one of the reasons why Government policies change at the 
region to back the installation of industrial complexes, instead of single 
factories. It was supposed that the advent of integrated complexes could
the regional development.
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Diagram N. 2/l - Evolution of the dynamic and traditional industries 
in Brazil and in the North East. (#)
Sources Table n. 2/3
The diagram shows that the evolution of the dynamic industries was 
more acentuated in the NE (49-8/13.5) than in Brazil as a whole (64.6 / 
36.1). By 1974, the dynamic sector had approximately 50# of the value of 
the industrial production in the NE.
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put an end to the isolation of industries that were forming into the region. 
Those complexes had theoretically the capability to bear new industries 
that would be aggregated to them in a manufacturing web , in the 
form of growth poles. It remains to be known the extent to which those 
larger scale industrial complexes would be strong enough to grow and 
spread roots in the area, to make a broad network linkages of industries.
These industrial complexes, however, would not solve the other criticisms 
made of the industrialisation proposed by SUDENE or by the Brazilian 
Planning Authorities, namely, the lack of jobs and the development of the 
region. In fact, the tax incentives system by reducing the cost of capital 
was conducive to the establishment of industries which used the very scarce 
factor of the region rather than industries which might use the excess of 
labour, and thus contribute to a positive socially responsible policy.
(c) Tax Incentives
With some changes during its history, those incentives were mainly an 
allowance given by government to firms and afterwards to individuals 
consisting of an reduction in the income tax to those wanting to invest in 
the North East. As the amount of investments grew, the pressure to extend 
the system to other areas increased at the same proportion, making the 
North East lose the exclusivity of those incentives. The results were a 
drastic reduction in the amount of investment that has directly affected 
the availability of money for the industrial complexes in the region.
In this situation, it is easy to understand Sudene's claims that it 
has not done more because of the lack of financial resources. Furthermore, 
part of those meagre funds were allocated at the industrial complex at 
Camacari, that is a national rather that a purely regional priority. Other 
poles such as the one being built in Rio Grande do Sul is being made with 
Federal and private resources. Without discussing the right and wrong of 
the application of Sudene's funds at Camagari, one may admit that it
11-20
diverted resources from other priority areas to Cama<pari, whence the 
responsibility of that complex to extend its benefits beyond the frontiers 
of the Municipality and to the State of Bahia and the whole North East is 
even higher.
Table n.2.4. Evolution of the Tax Incentives by areas of Application (%)
Year North East Others
1962 100.00 _
1964 91.8 8.2
1966 82.9 17.1
1968 64.5 35.5
1970 54.0 46.0
1972 24.1 75.9
1974 23.9 76.1
1976 21.8 78.2
Source: Revista Econ. Nordeste, voi. IO (2)
2.4.5. Large Scale Industrial Policies in the North East
(a) Managing large scale industrial complexes 
in undeveloped regions
The management of a large scale industrial project such as the NFP would 
certainly raise the question of the first priorities of business. Should 
those complexes be developed as competitive units in conditions not only of 
supplying the region with petrochemical products but also of facing 
competition in other markets and from other industries outside the area? How 
can this be achieved without endangering the stated development of the region 
badly needing more jobs and more even distribution of wealth?
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Diagram No. 2/2 Distribution of the Tax Incentives originally scheduled 
for the NE.
1
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It is churlish but also frequent for industrial companies going into 
development areas to forget the original objectives for which they were 
created. There surely must be two-fold conditions to obtain those objectives 
- a favourable environment as discussed in the previous chapter and a 
management purpose to accomplish them. It would be an economic illusion 
to create poles where non-appropriate environmental conditions exist: it 
is also unreal to set up social objectives where the management of the 
project is not determined to pursue them.
Managerial staff very often identify themselves with "profit" that 
seems to be a key word to measure management success or failure. If that 
is the case here, it is a unfavourable behaviour in these large scale projects 
for underdeveloped regions, at least, in the short run.
(b) Social Objectives in large scale Projects
In fact there is a general and wide acceptance of the social values 
of business in modern society. Nowadays, nearly all the management literature 
suggests a list of social objectives for business. But, in practice, those 
objectives are very often forgoten. They work better in theory them in practice.
This controversy is very high whenever in underdeveloped regions the 
government decides to invest in massive industrialisation. Generally, there 
are three streams of opinions:
(i) Those who advocate a subordination of the company profitability 
to attend other objectives for which they were created;
(ii) Others opt for a strict rationalisation of the company leaving 
the social problems for the government to decide;
(iii) Others want a certain type of compromise and suggest a system of 
a common fund whereby they and the government can subsidise the
costs of labour.
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This discussion goes deep into the nature of business, where some 
managers adopt a line similar to that supported by the management by objective 
philosophy (Drucker, 1964 , Humble, 1970) . Others simply neglect that, at 
least in practice. A different approach to this problem has been put 
forward by managers of those complexes. The argument is that the basic 
industries in the pole should be as profitable as possible and they should 
be managed in strictly rigorous business strategy, very profit-conscious, 
and well rationalised. It is argued that they should be managed in this 
fashion, because they are 'propulsive' industries in Perroux sense, needing 
a high level of efficiency not to pass excessive costs to the peripheral 
units to be created. So, if the basic industrial complex fails, all other 
satellite industries would go with it. These satellites industries, 
however, could provide jobs, linkages and the integration with the local 
community.
Reasonable as it appears to be at first glance, this argument fails in 
three grounds. Firstly, every single industry has to be immersed in the 
community and responsive to its needs and not transfer this responsiveness 
to other industries or customers. Secondly, they have received incentives 
and government help and so, indirectly, public money and thirdly, the 
arrival of satellites industries is only a possibility and not a reality 
in Bahia. In fact, the percentage of the pole output that is processed 
in Bahia does not reach 10% (see 3.93).
(c) The North East Petrochemical Pole (NPP)
The NNP has potentially all the characteristics a growth pole should 
have (see 2.2). The only straight forward difference is that, instead of 
a propulsive industry in the Perroux's concept, there is a propulsive 
complex, i.e. a group of firms closely linked together for the production
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of different petrochemicals. The NPP also satisfy Hermanson’s definition 
of industrial complex "as an ensemble of technologically interconnected 
industrial units usually located on a given territory".
From a study based on the firms which set up branches in the state of 
Bahia using the tax incentives given by the government, there is an input- 
output table that indicates close linkages between the chemical segments 
of an industry with other sectors of the economy (table n.2.5). This table 
indicates only relationships between different kinds of new-coming industries 
which, on its own, does not mean their integration to the regional economy.
The function of a pole, however, is not only to sell its production 
to other companies of the same pole, but to create an environment suitable 
for other satellite companies to appear. Selling products is not only a 
proper function but vital to the survival of any industry. The concept of pole
goes beyond that however. It should sell its products to companies it helps to 
create. The appearance of a large linkage of industries in the North East, 
besides being an objective of the Government plans for the region is also 
fitted to the requirements for a healthy functioning of a growth pole. The 
extent to which Camacari will be able to do that is, then, a double govern­
ment task in its role of creating more jobs in the area and also in its 
entrepreneurial role as a shareholder of the petrochemical pole. It is 
also a business job in its social objectives and in the reasoning behind 
the creation of the pole, and a consequence of the public incentives given 
to the installation of that complex.
li) List of Companies to be considered in this work
In Appendix A, there are more details about the firms of the pole as 
they appeared in diagram n.2.3. They are presented according to location 
and in alphabetical order with additional data on the year of starting 
operation and jobs. It includes firms in project stage as well. There are
other firms in project stage
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Diagram Mo. 2/3 - Interconnections among the firms of the pole
THE NORTH EAST PETROCHEMICAL POLE
RAW MATERIALS BASIC PRODUCTS INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS END PRODUCTS application!
“ 1
1
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outside the basic couple* area, such as Salgema and Coperbo. Have, we are
concerned mainly with industries located at the CCPEC area or in the Rf.IS, 
Biarram n, 2/3 shovs the main interconnections amonr those firms. It 
i;ives an idea of nnparert interraticn of the companies with the local 
markets as far as supply of raw materials is concerned. If we look 
more carefully to the sane dinrran. that initial apparent integration 
fades away. The origin of the raw materials is the. same companies which 
comprise the pole, with few exceptions. It looks as if the pole was only a 
big company which produced pure products for its own purposes and others 
to be sold mainly in the national markets, a small percentage locally and 
an even smaller proportion for exports.
Study undertaken by the SIC (Bahia) has stated that the pole acquired 85% 
of its raw materials locally, 8% in the rest of BraziJ and 7% from 
international markets. The destination of the products has 32% for local 
markets, 67% for Brazil and 1% for exports. Again, if we consider the 
transactions among the pole companies the figure for the State would be 
much smaller.
Of course, the processing of raw materials at the region is an economic 
advantage but it is not sufficient for the whole integration a pole is 
supposed to create. A pole like that can turn to be an enclave similar 
to that pointed by Aydalot in his studies of the gas reserves in France 
(see 2.2.1).
Similar analysis made among other firms of the NPP inside the RMS (CIA) 
shows the same trend. Their raw materials come mainly from the local 
markets but their output are destined to other locations outside the region.
In the two precedent tables, local means the State of Bahia, whence 
some of the products sold at the North East region are included in the
11-28
national market. Anyway, the proportion of the output going to other States
of the North East besides Bahia is very small and would not make much 
difference.
( i i; Linkages and Interconnections among the Firms in the NPP
The interconnections among the firms of the pole are shown in diagram 
n.2.3 which also guides us towards the definition of the main industries 
that will be considered in this study as being part^of the pole when it 
satisfies the following conditions:
(a) It is a manufacturer of petrochemical products, or end-product 
based on petrochemicals and
(b) Either it sells most of its output to other firms in the pole 
or it purchases its inputs mainly from firms belonging to the 
same complex, independently oi its geographical location.
So, RLAM, a Petrobras refinery is not considered as belonging to the 
pole, because its main production of combustible oil and gasoline goes to 
the consumer market and not to other firms of the petrochemical complex.
But Dow Quimica belongs to it, notwithstanding its location being out of 
Camagari.
So, the firms we are dealing with , with their main products, markets, 
raw materials and their origins are discriminated in the next pages.
(d) The Transformation Industries based on Petrochemical Products
Many other firms are, however, aggregated to the pole idea by a 
dependence they have on those petrochemical feedstocks. Many other firms 
that have been settled in the North East depend partially or entirely on 
Camagari to get its feedstocks. They are the transformation industries 
of petrochemical products, proposing to make consumer-end goods for the 
public.
In fact, these industries are located all over the North East, not 
only in Bahia. A research undertaken by BNDE/SUDENE/BNBI PETROQUISA has 
found 82 of those industries in the field of plastics, 18 in electronics. 
There are some more in fertilizers, and other products (see 3.9).
In an extensive program of interviews and visits to companies already 
settled in the North East, they have confirmed that, even without being 
directly dependent on the pole, they have at least a circumstantial 
dependence on Camagari. The establishments of the pole solved their acute 
problems of raw materials, which they have to buy in other markets, generally 
in the South East or abroad, where they have to face all different sorts 
of problems such as shortage of the product, restrictive quotas, high cost 
of transport and so on. The coming in sight of the pole by clearing the 
feedstocks problem has managed to avoid the close-down of some transformation 
industries in the North East. The pole has, then, the power to aggregate 
existing companies to its sphere of influence. We will turn to this subject 
when discussing a strategy for the transformation industry based on petro­
chemical products (see 3.9).
CONCLUSION
According to the theory, petrochemical industries can perform a role 
of growth pole in Perroux's sense. They possess all the requirements 
needed for an industry to become a growth pole, as can be shown by the 
large use of petrochemical products that are present in virtually all other 
kinds of industries. Their dynamism can be drawn as from their linkages 
with other industries, as from their growth and from the diversity of their 
production line.
As regarding the government action in the region, it has evolved from 
an initial concern over the "droughts" and 'engineering works' to prevent 
them to a position of development plans where other aspects of the region,
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especially, industrialisation were considered. The last step in this 
direction was the option for large scale projects, one of which is the 
NPP.
As the lack of regional linkages and roots was a serious problem in 
previous programs of industrialisation in the North East, the advent of 
large and integrated industrial complexes is expected to overcome those 
"linkages and roots" problems. So, at least in theory, these industrial 
poles are an improvement in relation to the previous policies.
The impact of the pole on the North East region does not depend only 
on the nature of the petrochemical industries, but also on their real 
adaption to the local environment. The mere fact that the petrochemical industry 
has a broad network linkage does not mean those linkages exist in the North 
East. On the contrary, due to the poor structure of the regional industry, 
those industries need to be created almost from the scratch, whence a 
special attention must be paid to the creation of peripheral industries 
with solid roots in the region for the consolidation of the pole. If the 
pole is to be managed according to its capital intensive nature, on a 
profit conscious, well rationalised and competitive business basis, social 
objectives such as the provision of jobs, could be attained only by the 
arrival or coming-in-sight of these new peripheral units, whence the efforts 
to build these linkages must be even stronger.
Furthermore, as the pole is the leading industrial development project 
in the NE, headed by the government, it has also some solid committments
regarding its social responsibility. In the case of petrochemical companies, 
these social objectives are not only an obligation from the social 
responsibility point of view, but also a vital element in the strategy for 
its survival and consolidation, since they depend on the spread of their 
roots. As the provision of jobs is expected to come especially from the 
new companies to come into the area and there are no guarantees they will 
join the pole, the prospects of a major impact in the area are all far from 
bright.
CHAPTER 3: THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the nature of petrochemical industry, its 
trend and its characteristics in the world and in Brazil. He begin our 
work with a concept of the industry, its nature and the intimate relation 
between oil and chemical and petrochemical companies. The objective here 
is to establish at which stage, an oil company leaves its oil operation 
to go into petrochemical processing and to set the influences of this 
concept on the petrochemical industry in Brazil.
Then, a section on the general characteristics of these industries 
is introduced to verify whether they are in line with the pole objectives. 
Do they help the attainment of the goals set for them? Do these character­
istics help the organisation of petrochemical industries in Brazil in 
the form of poles?
By the nature of petrochemical industry — capital - intensive - 
sophisticated technology etc (see 3.4) —  the NPP cannot be expected to 
play a major role in the solution of the ailing unemployment of the region 
(see chapter 1). In order to achieve its objectives there was an initial 
assumption for fast growth of the transformation industry based on petro­
chemical products. The chapter considers the degree to which this has, 
in fact, been achieved.
The NPP comprises a concentration of industries in a given point.
This fact must affect the life of the community in which it is settled.
If the idea works then the area can anticipate local improvements for 
industry in general and for the population at large. We explore how 
far this expectation is fulfilled for industries and reserve for Chapter 6 
the expectation of the local population.
Considering these points, we head for a general strategy to counter-
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attack the present weaknesses of the pole.
3.2. The Chemical & Petrochemical Industry
3.2.1. Chemical Industry
The chemical industry is concerned with the conversion of one molecular 
form to another on a commercial scale. This operation requires many 
technological stages from the preliminary treatment of raw materials through 
the changes of molecular forms up to the purification of field products.
This concept, however, is too broad to be operational,since other industries 
also operate molecular changes without being considered essentially as a 
chemical industry; for instance, iron and steel, metallurgy, food industries. 
Furthermore, chemical industries "have moved into businesses in which the 
basic technology is by no means simple chemistry and chemicals" (Bradbury, 1972).
3.2.2. Petrochemical Industry
Petrochemicals is a widely used term to designate the chemical products 
derived from petroleum and natural gas. Some authors avoid this word, 
because "it is etimologically undesirable, specially in latin derived 
languages". They prefer the expression petroleum-chemicals or even "chemicals 
from petroleum". As petrochemicals is a word of increasingly world-wide 
acceptance, this thesis will use it to designate the chemical side of the 
petroleum industries. The petrochemical industries represent that segment 
of chemical products from raw materials derived from petroleum (Shell 1966) 
to the diffusion of petrochemical products, many products are popularly 
called petrochemicals independently of their source. In fact, people who 
buy a single chemical product are not particularly interested in the technical 
specification of it but in its performance or qualities. An example is those
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who buy MVC fibres are not necessarily concerned with the chemical formulae 
of it but in the properties of that fibre, such as its strength, its 
weight, etc. To make that fibre, the chemical industry has contributed 
not only with some chemical operations (the change of molecular form of 
the initial polymer) but with other physical operations for the customer 
to have an acceptable and handleable product.
3.2.3. Division of the Chemical Industry
Traditionally, chemical industries are divided into organic - products 
with a high proportion of carbon - and inorganic. Petroleum being basically 
a mixture of hydrocarbons, it follows that the chemicals made from it are 
generally organic. Inorganic products are also possible, such as sulphur, 
cyanidrid acid, ammonia, etc, which occur as impurities in the oil stock.
V.
3.3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETROCHEMICAL AND OIL INDUSTRIES
As the feedstocks used by petrochemical companies are hydrocarbons, 
whose molecules have the properties of combining between themselves and 
with other elements, the number of products coming from petrochemical 
sources are very high going easily over a million. It is said initially 
all chemical organic products can be made from petrochemicals.
Petrochemicals are, then, a mixture of chemical technology on one side 
and petroleum (oil) industries on the other. The relationships between 
these two industries to produce petrochemicals are so close that their 
operations are inseparable in many cases. It is very difficult to say 
exactly when the oil industries finish their processes to yield a place 
to petrochemical companies* Infact, the chemical industries, besides using 
materials from petroleum, took advantage of the sequential and raw continuous 
operations the oil companies use to process their fluid materials.
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the oil takes advantage of the technology developed by the chemical industries 
to transform different raw materials into sophisticated consumer's products. 
That is the reason why the oil companies are firmly engaged in the chemical 
business. Shell, BP, Exxon and the like are also important chemical 
producers, (Chemical & Engineering News, May 31st 1976).
These interrelationships explain the reason why petrochemical companies 
are generally found in regions where either chemical companies have achieved 
a high level of technology or where oil refinery and gas extraction plant are 
highly developed.
Summing up the relationships between petroleum and chemical industries 
interested in producing petrochemicals, a general rule can be formulated:
"The former supply the latter with raw materials and the latter manufacture 
finished products (Shell,1966)". There are many exceptions to this rule
and the best way to verify them is to analyse each petrochemical complex 
or single company. As a result of this analysis, the following associations 
might be found.
3.3.1 Association between Oil & Chemical Companies
(i) Petroleum companies supplying raw materials and intermediate 
products to chemical firms;
(ii) Petroleum companies extending their activities beyond the 
intermediate products to include end products;
(iii) Chemical companies using different raw materials (naphtha, natural 
gas, liquified petroleum gas) in small proportion to manufacture 
petrochemical products with their own technology, i.e. ICI;
(iv) Joint ventures between an oil and a chemical industry.
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(a) The Previous Associations In Underdeveloped Countries
A common case In developing countries is the association of an oil 
and a chemical industry to buy patents and technology of another industry.
The extent to which the association with more developed foreign companies 
can help the acquiring local companies to create their own technology is 
difficult to assess. First of all, the acquiring company can be buying 
an obsolete technology, or even, if it has acquired an up-to-date process, 
it can be obsolete in very few years due to the fast innovation in the 
technology of petrochemical industries. Secondly, the acquisition of 
highly sophisticated, capital-intensive technology is always a controversial 
question in developing countries. When they opt for advanced technology, 
they might want assurances that labour-intensive operations will assist 
in some stages where it is possible to use unskilled or semi-skilled labour. 
This is apparently the way chosen for the development of Brazilian petro­
chemical industries. Other countries, such as Mexico, have opted for the 
development of its own technology with good success up-to-now, in the sense 
that they have to go through many difficult stages to arrive at the petro 
chemical products they want. Independently on the question about tech­
nology, the four combinations we have seen above, are likely to appear 
whereever petrochemical complexes exist (UNIDO, 1966) .
(b) The Case of Brazil
In Brazil, as we will further explain in section 5, these combinations 
are definitely represented. It was PETROBRAS, the state-owned oil company, 
which began supplying raw materials to the first chemical industries in 
Sao Paulo; afterwards, it began its own production of rubber in Rio de 
Janeiro; Rhodia also started its production of ISOPROPANOL from petrochemical 
feedstocks, and, finally, the majority of the present Brazilian petrochemical 
projects seem to be under association (iv). It is PETROBRAS, through its
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subsidiary PETROQUISA which is heading further development of this 
business.
3.4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Petrochemical industries present very similar patterns of installations, 
processes and output, independently of the countries where they are located 
(see also 3.3). The following characteristics can be indicated.
3.4.1. Product homogeneity and standardization
Petrochemical products are defined by rigorous chemical formulae and 
their specifications are fully prescribed by international standards. There 
is not much room for a company to innovate with new models, design etc. as 
can be done in the automobile industries, for instance. Any innovations 
are likely to be in the technological process or in new combinations 
routes to achieve a given end product (see 3.7).
3.4.2. Process continuity and stability
This is derived specially from the fluid nature of raw materials for
petrochemicals. As they are liquids or gases, it is obviously much better to
operate them in a continuous process through pipe lines, than use other
forms of transport that will require frequent process breaks and batch pro­
duction.
3.4.3. High Capital Intensity
The investment put into petrochemistry is very much higher than the 
cost of labour. Also, a petrochemical plant requires a sophisticated 
machinery of very good quality and material to process the raw material with­
out being in danger of corrosion and explosion. Investment per unit of out­
put is very high and the capital/labour ratio has been calculated to range from 
US$20,000.00 to US$100,000.00 for each new job created (Mercier, 1966) . At 
Camaçari, this ratio is then about US$180,000.00 for each new direct job.
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The difference is partially explained by the successive increases of oil 
prices since 1975, which has forced the government to put much more capital
in that project then it was initially planned.
To take advantage of economies of scale, petrochemical plants are in­
creasingly being planned to produce more output. Small petrochemical units 
can be unprofitable or at least not have the same profitability as the 
large ones. The reason is that the investment in petrochemical is not 
directly proportional to the capacity of the plant but varies according to 
a power factor lying generally between 0.60 and 0.85 (UNIDO 1966). See 
the next table for an example.
Table n.3.1. Costs of Plans for the Production of Ammonia
Capacity
Tons/Day
300 400
Variable charges
(not including labour in US$
tons/day of ammonia) 9.8 9.8
Fixed charges (including labour) 44.8 40.2
Production cost 54.6 50.0
Source: Unido, (1966) Vol. I, pp 32
Another example quoted by UNIDO (1966) illustrates the proportion 
capital/labour in petrochemical plants for developing countries. A 
petrochemical complex for the production of synthetic rubber and other 
similar products in Argentina has an average investment per worker of
about US$100,000.00.
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3.4.4. High proportion of skilled labour, including 
technicians and scientists
The operations of complex installations require highly qualified tech­
nicians in the field of metallurgy, chemistry, mechanics, control, etc.
A plant in Trinidad for the production of ammonia fertilizers employing 263 
people will use only 22 labourers, but will need 145 technicians, engineers 
and scientists (UNIDO 1966). This subject is dealt with in chapter five, 
when will discuss the problems peculiar to each one of the labour categories.
3.4.5. Fast Obsolescence of its processes
This is due to a continual improvement and innovation in technology 
or to a new route to get the same product. The chemical industry in 
general and more particularly the petrochemicals are among those sectors 
which spend very highly on research and development.
3.4.6. Availability of alternative production processes 
and raw materials
Raw materials from petroleum have increase their share in the chemical 
industries in general. Researchers are continually discovering new processes 
to make different products from the same feedstock, or, the same product 
from different sources.
Besides these general characteristics, other factors are closely related 
to the development of petrochemical industries. They have generally organised 
their plants with (i) complexity of installations and (ii) backward and 
forward integration of all units.
3.4.7. Complexity of Installation
An installation of a petrochemical plant is a truly interdisciplinary 
job. This requires specialised teams on design, transport, construction, 
mechanics, etc. As the petrochemical units are usually built near refineries 
to take advantage of cheap raw materials and to minimise costs of transport, 
a specialised team to connect the feedstocks from the refinery to the newly
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built petrochemical plant is necessary. In our study, this factor will 
play a major role in the development of Brazilian engineering companies.
3.4.8. Backward and Forward Integration
The concentration of industries in close areas is a very common fact.
Very few sectors, however, offer more advantages for the industries to 
cluster them the petrochemical sector. Petrochemistry has a process of 
production, called family of products, whereby a given raw material is the point 
source for a wide variety of products, (see diagram 3.1). So, an inte­
gration backward and forward can be used to combine this family of products 
in the most economic way. The refineries would benefit from the use of 
many products of petrochemical units they use to mix up in their refined 
output. The petrochemicals companies will benefit from the utilization 
of some by-products of the refinery, besides their main feedstocks. This 
operation can be made by the use of pipeline among many petrochemical plants 
if they are clustering together.
Summing up, these characteristics help the organisation of petrochemical 
industries in forms of poles, where many industries depend on each other 
for their raw materials, their output and even their processes and technology. 
This concentration will have a straightforward influence on the local 
community that will be obliged to house the new employees of the pole, provide 
a better service structure for the inhabitants and, above all, prepare the 
professionals the pole needs for its construction and for its operation. 
Infrastructure will also require the building of new roads, railways, ports 
and the whole range of services necessary for the operation of an industrial 
complex of such a size. The bigger the pole, the larger its needs for 
infrastructure services. This problem is even more acute by the concentration 
aspects. In fact, the sequence of basic, intermediate and end products have 
advantages to be settled in a cluster way. Even among the specific consumer 
end products, some are better located near their source of raw materials. Here,
III-ll
we may even include goods which can be easily transported.
3.5. THE EVOLUTION OF PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES IN THE WORLD
3.5.1. In Developed Economies
Petrochemical industries grew firstin those places where the chemical 
industries had already been developed»where demand for organic chemical 
products was high and conditions to produce them had been achieved. Thus, 
they first appeared in the USA and had a fast development during the war 
period. After the war, petrochemical industries developed in Europe and 
Japan at a pace even faster than in the USA.
3.5.2. In the Third World
There are, however, obvious advantages in having some petrochemical plants near 
the refineries and oilfields. An increasing demand for organic chemical products
and political-economic policies related to the desire to develop industry 
in backward countries have determined the establishment of these 
industries in the Third World. This point has called the attention of 
the United Nations, which promoted conferences and symposiums to deal with 
it. For the purpose of petrochemical industries the developing countries 
have been classified into three distinct groups:
(a) Countries with large petroleum and gas reserves
The first group represents those countries with large petroleum and 
gas resources, limited domestic markets and a generally favourable balance 
of payments which enable them to invest in highly capital intensive petro­
chemical units. The problem for this group is to assure foreign markets 
to export the bulk of the petrochemical output. A good example here is 
Trinidad and Tobago. Other newly rich oil producing countries have also 
their petrochemical industries, for example, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi-Arabia, 
and Venezuela have ambitious plans to build new petrochemical plants.
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(b) Countries with good supply of hydrocarbons and large domestic markets
The second group consists of countries with good supply of raw 
materials and a potentially large domestic markets. Brazil, Argentina, 
and Mexico, three Latin American countries lie in this group. The main 
task here are the choice of the right products to be made and their distri­
bution in the local, regional or even international markets.
Statistics show that the spread of petrochemical plants from the 
developed to the developing countries has been concentrated in this group; 
vhich has almost 90% of the overall production of petrochemicals in the 
Third World. Projects for new plants and plans for further developments 
have also a bright horizon in those countries. Latin American is by far 
the leader of Third World petrochemicals producing countries, but its 
production and consumption are concentrated in only three countries, as 
shown in tables n.3.2. and 3.3.
(c) Countries lacking both raw materials and potentially 
large domestic markets
The third group represents those countries lacking petroleum resources
and potential domestic markets. The majority of developing countries are
in this group, and they are, inevitably, importers both of oil and oil-related 
products.
3.5.3. Latin America and Brazil
From the table it is clear that the leading petrochemical producing 
area in the Third World is Latin America and Brazil is its main producer.
As far as consumption is concerned, those three countries - Brazil,
Argentina and Mexico - are responsible for more than 60% of the total 
Latin American forecasted consumption by 1980. Brazil is responsible 
for 41% of Latin American consumption and 53% of South America.
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3.6. EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
The initial development of petrochemicals in Brazil was delayed for 
two reasons. First of all, the controversy around the existence of raw 
materials within the national industry. Secondly, once oil was discovered 
and a monopoly granted to a Federal organisation, the discussions that were 
undertaken to establish whether petrochemicals were included in that 
monopoly or not. This question was further complicated by the uncertain 
situation between the oil and the chemical industries 'when is oil not oil but 
a chemical industry?'(section 3). Those discussions were stopped by am 
official resolution of the'Conselho Nacional de Petroleo - the state body 
responsible for Brazilian petroleum policies, which established that petro­
chemicals were outside the limits of the state-monopoly. From that point 
until now, the resolution of Braziliam petrochemical industries present 
three distinct periods.
3.6.1. First Period (1956/1964)
Some industries were built near the Presidente Bernardes refinery, 
at Cubatao, Sao Paulo, to utilize its by-products as raw materials. Early 
in the sixties, Petrobras, Braziliam state-owned oil company - built a 
synthetic rubber unit near another refinery at Caxias, Rio de Jameiro. The 
major characteristics of this period are that the industries were settling 
its factories due to the availability of raw materials from the oil refineries 
and to the demand of petrochemicals products. Allthe projects of this period 
were timid and small amd preceded by no general plams. They were a matter 
of opportunities derived from the availability of by-products from the
refineries or even an unfulfilled demamd.
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3.6.2. Second Period (1965/1970)
This period saw the first steps towards the planning and rational­
isation of the petrochemical industry. Two important facts contributed 
to the definition and encouragement for that industry.
a. GEIQUIM
First, the creation of GEIQUIM - a State body under the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce - to promote, guide and integrate the national chemistry 
industry. This group was created in June, 1964, by Government Decree n. 
53,975. In the following year, the government set up several kinds of 
incentives to be given to those projects which obeyed the policies of the 
national economic plan. Also, in 1965, the government ratified and 
emphasised the legal position that the petrochemical industries could be 
in private hands.
Geiquium approved 78 new petrochemical products and authorised many other 
expansion requests. Compared to the first period of lO years, this one had 
a much better performance in terms of capacity of production. The first 
period had around 130,000 tons per year capacity all together, against
4,583,000 tons/year of the second. Part of these approved projects, however, 
only entered in operation during the early seventies.
b. PETROQUISA
The second factor is the creation of PETROQUISA ■» a subsidiary of the 
state owned Brazilian oil company making possible its association with 
other private or state companies to boost the petrochemical sector.
Petroquisa immediately set up in association with companies already 
operating in the field to build large industrial complexes around with the 
whole range of petrochemical industries could be clustered.
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3.6.3. Third period or period of the petrochemical Poles 
(1970 until today)
(a) Petroquímica Uniao (PUSA) and the first petrochemical pole
By the end of the sixties, Sao Paulo had achieved scattered petro­
chemical companies needing some coordination of efforts to work smoothly 
as one big company. At that time, the plants of the earlier periods began 
to expand and new ones were installed. It was thought that the construction 
of large complexes for basic petrochemical feedstocks was a necessary 
condition for the stability and prosperity of the petrochemical industry.
In June, 1972, the creation of Petroquímica Uniao was the signal for the 
first petrochemical complex. Together with other petrochemical plants settled 
in the region, that complex achieved a great importance, becoming thus the 
first petrochemical pole integrated with many units where Petroquímica Uniao 
(PUSA) played the major and dominant role.
(b) COPENE and the 2nd Petrochemical Pole
In July, 1970, the main points for the installation of a 2nd petrochemical 
pole in Bahia were settled. The big difference between this pole and the 
first one was its planning from the beginning and the intention that the two 
poles should be integrated and interconnected with each other. The whole 
project was made to integrate a few inc^pstries, already, operating in the 
administrative area, plus the implementation and centralisation of the majority 
of new units into a single place, whereas in Sao Paulo, industries were established 
in a variety of municipalities, Cubatao and Capuava being the most important 
ones. The North East Petrochemical Pole has only a couple of units outside 
the municipality of Camaçari and Dias D'Avila, that is the reason why it is 
very often called Camaçari Petrochemical Pole. To carry out the planning 
and supervision of the works of the pole, Petroquisa, then, created its
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own subsidiary - COPENE - Companhia Petroquimica do Nordeste.
The pole was due to be built in two stages. First, the installations 
of units based on aromatics (benzene, toluene and xylenes) second, the 
construction of a central unit for raw materials and other units based on 
olefins (ethylene, propylene, etc).
(c) COPESUL - The Third Petrochemical Pole
By the end of 1973, three companies were already operating in the 
pole with many other approved projects. By 1978, the companies in 
operation and under construction plus the approved projects totalled more 
than forty. By 1975, the government had decided to create a third planned 
pole, using the experience of Caraagari. COPESUL is the new Petroquisa's 
subsidiary to carry out the planning of this new pole, located in the 
extreme South of Brazil, near the Uruguayan and Argentinian borders. The 
installation of a fourth and fifth pole are already in the government plans.
3.6.4. Planning the Expansion of the Poles
Due to a general euphoria derived from the high rates of development 
experienced by the Brazilian economy in the beginning of the seventies, 
there were plans to invest several billions of dollars in those first 
three poles to put Brazil as a big world petrochemical producing country 
during the 80's. For a quick analysis, the next tables bring the relation 
between the production capacity of the petrochemical poles of Sao Paulo and 
of the North East and the forecasted consumption of some petrochemical 
products.
The data of the tables n.3.4 and n.3.5 give also a comprehensive idea 
of the relative importance of the North East and Sao Paulo pole in the
Brazilian petrochemical industry.
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Table n.3.4. Production capacity of the North East Petrochemical Pole 
compared to Sao Paulo. (OOO tons)
Product Sao Paulo North East
Plastics
Polyethylene LD H O lOO
Polythylene HD 30 60
PVC 127 lOO
Polystyrene 85 63
Polypropilene 50 50
Synthetic Fibres
Nylon & Nylon 60 lOO
Polyesther 66 132
Acrylic 12 11
Synthetic Rubber 110 73
Source: Petroquisa
(a) Planning the development of the NPP
By the time of the establishment of the first petrochemical pole,
Sao Paulo had already a well diversified industrial park and also a 
reservoir of labour already trained for industrial work. Sao Paulo was 
responsible for 80% of the transformation industry in Brazil, while in 
the NE, there was no -such developed industrial structure to match. Clearly 
planners and policy makers have an additional task to attract industries
and also to train the refined labour force.
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Table n.3.5. Forecasted consumption of some petrochemical products in 
1974, 1980 and 1985, according to the zone under the 
influence of each of Brazilian Petrochemical poles.
(lOOO tons)
Regions 1974 1980 1985
Zone under the influence 
of the North East Petro­
chemical Pole
Plastics 100.0 315.0 700.0
Synthetic rubber 24.5 55.0 105.0
Elastomers 29.0 53.0 90.0
Zone under the influence 
of Sao Paulo Pole
Plastics 390.0 1,150.0 2,380.0
Synthetic rubber 97.0 205.0 360.0
Elastomers 132.0 220.0 350.0
Zone under the influence 
of the petrochemical 
poles of Rio Grande do 
Sul
Plastics 110.0 335.0 720.0
Synthetic rubber 26.5 60.0 110.0
Elastomers 39.0 67.0 110.0
Plastics 600.0 1,800.0 3,800.0
3
Synthetic Rubber 148.0 320.0 575.0
8 Elastomers 200.0 340.0 550.0
Source : Associacao Commercial do Rio Grande do Sul
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Being the second pole to be built the NPP has an hypothetical advantage 
over Sao Paulo regarding the possible transfer of technology and know-how 
after which the pole would be able to carry out the task of developing its 
own technology. The whole thing, however, will be feasible only if the 
pole pursues the right policies to acquire that technology and to have 
its human resources highly trained to undertake that task.
The way the pole has been built, however does not seem to have made 
use of that advantage (see 4.2). The use of foreign engineering firms 
and processes, outside technology and patents without a national strategy 
for the development of a national technology or, at least, a body of skills 
and experience to operate, and ultimately develop along its own lines, the 
technologies which have been acquired, would certainly delay the creation 
of an independent know-how. It is the transfer of technological knowledge 
so that the operators and technicians do not need constantly to refer back 
to source but are themselves competent in an independent way. Furthermore, 
the time lag between the building-up of the polos are too close to allow a 
wide exchange of experience and know-how.
3.6.5. The Choice of Products and Regional Development
A fundamental point to set up industrial plants is the decision on 
what kind of products are going to be produced. When such plants have 
the regional development as one of their objectives further points to 
find out the relevance of those products for the region must be raised.
The answer to these points gives beforehand an indication of the 
importance the regional development has for the policy makers in the pole. 
It would bo ideal to develop a list of products that could be complementary 
to the regional industry or that could be established in the area with 
evident advantages in terms of location. Another option is open for those 
products that could start the installation of new industries with strong 
multiplying effects of employment and income.
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The problem is that the main products of the pole do not marry to the 
traditional industries of Bahia and of the North East. Even the textile 
industry is based on natural rather than synthetic fibres. The only 
exception to this problem is the incipient chemical industry - especially 
the transformation industry based on polyethylene and PVC - that has 
received a little boost with the implementation of the pole. There has been 
a small growth of the transformation industry that, even falling far short 
of the forecasted growth, indicates that their development is feasible in 
the North East. Only in the state of Bahia in 1978, there were 40 industries 
in the field of plastics. Even so, the stated aim of utilising around 30% 
of the pole output in the region is far from being accomplished. The pole, 
nowadays is exporting more than 90% of its output, which means there is an 
enclave at the region that is similar to a plant that is takeing nourishment 
from the soil but giving nothing back.
There are some products such as LD-Polyethylene, whose consumption in 
the region is increasing. In 1978, around 10 thousand tons were transformed 
in the North East, but there is firm ground through the presence of new 
industries to believe that there will be an increase of 100% in that usage.
The growth in consumption of a few products does not affect significantly 
the position of the pole as an exporter of raw materials rather than a 
catalyst industry in the area. That indicates again the nature of the pole 
as a national rather than a regional priority in the sense that the multiplying 
effects would be higher in other parts of Brazil them in the North East.
A serious excuse that can explain partially the manufacturing of products 
that are processed locally is the concept of family of petrochemical products, 
that is described in the next heading. After the cracking of oil gas or 
naphta, a very wide series of semi-manufactured products appear which go 
towards the making of a multiplicity of further intermediate and end products. 
The specialisation of a pole on only one product is then not
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economic and odd in managerial terms. The harmonious development of a whole 
family of products with a single basic petrochemical technology requires 
strategic thinking of a complex nature. Following on the basic strategy the 
development plan demands a whole series of sub-plans for intermediate and end 
products right up to consumer-level.
On the other hand, the development of all the petrochemical segments at 
the same time is certainly a bit unreal, when there is a lack of resources 
to build even a few transformation industries. The solution is, then, to 
concentrate efforts in some fields where the region can show itself a 
strong competitor. The strategy should be selective and regionally based.
It is important to realize that a sector such as fibres, fertilizers and 
elastomers can bear a vast range of industries. The planning efforts, 
however, appear to have stopped at the point where the petrochemical complex was 
agreed on and before any consideration had been given to the transformation 
industries, notwithstanding some delayed efforts undertaken by the state Govern­
ments. We cannot see any serious disadvantages for the development of any particular 
industry using petrochemical feedstocks as far as it wants to join the pole.
The wrong point, however, is the absence of a positive strategy to create special 
incentives for down-stream industries that could fall in line with the regional 
development needs, industries with strong regional linkages, labour-intensive or
other characteristics capable of counter-attaching the weaknesses of the basic 
complex.
There are many fields of those down-stream industries, which can be 
fitted into the regional needs. Fibres, if there is a program to marry the 
interests of the traditional textile industries with the new ones,
are a good example. Further opportunities can be seen for fertilisers, 
plastics and elastomers. The fact, however, is the absence of any serious 
attempt and strategy to make the pole a leading industry to attract any defined 
sector of the transformation industry. Fortunately, this mistake seems 
not to be repeated in the Third Pole (Rio Grande de Sul), where class 
associations of different segments of industries are discussing ways of
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Diagram No. 3/l
E T H Y L E N E  P R O D U C T S ' T R E E '
(Based on a leaflet by Alberta Ind. & Commerce)
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making their views heard at the whole planning of the pole.
3.7. FAMILIES OF PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS
Petrochemical products are usually distributed as inputs to a variety 
of other industrial sectors. Broadly speaking, it is hard to find out an 
industry which does not use some sort of petrochemical input. There are 
some doubts about the exact point where the oil industry finishes to yield 
- place to the petrochemical ones. Technicians , engineers and economists 
are not unanimous on this field, due to the intrinsic and interdependent 
relationship between both industries. This interrelationship tends to be 
greater in the light of the increasing chemical operations made inside the 
oil refineries.
3.7.1. Concept of Petrochemical Family 
For this work a whole description of all the petrochemical products 
is not necessary. What is important is to understand the concept of 
families of petrochemical products and to know the main routes of a product 
in each family.A Petrochemical family is a chain of products which starts 
from the petrochemical raw materials and finishes in the end products for the 
consumer industries. This tendency for the petrochemicals to be grouped
in family of products helps the trend for this industry to be vertically 
integrated. Other factors are many products can be derived from two or 
more basic petrochemicals, which results in the interrelation of different 
families. A good example is acrynonitrile that can be produced from propylene, 
acetylene or ethylene. As an illustration the following tables and diagrams 
give examples of petrochemical families within the main products with which 
this research is concerned, all based on very important intermediate materials 
from any petrochemical complex.
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3.7.2. Classification of Petrochemical Products
The classification in basic, intermediate and end-use product does 
not mean that only the last group is ready for the market. That is not 
a marketing classification, but a technological one. Some basic or 
intermediate products can be sold as commercial products for consumption 
as it is the case for ammonia and alcohols. The end use product is said to be 
the product of n ^  generation of petrochemical processes. There are 
thousands of those products but they are grouped in main categories depending 
on their applications. These include plastics, synthetic fibres, detergents 
fertilisers, synthetic rubbers, resins, solvents etc. The first question, 
then, for a country wanting to begin its petrochemical industry is the 
choice of the products to be made.
The choice will obviously result upon a product of the first generation 
(a basic product) if the country wants to develop its petrochemical industry.
A careful research into the market demands and the availability of supply 
of raw materials are also an important initial steps. Suppose that the 
product chosen to be industrialised is ammonia. Who is going to buy it?
What for? Will it be cheaper to produce it here rather than importing it?
What is the influence on the regional and national economy? If the choice 
is a basic product such as ethylene, however, mainly used as feedstocks for other 
industries, the questions to be asked acquire a new dimension, going beyond 
the simple field of marketing management techniques. It involves the whole 
question of industrialisation of the country, the availability of other 
chemical industries to buy the ethylene's unit outputs, the development of 
the local human resources to carry out an extensive program of industrialisation 
and the previous assurance of outside markets to absorb some of the by-products 
to be made. It is very difficult for a developing country to absorb all 
the products coming from a petrochemical complex. Quatar is a very good example 
of a country involved in building a large petrochemical complex based on 
ethylene for exports. Quatar's regional market will not be sufficient to
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absorb a significant part of the growing industrial complex at Umm Said 
(F.T. Feb. 22, 1978, 27). Other oil producing countries have recently 
adopted similar policies.
It is evident that the choice will depend on the economic policies 
of that country. An ethylene plant provides a broad range of specialised inter­
mediate products to be used by several other industries. Countries wanting 
to develop their agriculture may opt for those products ending in fertilisers 
or similar additives for agriculture.
3.7.3. Cooperation among Developing Countries
As most developing countries have only small markets, integration between 
countries and regions comprising more than one country are an essential step.
In this way, countries could benefit from the advantages of having greater 
units (plants) for larger markets. A compromise has to be reached whereby 
some countries will not build plants already developed in any other neigh­
bour, or whose construction will be more advantageous there due to the 
existence of other units processing its feedstocks or similar reason. Cooperation 
between neighbouring countries can take advantage of the natural concentration 
of petrochemical industry by a decentralisation of some of its units.
(a) Brazil and South America
This problem is also very important in Brazil independently of its 
potentially large markets and weak relations with its neighbours. Notwith­
standing a cooperation with countries such as Argentina, Uraguay, Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Venezuela would be advantageous. The first has a growing 
chemical and oil industry well established. The latter has large resources 
of hydrocarbons. the others are trying to develop their own industry. In 
this way, the location of the third pole in Rio Grande do Sul, near the 
River Plate's countries can contribute to closer cooperation of the Latin 
American petrochemical industry.
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Diagram No. 3/4 - Simplification of some important petrochemical routes.
Primary Intermediate En4
Products Products Products
Ethylene---- ♦ ---- *
Ethylene *■ chlorine --- » Vinyl chloride---- ■» Polyethylene
+ acetic acid . Vinyl acetate _ ___ _ Polyvinyl chloride
+ oxygen _-4 Ethylene oxyde -* athylene glycol
oxygen --v Acetaldehyde-» acetic acid Polyvinyl acetate
benzene --» Styrene Polystyrene
Propylene ---> ____ 4 Polypropylene
1
4. benzene — » Cumene —4 phenol/acetone
4- ammonia Acrylonitrile--- > Acrylic
Benzene + hydrogen —
Caprolactam
-*cyclohexane-*[Adipic acid ------- * Polyamide
p-Xylene +. methanol --♦DMT (+ ethylene glycol)------- > Polyester
Butadiene---- » » Pn1yhntadif»r.e(BR)
4- styrene — * ---- 4 Styrene-butadiene
rubber(SBR)
o-Xylene 4- propylene -»Phthalic anhydride— ♦ (♦ alcohols) 
Lphthalate plasticizers
Sulphur------ > Sulphuric acid
Methanol
Ammonia
Sources UNIDO (1973) The Chemical Industry
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Agreements with those countries can increase the trade of chemical 
products that are not processed at home. By geographical position, the 
third pole will have some advantages in this trade. The North East, on 
the other hand, is nearer to European and African markets where it could 
try to export one or another product.
3.8. LIST OF PRODUCTS OF THE NORTH EAST PETROCHEMICAL POLE
A list on the next page gives a sample of the main products being 
industrialised in Camagari. Other products and by-products may be added 
to that list. It is not necessary, however, to include all of them, since 
our main purpose is to show the variety of ind istries those chemical 
products are destined for. This gives further room for the hypothesis that 
the petrochemical complex will give rise to a variety of complementary 
industries and to some specialised services industries. On the other hand, 
world wide experience has shown that an industrial pole is not sufficient 
by itself to generate economies of scale in the place where it is located 
(Coraggio 1973) . It is also not sufficient to hope that new industries will move 
into the area. The prospects for them to thrive are not bright. In other words, 
as they will not just come, they must be encouraged in some way.
More serious yet is the incapacity of those highly capital intensive 
industries actually established to create a substantial number of new jobs. The 
approx. 14,00 created so far in the pole itself is a ludicrous figure compared to 
economically active population of the RMS, or even to US$3,5 billion investment
made. Additional efforts must be made to encourage the coming of new industries
to transform those petrochemical outputs into new products, or else they will
be exported to other parts of the country, increasing the economic dependence 
of the North East.
The policy for new industries presents many difficulties such as (i) what 
industries should be encouraged to come into the area? (ii) what kind of 
incentives should be applied? (iii) what products or group of products
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should be made there?
3.8.1. What Kind of Industries?
It seems the roost viable solution to bring labour-intensive industries 
at that stage. The main points that stress the advantages of having capital 
intensive companies have disappeared, when products become economic and 
real. As one °f the objectives of the pole is the creation of new jobs 
it would be wrong to accept new industries that do not contribute 
significantly to reduce an unemployment plus underemployment rate above 25%. 
And much worse is to continue this policy without a clear definition of how 
the unemployment problem could be tackled in the near future.
Table n.3.6. Main Products of the NPP
.......
PRODUCTS
APPLICATIONS
BASIC INTERMEDIATE END
Aromatics Residues Phenol
Formaldehyde
HD-PE Pharmecuticals
Benzene Ammonia Sulphate LD-PE Food Industry
Butadiene Sodium Cyanide PVC Plastics
Ethylene Propylene Glycol Polystyrene ■Detergents
Natural Gas (H2) Propylene Oxide 
Urea
Polypropylene Textiles
Elastomers
Propylene Butyl Alcohol Acrylic Fibres Solvents
Toluene Caprolactam 
Propylene Oxide
Acrylic Resins Metallurgy
O - Xylene Maleyc Anhydrid 
Fhthalic Anhydrid
Nylon
Polyester
Fertilizers
P - Xylene Melamines
I'.etionine
Paint
Varnishes
Sulphvric Acid *
DMT NPK InsecticidesTDI LAB
Caustic Soda * Ethylene Glycol Polyester Fibre Explosives
Chlorine * LAB
HMTA
Carbon Black Furniture
*
Organic Froducts.
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3.8,2. What Incentives?
Many sorts of incentives have been given to firms willing to move 
to less developed regions in order to narrow the gap between those areas 
and the more developed ones. Taking into consideration the characteristics 
of petrochemical industries, the incentives to be offered to the satellites 
industries must be such that they could favour the installation of 
industries with more linkages with the region in terms of production, 
consumption and labour. The most common incentives are tax reductions, 
long-term loans, wage subsidies and subventions for construction and infra­
structure costs. As the main problem here seems to be the high level of 
unemployment, incentives should be given to encourage firms to employ more 
labour instead of adopting sophisticated mechanisation and machinery. This 
can be made by wage subsidies, tax reductions proportional to the relation 
labour/inve stnen t.
3.8.3. What Products?
The firms could be divided into groups according to the supply of the 
petrochemical output. The supply of polyethylene, PVC, polypropylene, 
acrylic fibre, polyesthers, nylons, etc, makes industries such as textiles, 
packaging, plasticisers (upholstery, shower curtains, vynil plastics) 
particularly attractive as far as supply of feedstocks are concerned. 
Fertilisers have an important role to play in a predominantly agricultural 
region. Other important groups are pharmaceuticals, solvents, insecticides, 
moulded plastic products, surface coating, printing inks and adhesives, 
synthetic detergents. These are industries where labour intensive techniques 
are possible. All these industries put together could be able to create 
more jobs than the basic complex. Without them, the petrochemical pole 
would make only a weak impact on the local employment structure this decade, but 
time could reduce that impact even further since the trend in petrochemical 
industries is for an increasing mechanisation and thus lower labour intensity.
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3.9. LEADING SEGMENTS OF THE CONSUMER-END INDUSTRY BASED 
ON PETROCHEMICALS
A research by the group for the development of the transformation 
industry (SUDENE, w.d), based on petrochemicals registered the existence 
of industries in the North East, spread through out the nine States, which 
used petrochemical feedstocks in the segment of plastics; around 18 in 
the elastomers. There were other industries in the field of fertilisers, 
inks, varnishes which could increase that figure.
Not all of them, especially those which use other than petrochemical 
feedstocks as their main raw materials can be classified as a consumer end 
industry based on petrochemicals (see 3.6.5.).
3.9.1. Characteristics of the Transformation Industries
The transformation industries, compared to the petrochemical presents 
some advantages in terms of the several objectives of the pole. Contrary 
to the petrochemical industry, the transformation industries are not capital- 
intensive, do not require concentration of investment, can be market 
rather than product-oriented, uses a fairly simply technology and have a 
broad range of products. These characteristics are better fitted with the 
requirements of employment. On the other hand, the huge area of the North 
East will probably dilute the effects of any transformation industry, 
since it tends to put scattered plants throughout the nine States of the 
region.
Even so, if the effects cannot be as evident and measurable as those 
of the basic complex at Camagari, this does not mean that in regional terms
ithe growth of Camagari proves that industrial concentration is better. In fact, 
data about the revenues of the local government have shown a substantial growth 
(dia. n.6.5). Camagari, however, is only a miniscule part of the NE. A situation
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of no growth at Camagari would be a gross failure, equivalent to have an 
investment of 3.5 billion dollars with no return at all.
3.9.2. Planning for the Transformation Industry
The transformation industry is very often considered as too fragmented 
to be subject to more effective control by the government, to the point 
that some high ranked officials suggest it is impossible to exert control.
The difficulties are also derived from the enormous number of uses for petro­
chemical products. We do not agree that close control on the activities of 
those industries is impossible, since the suppliers of the feedstocks are very 
few and can have a systematic knowledge of their customers and what they are 
manufacturing. Control is important to avoid the growth of the black market 
for certain petrochemical raw materials, especially those segments of 
relative shortage of the products. An illustrative example is the case of 
polyethylene (low density) of which there is a shortage in Brazil. Some 
companies receive the product and sell it immediately without processing 
to other companies in the black market. This is possible due to lack of 
control exercised by the three producers - Politeno, Poliolefinas and Union 
Carbide.
3,9.3. Present Problems of the Transformation Industries 
in the North East
(a) Unbalanced Planning
The first and one of the major problems in the planning of the NPP 
lies in the fact that planning for the transformation industries were made 
after the planning of the basic complex and apart from it. It started 
too late. In this sense, the NPP, as it has been conceived, is at most a 
plan for a big industrial project rather than for a pole (see 2.2 and 2.4.5d).
111-36
In fact, fundamental questions lie at the root of the whole project, 
what needs the pole and its transformation industries sure trying to attend, 
what benefits they are bringing to the community must always be considered 
in the development of the whole NPP in its several stages. Seeing that 
the enterprises come to offer goods and services for the conmunity, these 
aspects should be thoroughly discussed. For a poor population such as the 
North East only a few of the products based on petrochemicals feedstocks 
could be considered essential in terms of his basic needs of health, 
nutrition, housing, hygiene, education etc. Those industries provide a 
good service, however, in terms of jobs, in spite of the small number created 
directly. The ideal would be a marriage of both - essential goods and 
services. As far as the consumer end industry is concerned, the external 
objective of its production is not prejudicial, what can be harmful is the 
aspect of the products coming from the basic complex without further processing. 
The reason is that the former are important to build the industrial web 
of new plants as included in the notion of growth poles.
(b) Underutilised Capacity
This problem is more acute in Sao Paulo where the transformation industries 
are already well established, but there is a shortage of some petrochemical 
feedstocks such as LD-Polyethylene. But even in the North East whose regional 
industries absorb only around 10% of the pole output, many companies have had 
to reconcile themselves to run well below capacity due to shortage of feedstocks. 
It is an apparent contradiction that the government intends to back the develop­
ment of this industry in the North East and at the same time causes many problems 
for its growth. The first problem is to leave it with unutilised capacity by 
an insufficient quota of raw materials, since the policy of the pole is to 
provide feedstocks for enterprises all over Brazil not only in the NE, making 
the present national production fall short of the national installed capacity 
of the transformation industry. According to field research the
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majority of the plastic industries in the North East can increase output 
if a higher quota of feedstocks is delivered. In this group, we can 
put especially those companies processing polyethylene for domestic 
appliances, plastic bags, toys, slippers and sandals, for which there 
is an open market in the region.
(c) Payment Policy
Much more than the unutilised capacity for the transformation industries 
is the payment policy of the pole. Those small enterprises scattered 
through the different states have to pay for their raw materials in 30 to 45 
days. If we discount a week for transport, it leaves only 21 to 36 days 
for payment, when they have to sell their consumer goods with credit of 90 to 120 
days at the market. It is easy to see a continuous process of fast 
decapitalisation. After a few months, they lack working capital to 
operate their own businesses. That is one of the most serious disencouragement 
of the transformation industries in the North East.
(d) Prices of Feedstocks
At the beginning of the last pole some products were much more expensive 
in Brazil than in the World market, which made domestic prices much higher 
than imports. Brazilian policies, however, do not allow imports when there 
are available products or their similar in the home markets. That is a 
fair measure to protect the domestic industry but it produces additional 
problems to the consumers. Some companies have the price of their raw 
material increased in a disorderly fashion after the implementation of the 
pole. Fortunately, this is a temporary problem, because the instability 
of the world prices for oil have increased dramatically the prices of 
petrochemicals to the point that Brazilian prices are nowadays better than
in the international market.
H I - 3 7
majority of the plastic industries in the North East can increase output 
if a higher quota of feedstocks is delivered. In this group, we can 
put especially those companies processing polyethylene for domestic 
appliances, plastic bags, toys, slippers and sandals, for which there 
is an open market in the region.
(c) Payment Policy
Much more them the unutilised capacity for the transformation industries 
is the payment policy of the pole. Those small enterprises scattered 
through the different states have to pay for their raw materials in 30 to 45 
days. If we discount a week for transport, it leaves only 21 to 36 days 
for payment, when they have to sell their consumer goods with credit of 90 to 120 
days at the market. It is easy to see a continuous process of fast 
decapitalisation. After a few months, they lack working capital to 
operate their own businesses. That is one of the most serious disencourageraent 
of the transformation industries in the North East.
(d) Prices of Feedstocks
At the beginning of the last pole some products were much more expensive 
in Brazil them in the World market, which made domestic prices much higher 
than imports. Brazilian policies, however, do not allow imports when there 
are available products or their similar in the home markets. That is a 
fair measure to protect the domestic industry but it produces additional 
problems to the consumers. Some companies have the price of their raw 
material increased in a disorderly fashion after the implementation of the 
pole. Fortunately, this is a temporary problem, because the instability 
of the world prices for oil have increased dramatically the prices of 
petrochemicals to the point that Brazilian prices are nowadays better than
in the international market.
Ill-38
(e) Poor Market
The size of the North East market is undoubtedly a restriction on 
the development of the transformation industries in the region.
A manager of a 600 ton plant has synthesised the problem in a simple 
sentence. What is the purpose of creating more industries in the North 
East in our business - sleeping blankets - if we can deal with the whole 
regional demand with our installed capacity? As many petrochemical products are 
typical of middle class, the only alternative is the external or inter­
national market. Lack of jobs, low wages, poor communications (roads) 
made petrochemical products a luxury inaccessible for a miserable population.
In fact, many industries throughout the North East have tried to penetrate 
the South East markets with good results up to now. The majority of the 
middle and large companies of this sector in North East have managed to 
put part of their output in the South East and also South markets, what 
must be seen not only as a commerical policy, but survival strategies.
Of course, this aggression of the North East is commercially healthy, but 
the problem behind it is the extreme poverty of the region in general.
As these industries are supposed to have a social impact in terms of jobs 
and industrial déconcentration, there is no point in stopping their growth, 
even, if their production is entirely for the external markets. The return 
would be gained in terms of income and wages. The problem in this strategy 
is that the South East industries are also running far below capacity due to 
the recession in the Brazilian economy, receiving also insufficient quotas, 
while the North East industries have received tax incentives to grow. The 
result, of course, is the export of unemployment from the NE to the SE.
(f) Lack of Experience
A lack of experience of the local enterprises on those segments of 
industries based on petrochemical feedstocks leads to a shortage of a 
clear understanding of all the possibilities of some products, such as
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polyethylene for instance, the exact dimension of the industry, the profita­
bility of its derived products. There is also a shortage of managerial know-how of 
the sector. Managers do not feel at home to develop these -products, despite
the good will and zest with which some enterprises come into the sector.
The development of new products in petrochemistry needs a good know-how 
and infrastructure. Some firms do not manage to develop new domestic appliances, 
for instance, because they do not have a good supply of tools or operators 
to produce some mechanical devices to give the petrochemical raw material' 
the shape they desire. The knowledge to make some plastic cables and a 
plastic shoe is similar but it needs a good mechanic instrumentist to shape 
the metal plates and sheets to trams form PVC and LDPE in those objects.
A lack of skilled labour in the North East maikes this problem even worse.
X have found these mechanics working on a part-time basis for several different 
firms because there are so few of them in the market. The size of 
the North East market will not allow the processing of more than a small 
percentage of the NPP output. Under these circumstances, one has to think 
in terms of national or even international markets. There is an incongruence 
where the central units is planned in a national strategy and the trans­
formation industries have to be restricted to local boundaries.
3.9.4. A Strategy for the Transformation Industry
The previously mentioned character!sties (3.9.1) and difficulties 
(3.9.3) of the petrochemical industry in the North East set up the pattern 
for the definition of a good strategy for the development of the pole.
Important premises here are that the pole needs the development of the 
transformation industries for its consolidation as a catalyst activity in 
the area. There is no pole without the transformation industry (see 2.2).
As the majority of the industrial units of the pole have already been 
operating, the main key strategies lie in the efforts to build its network 
linkages throughout the North East. There is a need of a more effective 
government action, similar to that used for the implementation of the basic
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complex at Cama^ari, to develop the consumer-end industries. As those 
industries are scattered throughout different States in the North East, 
an inter state agency is better placed for the coordination of those 
efforts.
The strategy to be followed should contain measures to define some sectoral 
priorities and to counteract the effects of the major problems faced 
bv those industries, that is, the lack of credit, insufficient quotas 
of raw material for the regional industry, lack of working capital, the 
expansion of the market for new commodities, and, a better guidance for 
managers and enterpreneurs of the North East (see chapter five).
A long term strategy needs a definition on priority segments of 
the petrochemical industries on which investments and efforts should 
be concentrated. Taking the main sectors of the petrochemical industries 
- plastics, fibres, fertilisers and elastomers - which of them offers 
more advantages for a regional development? The researches made by the 
group for the development of the transformation industry in the North 
East were based on the regional market that is small and poor. The 
development of this industry requires, however, the national market rather 
than to be limited by regional boundaries. The scale of the pole was not 
designed by the size of the North East market and so the transformation 
industry has to surpass these frontiers. The problem is very simple.
The North East has not the capacity to absorb the output of the pole, but 
must process those products for its economic growth as has been constantly 
stressed. The only possible strategies are either a quick growth of the 
internal income per capital of the region - which takes time - or to break into 
external markets, and that seems to be the only valid strategy in the middle run.
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CONCLUSION
The rise of petrochemical industries in Brazil followed the general 
pattern observed everywhere. They tend to appear in the most developed 
areas, where a know-how to process petrochemical feedstocks is already 
developed. There is the trend for petrochemical industries to cluster 
around petroleum refineries; in Brazil, they began in the industrial state 
of Sao Paulo around the 'Presidente Bemardes' oil refinery and afterwards 
spread to other points of the national territory where Petrobras - the 
State-owned oil company - had other refineries.
Notwithstanding, the development of Brazilian petrochemical industries 
was delayed by internal controversy over the availability of raw materials 
within the national territory and by the debate about whose sure the 
responsibility for the development of those industries, whether they should 
be developed by the State or by the Private Sector or perhaps some combina­
tion of the two. That delay produced a great deficit in the national 
petrochemical production, leading the authorities to rush the planning of 
three petrochemical poles in a short period of time, and failure to give
proper thought to the impact of the development on the human resources
/
available. If they were built, at least, ten years apart one from another, 
there would have been more time for the exchange of ideas, experience, 
technicians, management staff and so on. As the development of each pole 
has begun at a point when the previous one had not achieved its mature status, 
the efforts to select, hire and train the manpower necessary for those poles 
are much higher. No proper advantage has been taken of the learning curve 
which could make sure that lessons from one development could be applied 
to the next.
The general characteristics of those industries lead them to cluster 
around oil refineries or, in highly industrial areas. This helps the 
understanding of the reasons why petrochemical industries in Brazil were 
organized in form of poles. Large industrial complexes benefit from the
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backward and forward integration between oil and chemical industries, 
minimise the costs of transport and of very expensive and sophisticated 
installations, favours the standardisation and homogeneity of products 
and increases the advantages of having a continuity and stability of 
processes necessary to handle properly the fluid raw materials. The 
very nature of petrochemical industries, however, poses serious threats 
over the feasibility of the social objectives of the whole pole. As the 
petrochemical industries employ only a handful of highly skilled technicians 
and a few administrative staff, the NPP cannot be expected to play 
a major role in the solution of the ailing unemployment of the region. 
Therefore, the initial hypothesis that the basic complex of petrochemical 
industries at Camaçari could make a substantial contribution in the creation 
of new jobs must be doubted. The creation of those jobs will rely on the 
establishment of further industries, to be attracted by the availability 
of petrochemical feedstocks. These industries using semilabour-intensive, 
or even labour-intensive technology, could bring a singificant number of 
jobs. The prospects for them to come, however, are not bright at all at 
present, which suggests that the government will have to create many 
incentives to encourage them to move in and establish themselves there. 
Furthermore, those transformation industries which have been set up are 
spread all over the region, what makes their impact look very weak.
Another important point would be the contribution in terms of products 
to the local community and to the region. This seemed not to have worried 
planners at any moment of the preliminary works of the pole, since they 
have made the projection of petrochemical demand at national and not at 
regional levels. Therefore, the products to be produced in the region 
obeyed the national demand and not the local needs. This means that the 
regional can increase even further its dependence on the South East of 
Brazil. The North East will continue as a simple raw material exporting 
area. The argument that exports benefit the whole community is beyond the
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scope of this research, but the point that we need to stress here is 
that the region has not been taken as the main consumption market for 
the products. In the same way, no survey among the local industries has 
been made to assure their participation in future developments of the 
pole. It was an unbalanced planning. It might be expected that 
actions in that direction will be taken not to marginalize completely the 
local enterprises. The plans have not been made to decide how to move 
down to the lower rungs of the petrochemical production. They have 
been limited to the core, as is further explained in the next chapter.
The most serious problem of the NPP is the lack of priorities the 
transformation industry has received from the outset. The consolidation 
of the pole requires a change in the planning process with stronger 
backing for these peripheral units to come in, to grow and to overcome 
their main weaknesses - restricted quotas of feedstocks, prices policy 
which leads to rapid deterioration in working capital, a poor regional 
market and lack of experience in producing chemical products from petro­
chemical feedstocks.

IV- 2
4.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter studies the 'micro' - and 'macro'-organisation of the 
pole, that is, the internal relationship between the companies and the 
presence of the regional institutions, particularly governmental ones 
in the pole. The objective is to find out whether its structural 
organisation has been an effective tool for the attainment of the social 
and developmental goals of the region.
The chapter also deals with the 'macro-background' in which the sub­
plan for the human resources of the pole is made.
4.2 The Starting Point
The establishment of petrochemical companies in Salvador preceded 
the pole idea. In crude terms, we can say that the starting point was 
the discovery of oil in the region plus the existence of a large urban 
area, that made feasible the possibility of the industrial complex at 
Caraagari. During the sixties, some companies had established in the RMS, 
taking advantage of the available feedstocks from Petrobras.
Another important step was the report of the BID 'Banco Interamericano de 
De-denvolvimentol' economic mission at the end of the 60's (Viana Filho, 1970) 
which recommended the development of the petrochemical industries as a priority 
for the area. Afterwards, came the political decision to establish the pole 
at Camagari. As far as the transformation industry of petrochemical products 
were concerned, there were scattered units spread in the major urban areas of 
the North East. There were also consumer-end industries, such as textiles, 
that used petrochemicals in small quantities as feedstocks. The policies of the 
implementation of the petrochemical pole had, then, an initial task to bring 
those industries together to operate in the area.
In effect, companies such as CIQUINE, BANYLSA, NITROFERTIL (ex- 
PETROFERTIL), FISIBA and SAFRON-TEIJIN in one way or another preceded 
the pole idea and were established exactly in the RMS.
Table n.4.1. Petrochemical companies and products in the RMS before 
the arrival of the pole.
COMPANY PRODUCTS
Banylsa Nylon, Polyester
Fisiba Acrylic fibres
Nitrofertil Ammonia, urea
Safron-Teijin Polyester, Methanol
Paskin Sodium Cyanide 
Methyl Metacrylate 
(Sulphate of Ammonia)
CCC Carbon Black
Ciquine Phthalic Anhydride
4.3. THE CORPORATE STRATEGY
The initial idea was to have the control of the industry in Brazil 
which gave rise to PETROQUISA as seen in chapter three. As the Brazilian 
private sector is not sufficiently strong to face international competition, 
the government was the only one left to exert that control.
There was no doubt about the role of government in this particular 
development. How the government could exert that control was another matter 
that was dependent on several strategies it could adopt, regarding the 
composition of the companies, the level of control on private (multinational) 
enterprises or on the control of raw materials and commercialisation of the
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products. A full intervention in the private sector was rejected for many reasons: 
in particular, it is not according to the government philosophy; it is not the 
appropriate strategy when the objectives are the attraction of new industries.
It can be applied in situations where an already developed sector faces 
administrative or economic problems, or even when a newly developing 
industrial sector offers such advantageous opportunities that a selection 
of firms is required in order not to overcrowd the estate.
4.3.1. The Tripartite Policy
As the petrochemical industries are largely dominated by multinationals 
and in the face of the general weakness of the domestic private sector, 
the road open for the shareholder composition of each company was expressed 
by a policy whereby each company should have one third of its shares owned 
by Brazilian private shareholders, one-third by a foreign partner and the last 
third by the Government. That is known as the tripartite policy, which has 
some tenets behind it:
(i) the government decision that in order to strengthen domestic 
industry outside technology and capital are needed;
(ii) fear that without Brazilian capital involvement, multinationals 
will satisfy neither the regional needs nor the requirements of 
national petrochemical industry;
(iii) then, the necessity of an industrial scheme whereby some sort of 
control could be established on the multinationals without 
strangling enterprise by imposing the bureaucratic structures 
of government companies.
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Table No. 4/2 - Relationship between Petrochemical Companies in the NPP 
and their main shareholders ($£ of total shares).
COMPANIES S 1I A R E H O L D E I l S
Government Brazilian/Private Foreign
copene/cemap 5 1 . 0 49.0 **
ACRI1I0R 4 0 . 0 3 0 .0 30 .0
BASF - 8 6 .6 13.4
CI^UINE iUIKICA - 10 0 .0 -
CrjJJUIS PETRC.JJII.HCA 33.3 33.4 33.3
CPB - 1 C0 .0 -
CPC 33.3 33.4 33.3
CCBAFI 1 0 . 0 9 0 .0 * -
COPENOR - 75.0 2 5 . 0
CON 98.4 1 . 6 -
DETEN 35.4 63.6 1 . 0
EST1REN0 33.3 33-3 * 33.3
ETOXILADOS - 1 C0 .0 -
FISIBA 38.0 33.0 2 9 .0
isocianatcs 49.1 39.6 11.3
MELAMINA - 10 0 .0 -
METANOR 33.4 6 6 .6 -
NITRCCARBONO 26.5 53.0 20.5
NI1ROFERTIL 1 0 0 . 0 - -
OXITENO - 10 0 .0 -
POLIALDEN 33.3 33.4 33.3
POLIPROPILENO 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 30 .0
POLITENO 3 0 .0 4 0 . 0 30.0
PRC1IOR 49-9 5 0 . 1
BAEYLSA _ 100.0 -
BOV/ Q.UU.IICA - - 100.0
FAVAB - 100.0 * -
PASKIN 2.6 97.4 -
3AFR0N-TEIJIN - 68.0 32.0
SULFAB 12.1 87.9 -
SOURCE: COI’EC
* Private groups that, however legally registered in Brazil as private 
companies, are associated with foreign firms.
** Users of the Products.
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Diagram 4.1. The initial idea of the tripartite policy (shareholders' 
composition).
The corporate plein would be set up by a 
corporate committee.
How far this scheme can work will depend on the ability of the govern­
ment to convince both partners of its healthy structure and also on the 
profitability prospects of the whole project.
4.3.1.(a) The Reality in the NPP
An analysis of the actual shareholder composition of the firms in the 
pole shows that the tripartite policy did not work as smoothly as had been 
envisaged. This is a consequence of the following facts.
(i) Multinationals have proposed to open subsidiaries where they 
have the majority of shares. That is the case with Rhodia 
Dow Quimica that are almost entirely owned by their parent 
companies.
(ii) Large domestic groups from different parts of Brazil have decided 
to establish plants outside the guidelines of the three-third 
policy, generally to take advantage of the regional tax incentives.
(iii) The government has actually accepted a lead-role in some firms, 
notably the CEMAP-Central of Raw Materials.
(iv) Not all companies have three partners (regardless of the number 
of shares they hold).
(v) Many foreign partners refuse to take an effective one-third of the
shares.
Table Ho* 4/3 - ilelaticnship between know-how and Tnc.r.e-.rii.£; - roccsses in the Pole (Only the air. 
lr; ducts of each Company are considered).
Source* letroquisa
0b8.: Brazilian Fir:.ic are identified by the word National#
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4.3.1.(b) Control through raw materials
Theoretically, the firm which has the control on the provision of 
raw materials and key petrochemical products where there is a shortage 
of those products, has also a stronger position in the pole. Using this 
criterium the group Petrobras/petroquisa is the strongest in the pole, 
since it is responsible for the provision of organic raw materials and 
key petrochemical products through COPENE (diagram 4.1). Other feedstocks 
such as chloride, sulphuric acids are divided between Salgema, Dow and 
CQR.
The restrictions on Companies to exert a stronger government control are speci­
ally derived from the agreements all the firms sign when joining the pole. COPENE, 
then, is obliged to divide the output of each product according to the 
clauses of those agreements that do not allow a stoppage in the provision 
of stocks for a particular firm. In fact, it is not in COPENE's interests 
to create an atmosphere of uncertainty among the customers of feedstocks.
So, the control of raw materials and key products are not sufficient 
for an effective control of the pole, notwithstanding being an important 
element which can give those who handle them a strategic position. A 
restriction in this position is derived again from the technological problem.
Even when government controls raw materials, the specification of each 
product, their quantities and combinations are made at the technical level. 
Therefore, the government through its own companies must supply according 
to prescribed standards, and according to demand so it loses even that level 
of control it had initially.
Diagram 4.2. Control derived from the supply of raw materials and key petro­
chemical products.
Theoretically, the government is the 
strongest partner, but its power is 
limited by the agreements it has to 
make./
National
Private
DiatTan No. 4/3 - The Central of Raw Materials.
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Another accepted trend behind that tripartite policy was the belief 
that the share owned by government and domestic companies could put the 
control of the pole in Brazilian hands by an alliance between both 
domestic partners. This, however, assures nobody any control at all.
First of all, many domestic groups already have their linkages with 
foreign partners. Secondly, the vast literature on multinationals and 
sociological studies of capitalist groups in underdeveloped countries do 
not suggest that those groups would prefer to side with the government 
rather than with their foreign colleagues. So, the government has less 
power to control the activities of the pole than the scheme suggests 
beforehand. (Vernon, 1971, Pinelo 1973).
4.3.1(c) Control through technology
The partner who controls the technical side (generally the multinational) 
has a vital element in his hands . Even if the other partners have an absolute 
majority of shares, they will not be able to set up a corporate plan by 
their own since they do not know the exact level of technology to be used in 
the manufacturing of the various products. As in the majority of companies 
the know-how belongs to a foreign partner, this alters the balance against 
the government control. Furthermore, as labour policies depend on the 
technology to be used, the foreign companies have a very important role to 
play in the planning of the human resources in the area. Of course, the 
technology to be sold is that already in use by the parent company in the 
developed country it comes from. There is no other way. First, if anyone 
wants to use other technology, lie would have to create or to buy from another 
partner. So, the original advantages of having foreign partners disappear; 
secondly, companies may not have two technologies - one, for developed 
countries; another for underdeveloped ones. The technology a company uses 
is the one it knows and this is the one it will sell. That is the reason
why the foreign partner in the NPP has also the task of on-job-training
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programs for those technicians who will work in operation, maintenance
and technical assistance to the customers.
Diagram 4.4. Control derived from the knowledge of the technology.
Foreign As the foreign partners have the
Government in the planning process of the pole.
4.3.1.(d) Administrative Control
As the government has the advantage of choosing the partners for a 
given enterprise through Petroquisa, in the majority of the cases, taking 
the initiative for a selected project and establishing a new enterprise 
and choosing the other partners, it can also pick up the foreign partner 
which offers more advantages to the project. Some limits to this selection 
are:
a. There are only one or two foreign partners with the required 
know-how of the product to be made, and willing to go to the NPP;
b. Many foreign companies (multinationals, especially) do not like 
to associate with governments and/or local enterprises.
c. Many foreign companies have main policies to set up subsidiaries 
rather than accept joint ventures even with non-government organ­
isations.
If the number of foreign companies wanting to move into the pole was 
high, let us say, about five companies for each project, Petroquisa would 
have freedom to opt for that partner whose technology better approached 
the requirements of the pole. Then, it could put some conditions over 
training of the staff and also the extent to which labour-intensive techniques
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should be used in certain phases of the process, where capital-intensive 
technology was not absolutely necessary (see chapter two). However, this 
condition does not exist, for the simple reason that "beggars do not 
choose". There are also some indications Petroquisa was not interested 
in forcing a change of capital-intensive technology at this stage, since the 
objective has been the implementation of a highly competitive basic 
complex leaving freedom for the down-stream industries to set up other 
kinds of technology. But, even if a substitution is tried, the amount of 
capital that can be saved by employing labour will be very low due to 
the reason explained in chapter three. Saving between 5 and 10% of the 
whole investiment is the figure likely to occur, according to some literature 
on this figure (UNIDO, 1976, Araujo JR, 1974, UNIDO, 1966a).
4.3.1.(e) Relationship national/foreign technology and engineering process
Table n.4.4. Growth of Chemical Industry and Purchases from Engineering 
Sector.
Discrimination Percentages of growth
Growth rate of National Economy 
(% per year) 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Related growth rate of chemical 
industry (% per year) 3.3 6.6 10.0 13.3
Purchases of chemical industry on 
capital account from egnineering 
sector (% of value of sales
for expansion 3.3 6.6 10.0 13.3
for replacement 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
TOTAL 11.3 14.6 18.0 21.3
Source: The Chemical Industry, UNIDO 1969b).
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The growth of the chemical industry is just the same as the related 
growth of the purchases of that industry on capital account from the 
engineering sector # considering only the values for expansion. The 
engineering sector is more important, however, on the replacement programs, 
which indicates the urgent need for countries acquiring new petrochemical 
technology to have the control of the engineering sector. Even, if the 
acquiring country manages to get control only of the engineering techno­
logy and not of the chemical process, it has already obtained a substantial 
share of the technological process. The implication on jobs is evident.
Diagram 4.5. Relationship national/foreign technology and engineering 
processes.
Engineering Technology
4.3.1.(e) Appraisal of the tripartite policy
Ideal as it could appear, the tripartite scheme can be a simple 
justaposition and not an amalgamation or melting of forces. It is 
doubtful that a foreign partner owner of a specific know-how would be 
willing to hand it out in exchange for a minor participation in a joint 
venture. If this justaposition takes place, the company will have 
divided areas of influence among the partners with the technology to be 
used exerting a broad control on the operational activities. That is to say, 
they will have more power than they deserve as a shareholder.
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This fact is the result of the weakness of the Brazilian partners, 
who are in the projects due more to government incentives rather than 
to their own merits and to the knowledge of the appropriate technologies.
This is better understood by the analysis of the financial scheme used in 
the pole.
Taking the source of the funds used by those companies, we can verify 
that the state is responsible for 78% of the total investment. The out­
standing 22% being divided between the three partners of the pole, including 
the government as a shareholder. As the foreign partner sells his tech­
nology to the new company in exchange for shares, his cash participation is even 
less than the theoretical 7% that is reserved for him. In other words,
Brazil is responsible for more them 9/10 of the investment made at Camacari.
As the true philosophy behind the tripartite policy is in the last 
analysis a compromise policy between nationalisation and private enterprise, 
this dilemma cannot be solved by the industrial management, but it involves 
a more profound understanding by all partners of the nature of the economic 
structure that is being built in Brazil. Notwithstanding, that the NPP is 
intended to strengthen the Brazilian private sector, its presence at that 
site does not seem to have had much influence on this aspect up till now.
Anyway, as technology does not come alone but needs a whole structure 
of Assembly Engineering companies and detailed projects firms, a great 
improvement would be to make Brazil share a greater proportion in the 
implementation of these industrial plants. Here comes an obstacle related 
to the selling of technology. It is very usual for a given know-how to be 
sold with the specification of the firm that has the knowledge to put it 
into operation. The engineering firms which will work on the Assembly or 
on detail projects are already locked up inside these licensed technological 
packages. As there have been more than one country buying these tech­
nologies, a possible solution is to widen the basis of these engineering
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firms by international agreements with other Third World customers of the 
same services and with a significant petrochemical development program 
such as Argentina, Mexico and so on (section 3.5.3).
Nevertheless, further hope of strengthening the private sector can 
lie only in the development of the down-stream industries as seen in 
section 3.9.4.
We may conclude this section by saying that the tripartite scheme 
has neither proved to be an effective instrument to bring foreign investment 
to the country, nor it has a reliable tool to strengthen the private 
domestic sector in petrochemicals (4.2.1(a)). An important question, then, 
has to be made here. If with the tripartite scheme, the country is 
responsible for more than 90% of the investment, why not employ the out­
standing 10% left to buy the processes required for the pole or to guarantee 
technical assistance from different sources? It is clear that such a 
suggestion should be preceeded by a thorough analysis of the availability 
of those processes and the willingness of their holders to sell them.
Anyway, what must be clear is that the tripartite policy should be improved 
as a guarantee of a better participation of the Brazilian sector on the 
technical operation of the pole and to bring more investment from the foreign 
partner for these industrial efforts.
4.4. THE ORGANISATION STRUCTURE
As there are many institutions which have worked for the NPP and are 
related to different levels of government or to the private sector, 
the following headings study the way the pole works and its relation to 
the previously mentioned institutions. There is no attempt to cover all 
the governments bodies at Cama^ari, but only those with which we have dealt
in this research
4.4.1. The Federal Government Presence
As a national priority the NPP has been mainly a Federal Government 
project with strong regional support (chapter one/two). The Federal 
presence is made mainly by the financed institutions and by the State- 
owned co. Petrobras (Petroquisa/COPENE). There are however, many other 
Federal bodies with an effective contribution for the development of 
Camagari, such as GEIQUIM, SUDENE, GTFBA (Escola Tiomica Federal), UFBA 
(Uniconidede Federal da Bahia), CENTEC, GEIQUIM, INPI & FINEP, that are 
attached to different Federal Ministries (see diagram 4.6). The only 
coordination of the Federal services is made by Petroquisa/COPENE for the 
industrial aspects of the project.
4.4.2. The State Government Presence
As seen in chapter two, the state government has worked to get the 
Federal government to set the pole at Camagari. The BID mission was an 
initial indication of this policy. Further on, it has implemented a set 
of policies aimed at encouraging firms to move in (tax incentives) and has 
undertaken a wide infrastructure program at that site (6.3). The state 
secretariats for Labour and Social Welfare, Mines and Energy, Planning 
and Industry & Commerce were particularly busy at the project. The 
coordination of the state works for infrastructure development was headed 
by COPEC, which has also a section responsible for contacting new firms 
intending to enter the pole.
Similar to the Federal sphere, the efforts here were channelling towards 
engineering works generally connected to the infrastructure works of the pole. 
As the building up went on, the pressure to get the down-stream industries 
was felt. A company called Propar aiming at attracting potential entre- 
prenuers and other companies to Bahia and particularly to the NPP was
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founded in 1978, many years behind the beginning of work in the pole.
Diagram n.4.7. Die State Government Presence.
(see section 4.3.5)
Even, the establishment of Propar was not sufficient to provide all the 
services a pole needs to have. As the linkage network of industries is an 
essential feature in any pole (section 2.2.) the implementation of the 
NPP should have both infrastructure works and a managerial committment to 
get the already existing companies and entrepreneurs to join the pole. 
Fortunately, the lack of local participation has been avoided in the implemen­
tation of the Third Pole. There, industrial and commerical firms with links 
to the petrochemical industries have already set their lobby group to have a 
say in the planning of the pole. It is very early to forecast the outcome of 
the Third Pole, but, at least, this is a much better start.
4.4.3. The Municipal Presence
The pole has changed the face of Camacari in all aspects - social, 
political, economic and administrative (section 6.5. and for 
further details). It was not, however, a force behind the start of the 
pole, but its receiver. Today, Camagari and the pole are two completely
interlinked entities. The advent of the pole has also forced the Municipal 
Government into a complete administrative reform so that initially the 
entire Municipal machine is geared towards that industrial complex or as a 
function of it. There are some sections of this Municipal Government with 
utmost importance for this research, such as DECASA, SEDES (Secretaria de 
•Desemolviment Social) and SEDUC (Secretaria da Educacao).
Diagram 4.8 Municipal Government
Municipal Mayor
1Education j SocialDevelopment Other . I Secretaries
1
1 ,
: |---- Universidadej
j de Camagari !
¡ i --¡ PURA
!------- 1--1 CURA
j DECASA }~<
(see section 4.3.5).
The performance of the Municipal government is fully analysed in chapter 
six. One point, however, cam be emticipated here. Similar to the Federal 
and State Government, there is no attempt by the Municipal Authorities to 
get suggestions from prospective commerical and industrial firms during 
the building up of the pole. Moreover, there is a lack of coordination 
among so many entities working at the site. The pure division of works 
among COPENE (Industrial building up), COPEC (the industrial estate area) 
and Municipality (works outside COPEC area) does lack the integration 
component so important in this kind of large scale industrial complex.
An attempt for this coordinating effort was made with COMCOP (coordination 
of Camagari Petrochemical Pole) a body integrated by several state secretariats 
and the Mayor of Camagari, but with neither power nor financial resources
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to implement its decisions. It has only consultative duties, which does 
not fall in line with the experience drawn out from other industrial 
estates around the world and from these massive industrialization pro­
grams in one-single area suggesting that the coordinating organization 
must have sufficient power and funds to carry out its responsibilities.
(Merlyn - 1971, HMSO - 1974, de Oliveira, 1977).
4.4.4. The Organisation Structure of the NPP
Chapter three has emphasised the concentration characteristics of 
the petrochemical industries. A previous diagram - 2.3. has shown the 
main inter-relationships between the firms in the pole, in which some 
industries are almost entirely dependent on that complex both for their 
feedstocks and for the selling of their products. The last column on 
the right of the diagram indicates applications of some products and 
also new fields for the down-stream entrepreneurship. The diagram 2.3. 
confirms close concentration and the interdependence of the firms as seen 
in chapter three.
This interdependence, however, does not mean a close linkage to the local 
economy. If we look back to table n.2.7. that shows the destination of 
the total output of the pole, we realise that the proportion of products 
being sold in the regional market is very low which weakens the structure 
of an ideal pole in Perrouxian sense.
(a) Petroguisa & COPENE
Due to Petroquisa's role as the leading petrochemical company in Brazil 
(and its subsidiary COPENE in the NPP) and to the fact that firms inside 
the pole have it as a partner, this section makes a brief reference to both
companies.
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Diagram 4.9. Petroquisa Structure
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Copene administrative council has an equal number of representatives 
from Petroquisa, the government, the users, plus a representative from BNDE 
which can be explained by the origins of its financial resources.
Diagram n.4.11. Origin of COPENE'S Resources
(iii) Other Companies' Structure
Some companies in the pole are still in the process of installation, 
so they do not have a definitive structure yet. Others are in the first 
years of operation which is not sufficient to consolidate their structure. 
Administrative structure is not a permanent scheme, of course, but a 
philosophy behind a given administrative hierarchy has to be well established 
even to get the necessary changes.
IBP has proposed the following strategies for a petrochemical company 
in the implementation stage and at the operational phases.
The research has shown that the actual structure of the companies in 
the NPP are similar to the one proposed by IBP. Most of the companies, 
however, lack a highly placed officer or Director for human resource planning 
or development, that is, they do not have a director for that function at 
the same hierarchical level as for Finance, Sales and Production. Two
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exceptions were DOW Quimica (outside Camacari) with a high level Director 
for planning and Safron-Teijin (both at CIA) , with a Director for Industrial 
Relations.
Diagram Ko. 4/12 - Organisational structure for petrochemical plants in 
implementation stage.
(Adapted from IBP's proposal )
These findings do not fall in line with the expected policies towards 
the development of human resources. In effect, the major aims of an 
organisation are likely to reflect in its administrative structure. It 
seems a bit contradictory defining the development of the regional labour 
force as a major goal and not having a Director for Personnel or Industrial 
Relations or manpower planning in the upper rungs of the hierarchy.
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Diagram K. 4/l3 - Model of Structure for Petrochemical Companies in the NFP.
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4.4.5. Institutions working for the Pole
This section is a summary of the previous one and intends to see 
who does what in the pole, independently of its classification as a 
government or private institution.
(i) COPEC is the Portuguese initials for the Committee of the
2Petrochemical Complex of Camaçari. It also means a 243 Km 
area reserved for all the units of the pole in the Munici­
pality of Camaçari. The Committee is a State Body subordinate 
to the State Secretariat for Mines and Energy. It is respon­
sible for the implementation of the policies established in 
the Master Plan.
(ii) COMCOP - Comissao Coordenadora do Complexo Petroquimico
(Coordinating Commission of Camaçari Petrochemical Complex) 
is a body integrated by the several State Secretariats and 
the Mayor of Camaçari, under the Coordination of the Secretary 
for Mines & Energy. Its functions are the leadership and a 
coordination of the policies of the different Government bodies 
at Camaçari.
(iii) PETROQUISA - Petrobras Chemical - is a subsidiary of the State 
owned oil company that operates in the development of the 
national petrochemical industry.
(iv) COFIC - Committee for Industrial Promotion of Camaçari - is 
integrated with enterpreneurs of the petrochemical plants.
(v) CEPED - Research and Development Centre - under the State 
Secretariat for Planning is responsible for the supply of 
technological support to the petrochemical activities in Bahia.
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(vi) CENDRO - Centre for the Development of Organisational 
Resources - is a CEPED's Unit, responsible for promotion 
of training courses, seminars, research and kindred 
activities for the development of the regional enterprises.
(vii) PROPAR is a State of Bahia company in charge of promoting 
the growth and establishment of new industries in Bahia.
(viii) SUDENE Federal Agency attached to the ’Ministerio do Interior, 
responsible for overall planning in the whole North East, 
including Bahia.
(ix) BNDE - The National Economic Development Bank is the main 
financial source for investments and loans to the pole.
(x) GEIQUIM - A Department of the 'Ministerio da Industria' in
charge of the development of the chemical industry in Brazil.
It studies the requirements for the establishment of new 
industries, proposing or reducing the incentives.
(xi) INPI - is also attached to the 'Ministerio do Interior' and 
is the National Institute for the regulation of patents and 
industrial licences.
(xii) UFBA (Uhiversidade Federal da Bahia)
CENTEC (Centro Technologico da Bahia)
ETFBA (Escola Técnica Federal da Bahia)
all of them under the 'Ministerio de Educacao' are organisms 
for education and training at the University and lower level,
(xiii) CENPES is the Petrobras Research and Development Institute.
It had a section called CENPEQ in Bahia.
(xiv) BN (Banco do Nordeste) a bank under the 'Ministerio de Interior' 
created to coordinate the Federal Government investments in the
NE.
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(xvj FINOR is a scheme to distribute funds derived from tax incentives 
(deduction) made on the income tax of individuals and enter­
prises in Brazil to firms setting branches in the NE . It is 
jointly administered by SUDENE and BNB.
(xvi) CONDER - A state of Bahia company in charge of development plans 
for the Metropolitan area of Salvador.
(xvii) DECASA - A Municipality of Camaçari owned company in charge of 
the housing programs for Camaçari.
(xviii) PNTE/CEBRAE - Federal organisation designed to back Managerial
development programs, usually for the small and medium companies.
(xix) State Secretariats with straight relationship with the development 
of the pole:
Setrabes (labour and social welfare)
SME (Mines and energy)
SIC (Industry and Commerce)
(xx) SEOES (Local government secretaries: Secretariat for Social Development) 
It had worked firstly with the 'Ministerio do Trabalho'(Labour) in the 
program for reception of migrants at Camaçari. It has also under­
taken two projects PURA (Projects of Guided Housing of Camaçari) 
and CURA (Project of Urbanisation and Preparation of areas) which 
have been analysed in chapter six (section 6.6.1).
(xxi) SEDUC (Secretary«for Education). it has responsibility
for education at the Municipality and is working on a project for 
the 'University of Camaçari'.
The complexity and interlocking or overlapping nature of these many 
agencies is hardly likely to operate effectively without some rationalisa­
tion and very careful coordination based on well understood policies agreed
by all.
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(see UNIDO, 1969b; Isard, 1959, CLAN/CONDER w.d.). Even so, the range of 
economies of scale in petrochemicals is very wide, whence the trend to build 
higher capcity plants.
An illustrative example is quoted by Vietorisz using data for the
production of ammonia and including observed non-linear values (INPUT)
related to investment, labour and supervision per shift.
-
Plant Capacity Input
Labour (tons per day)
Workers per shift lOO 7
200 IO
300 12
500 15
Supervisor p/shift 50 to 200 2
over 200 4
(tons per year)
Investments
(millions of dollars) 36,000 5
108,000 11
180,000 16
The inputs were worked out for those values which expand proportionally 
as production grows. There are other factors, however, such as indirect 
labour that could be added afterwards as a percentage of the direct costs.
In this exponential function with a low elasticity exponent, the increase 
in the total output has a small response in the total increase in labour costs. 
In fact, the exponent for most petrochemical products are smaller than that 
shown in the diagram. The vertical dotted lines in the diagram show the limits 
within which the function is likely to work, that is, the limits within which 
economies of scale are likely to appear. (Diagram n.4/15).
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The labour cost of a low capacity plant is the same or even bigger 
than the cost of a higher capacity plant operating under its full capacity 
inside its range of economies of scale. With the higher capacity plants, 
it is also possible to lower unit labour costs by increasing output to 
installed capacity, where the output can be sold. The tendency, then, is 
to install plant capable of output well beyond current demand with each new 
installation creating potential surplus of output at least until demand 
catches up. This is probably the main reason for the increasing plant 
capacities of petrochemical plcints in the world and also for the world 
over supply of some chemical products (olefins), as each operator seeks 
to work his plants at the optimum level and build them with the most economical 
capacity.
In fact, the increase in plaint capacity has lowered significantly the 
laibour costs in petrochemicals. Again, UNIDO (1966) compares labour costs 
at different plaint capacities.
Product Labour Costs
(% of the total costs)
Small Large
Ammonia 10.3 1.6
Methanol 9.3 1.5
Acetylene 7.8 3.9
Urea 11.1 4.4
Ammonium Nitrate 9.8 4.2
Acrylonitrile 8.1 5.2
Vynil Chloride 5.3 2.3
This labour cost today tends to be an even lower percentage, due to the 
growth in plant capacities auid to the increases in the total costs of fixed 
investment (equipment, mainly).
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Supervision is also very low in these highly capital-intensive 
plants due to the fact that a ratio highly skilled-employee to super­
visors tends to be low. Labour intensive industries use more super­
vision down to the lower echelons of the organisation (Woodward, 1965, 
Minzberg 1979). In the diagram n.4.17, the supervision line is plotted 
against the lower points of the range given in the UNIDO's table. Similar 
to indirect costs, supervision can also be calculated as a percentage of 
the direct costline (INPUT).
It is valid to state here that the main savings in these economies 
of scale are not derived from the labour function (even due to the small 
slope of its line) but from the fixed investment. That is one reason why 
the construction of small capacity plants in underdeveloped countries even 
with small markets is not advisable. In the same way, a high capital 
labour cost ratio is as undesirable as a high capital output ratio.
Then, it is not economically sensible to build small petrochemical 
plants even when initial markets are small. The strategy of the NPP is 
building capacity plans in line with this function.
(Diagram No. 4/l5 overleaf)
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4.S.2. Background for the Human Resources Plan
The corporate plan for the human resources can be divided into two 
parts (a) a Internal Corporate Plan and (b) an External Corporate Plan 
or the Corporate Plan for the Community (see chapter six) .
4.5.2(a). Internal Corporate Plan
Any coporate plan intending to develop the human resources must keep 
in mind the points raised at section 4.4., in the first place. Due to 
the nature and objectives of the NPP, there are otheipoints which deserve 
careful study for the overall policies and more particularly for the human 
resources policies:
(i) Régionalisation of the labour force - As have been previously 
stressed the objectives are for a greater participation of the 
local human resources. Some processes such as the ancillary 
activities, which are not closely related to the technological 
operations , can be extended fully to the local population, which 
can be an initial priority. With the development of the pole, 
an integration of local labour at all other areas can be prog­
ressively extended.
(ii) Choice of the plants for the basic complexes - As seen in chapter 
3, the choice of those plants were in full accord with national 
priorities and the particular characteristics of the petrochemical 
industries, but did not face the primary needs of the region, so, 
besides the efforts described in the previous paragraph, there 
must be found a way to correlate any products or by-products of 
that complex to the regional development.
IV  -  35
4.5.2. Background for the Human Resources Plan
The corporate plan for the human resources can be divided into two 
parts (a) a Internal Corporate Plan and (b) an External Corporate Plan 
or the Corporate Plan for the Community (see chapter six).
4.5.2(a). Internal Corporate Plan
Any coporate plan intending to develop the human resources must keep 
in mind the points raised at section 4.4., in the first place. Due to 
the nature and objectives of the NPP, there are otherpoints which deserve 
careful study for the overall policies and more particularly for the human 
resources policies:
(i) Régionalisation of the labour force - As have been previously 
stressed the objectives are for a greater participation of the 
local human resources. Some processes such as the ancillary 
activities, which are not closely related to the technological 
operations, can be extended fully to the local population, which 
can be an initial priority. With the development of the pole, 
an integration of local labour at all other areas can be prog­
ressively extended.
(ii) Choice of the plants for the basic complexes - As seen in chapter 
3, the choice of those plants were in full accord with national 
priorities and the particular characteristics of the petrochemical 
industries, but did not face the primary needs of the region, so, 
besides the efforts described in the previous paragraph, there 
must be found a way to correlate any products or by-products of 
that complex to the regional development.
IV - 36
(iii) Social overheads - The compact location of the npp makes
room for the development of common services and the sharing of 
social overheads or even an agreed general policy in such fields 
as transport, communications and provision of facilities for the 
community. The subsidies the pole gives to the transport of 
employees to and from the surrounding towns earn be substantially 
diminished, if it tramsfers a percentage of those subsidies 
to back a housing prograun at Camagari for instamce.
(iv) National Technology - Although technology is a subject that
stretches far beyond the frontier of huraam resource planning it is clear 
that it is closely related to it. There is not technology transfer 
without a skilled and trained basic labour force to accept the tramsfer.
A long term plan should be designed aiming at the acquisition and learning
of new technology. Special care should be taken to avoid
contracts that do not enable the domestic partners to learn
the skills necessary to the operation of the whole plamt. In
this way, operc tions such as the "turn-key" contracts should be
shunned • Policies intended to strengthen the local research and
development institutes must be envisaged and measures to relate the
purchase of equipment and technology to the training of the HR
taken.
(v) Organisation and Structure of the NPP Because of the way it is 
organised, there is no possibility whereby a single company or 
institute could set a corporate plan for the whole complex on 
its own (section 4.3). However, COPENE is undoubtedly the best 
placed organisation to lead a common program for the development 
of human resources. As a subsidiary of Petroquisa which is necessary 
partner in many companies in the NPP, it may also suggest
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to other enterprises the importance of such a development.
In summary and as a result of the previous points, all the enterprises 
have to get together to find a common ground for the training of their 
management, professionals, skilled and semi-skilled workers. Otherwise, 
if the companies just want to fight for the best man-power in a scarce 
market, without putting extra effort to training their own labour force 
they might possibly find themselves with insufficient labour to fight for.
Moreover, as the companies are interdependent in many fields (chapter 
three), they should have common industrial relations policies, whereby they 
were agreed at least on the policies towards selection, training and 
development. Remuneration is also a fertile field for cooperation.
As the policies for the human resources are likely to be different 
for each category of labour in accordance with their skills and with demand 
and supply, this subject is then broken into the following categories; 
which are thoughtfully analysed in chapter five;
a.1. ENTREPRENEURS - As seen from the 4.3., there is initially
no participation of the local entrepreneurs at the basic complex in 
the NPP.
a.2. MANAGERIAL STAFF - Petrochemical companies are understood to save
on management due to their capital intensive characteristic and to the 
fluid nature of some of their processes (section 3.4.). Mintzberg (1973)and 
ttorawetz (1973) have also studies backing this point. Due to the 
lack of local experience in petrochemistry, the region is not expected to 
be able to offer great support in this category, especially on the 
subjects related to the technological aspects.
a.3. PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNICIANS - These are the people who would carry
the main tasks of absorbing the new bought-in technology. Even if the 
demand for them can be met by the market, they can still be a problem.
Due to the importance of their responsibilities, the strategic importance
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of this group is better measured by the quality rather than the 
quantity the market can provide.
a. 4. SKILLED AND SEMI-SKILLED WORKERS - A very wide gap is expected between 
the demand and supply of these workers, due to the previous non­
existence of petrochemical industries, 
a.5. UNSKILLED LABOUR - Based on chapter one, we can affirm an excess of
supply over demand here. High unemployment in this sector might turn 
out to put strong political pressure over the labour policies adopted 
in the NPP. Due to its nature, this is studied in conjunction with 
the local community in chapter six.
4.4.2.(b) The Human Resource Policies and the Community
Chapter one has studied Camagari at the time of the arrival of the 
pole. As a small town that receives a massive industrial project, it has 
also acquired new problems. It is already suffering problems of high prices 
for land, pollution, high migration segregation and prostitution according 
to report from the Municipal Secretariat for Social Securtiy (SEDES) 
that deserves special attention by the authorities.
Considering some planning forecasts from the Municipality that over 150 
thousands jobs would be created in Camacari by the beginning of the 80's 
plus more than two dependents for each employee, we would have virtually half 
a million people living in that pole. Earlier estimates put the local 
population around 250 thousands by the same time. Jobs and population are 
supposed to be distributed in the following way:
Jobs - In the basic complex 16,000
- Derived from the down-stream
industries 35,000
- Indirect jobs (calculated in the
ratio direct/indirect equals 1/2) 102,OOP
153,000
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Resident Population : Camacari (centre) 150,000
(Dias d 1Avila) 100,000
250,000
(Ratio employee/dependent equals
1/2) 300,000
(Ratio employee/dependent equals
1/3) 450,000
It is clear that the number of jobs does not match the growth of 
population, even assuming as correct the over optimistic forecast for the 
creation of 150 thousand jobs at Camagari. with the service industry not 
concentrated at that town plus the slow build-up of the down-stream 
industries (see 1.5 and 2.4.5(a)) even a ratio of one direct job to two 
indirect jobs seem very high at Camagari. That ratio would give around
36,000 indirect jobs based on the 19 thousand jobs in the-firms now in operation 
in implementation or with approved projects (COPEC 1979).
Even if the estimates are too high strong pressure will be put on the 
government to house that expanding population, to provide services (health, 
education, leisure, transport and especially jobs). As far as the industries 
are concerned, they have to decide on the advantages and disadvantages of 
subsidising the transport costs of labour coming in from other towns. 
Alternatively, as long journeys to work negatively affect productivity and 
the corporate image of the industry at the local level they could back the 
programs of local services in the creation of a new community (housing, schools, 
services). Whatever the answer, the needs for an external corporate plan for 
the human resources are still prevailing. It has to be done regardless of 
the main authority behind it.
As the industries have a direct interest in the development of the human
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resources at the NPP, they must also support any movement in that direction.
From the present stage of development of Camagari, the main features
in this external corporate sub-plan must give priorities to-such items as:
(i) Health (Chemical industries can affect the health of employees 
and surrounding population.
(ii) Schools - especially devoted to the children of NPP employees.
(iii) Housing - priorities to those with jobs in the municipality or 
in any company of the pole, and avoidance of the creation of 
Shanti-suburbs).
(iv) Infrastructure - Transport to work, comramunications.
(v) Unskilled labour - There is a strong case to recommend the 
establishment of labour intensive industries around the pole 
without which the amount of unemployment might possible obstruct 
a suitable climate for the normal development of those capital- 
intensive industries. This is not a problem to be ignored even 
if the pole is incapable of providing sufficient jobs for that 
population. Future problems should be anticipated and action to 
avoid them taken today.
4.6. CONCLUSION
The scheme chosen by the government to strengthen the Brazilian petro­
chemical industry and to leave the control of the NPP in Brazilian hands 
has neither proved to be an effective instrument of control, nor was it a 
reliable tool to make stronger the Brazilian private sector in petrochemicals, 
nor was it an efficient means to bring outside investment into the country.
If the total private Brazilian participation in the NPP is small, the NE share of 
it is really insignificant. Furthermore, there is little participation of 
Engineering firms in the assembling and designing of the industrial plants.
The initial advantages the government could have in exerting a stronger control
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of the NPP, derived from its higher investment in the site and from the 
supply of feedstocks, shrink before the absence of a domestic know-how in 
the field.
The macro-structure of the different government levels, at Camagari 
is not very appropriate to tackle the problems of large scale industrial 
investments for the following reasons:
(i) lack of an effective coordination of many government organisations 
in the site;
(ii) priority was given to the development of the physical rather 
than human infrastructure for the pole; hence
(iii) priority was given to building a huge industrial complex rather 
than a pole in the Perrouxian sense.
The hopes put on the down-stream industries to further develop the 
social structure of the region with the provision of jobs are very weak 
due to the low rate of direct/indirect jobs in the few companies so far 
attracted to the NPP. As far as the organisation of the pole industries 
is concerned, it does not reflect a major concern for the development of 
the human resources inside or outside the companies.
There should be however, a fertile field for cooperation between the 
industries and the government for the social development of Camagari.

V  - 2
Introduction
This chapter deals with the development of human resources 
policies in the NPP and studies their strategic importance for its 
consolidation. It is divided into four parts.
Part One deals with general issues of the HR policies such as 
its strategic importance, planning and demand and supply. Part Two,
Three and Four are related to Entrepreneurs, Managerial Staff and 
the Professions, Technicians and Skilled Workers, the categories 
proposed in Chapter Four. The unkskilled labour is dealt with in 
Chapter Six.
As the NPP was organised with several capital-intensive, profit­
conscious industries, its commitment to create jobs has been conditioned 
by its labour-saving technology. The hope for substantial employment 
is, then, jeopardised, at least, at the core industries of the basic 
petrochemical complex. Further hopes to create more jobs lie, 
therefore, in the consolidation of the down-stream industries of the pole.
The chapter comments on the close relationship between the ^
consolidation of the pole and its human resources policies, particularly 
for the entrepreneurs (part two), the Managerial Staff (part three) and 
the Professions, Technicians and Skilled Labour (part four).
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PART I - GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HU'.AN RESOURCES
POLICIES
5.1. The Problem.
5.1.1. Strategic Importance of the Human Resources Policies.
5.2. The Place of Hunan Resources in Stratecic Planninr.
5.3« Demand of Human Resources at the 17PF.
5.3.1. Petrochemical Profiles.
5.3.2. Characteristics of the Demand.
5.4 . The Supply of Hunan Resources at the uPP.
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The need for Human Resources management or development 
is increasingly accepted in the business world. Personnel Administration 
or management, socio-organisational development, industrial relations 
and socio-technical systems are all names given to the function of 
"developing and managing (a company's) human resources at work towards 
new goals of greater sharing of personnel, social and economic values". 
(Mills,1973). Many other authors prefer a descriptive definition
and enroll a list of some tasks that may fall under a human resources 
Unit. These tasks cure: recruitment, hiring, training, developing, 
mobility, industrial relations, wages and job evaluation. Our main 
interests lie on those tasks which have a straight relationship with 
the impact an industrial company has on its environment, especially, 
recruitment, training, development and wages.
Regardless of whatever misgivings managers used to raise against any 
definition of human resources in an enterprise, we have opted for Mill's 
concept since it puts us straight into the business policy arena. Human 
resources are set towards goals, objectives. The first question, then, 
we have to ask is "who sets the corporate human resources plan in a 
company"? There is an increasing tendency to give the human resource 
field the same status that production, sales and finance have already 
achieved. In this way, it is believed that a human resource manager 
should be part of the top management of the company. Nevertheless this 
is still a controversial issue, since human resources policies can be 
regarded as a derived function in an enterprise, that is, the forecasted 
demand of labour, training and development, for instance, will depend on 
objectives set for other areas, notably, production, sales and finance 
(Reynolds, 1976). Following this line of argument, the human
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achieved. In this way, it is believed that a human resource manager 
should be part of the top management of the company. Nevertheless this 
is still a controversial issue, since human resources policies can be 
regarded as a derived function in an enterprise, that is, the forecasted 
demand of labour, training and development, for instance, will depend on 
objectives set for other areas, notably, production, sales and finance 
(Reynolds, 1976). Following this line of argument, the human
resources policies of the North East petrochemical pole is hinged upon the
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amount of goods- to be produced and sold in the market. The shortcoming 
of this argument is that an enterprise must be seen as a system where 
the policies of each department are dependent on the overall objectives 
of the system. We are arguing that the business must be taken as 
a system, so that any function in an. enterprise is dependent on all 
others and thus, is a derived one. As every single unit in an 
organisation depends on the people who work in it, it follows that the 
human resources policies involve all echelons of a particular company 
from the shopfloor to the top management. There are many reasons, 
however, why human resources planning deserves a strategic importance.
It cannot be left to independent actions by different units, but has to 
be placed in a unit high enough in the hierarchy to give this field 
a unitary approach or to coordinate the policies adopted in any branch 
of the company.
5.1.1. strategic Importance of the HRP
Among the reasons of the strategic importance of the human resources 
policies, we can specify:
(a) Human resources are a scarce factor
As we can expect, labour with the many varied skills required in an 
industrial complex is difficult to find in an underdeveloped region.
There is a surplus of unemployed people but this does not mean that a 
balanced labour force is available. That surplus is a liability rather 
than an asset in the short run. It really does not mean availability 
of an adequate labour force, so every enterprise must be prepared to 
convert that liability into an advantage. Even, if the petrochemical 
companies can find a glut of workers for some posts, there will be other 
occupations for which supply must be difficult to find.
(b) Human resources are, not a barterable commodity
The installation of an industrial complex requires land, capital,
machinery and men. In our case, the first three factors have been already
6provided. Not only do the men take more time to find they cannot
simply be 'bought in'in an underdeveloped economy. A company with
the same machinery and using similar technology may have different 
productivity performance, in different countries. A UNIDO 
study indicates that this performance 'varies in accordance to the 
development level of the country. "It is, therefore, in the human 
resources planning that the key of modern management in underdeveloped 
countries can be found" (UNIDO 1966a) . A company can buy an estate 
to be settled in, achieve the most up-to-date machinery available, 
borrow capital but it has to train and develop its labour force. That 
is of utmost importance for the strategic planning of the company. A 
very good approach is, to use Keller's words: (p.216) "to tap just about 
every possible source for additional entrepreneurs, managers and 
professionals". Harbison (1975 p.18) in a clearer and more daring way 
put human resources not only as the "active agents of production" but 
as "the central goal of development", and particularly, should we say, 
of continuing development, stage by stage.
(c) Wages and Salary
The increase in wages and salaries in the balance sheet has convinced 
many businessmen of the importance of manpower planning. Companies 
have to explain the reason why they are paying different wages -to their 
employees,and for that purpose a structured scheme should be provided.
In a highly competitive economy, the capability of firms to attract the 
best qualified labour force will hinge upon its wage systems and upon 
the image it has created in the labour market. In petrochemicals this 
argument has a serious shortcoming. Despite the fact that wages and 
salaries in the petrochemical industry are high in comparison with other 
industries (C.& Eng. Dec, 1977) , this item represents only a small 
percentage of the product cost. So, petrochemical firms can increase
substantially the wages of their labour-force without great alteration
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is of utmost importance for the strategic planning of the company. A 
very good approach is, to use Keller's words: (p.216) "to tap just about 
every possible source for additional entrepreneurs, managers and 
professionals". Harbison (1975 p.lS) in a clearer and more daring way 
put human resources not only as the "active agents of production" but 
as "the central goal of development", and particularly, should we say, 
of continuing development, stage by stage.
(c) Wages and Salary
The increase in wages and salaries in the balance sheet has convinced 
many businessmen of the importance of manpower planning. Companies 
have to explain the reason why they are paying different wages to their 
employees,and for that purpose a structured scheme should be provided.
In a highly competitive economy, the capability of firms to attract the 
best qualified labour force will hinge upon its wage systems and upon 
the image it has created in the labour market. In petrochemicals this 
argument has a serious shortcoming. Despite the fact that wages and 
salaries in the petrochemical industry are high in comparison with other 
industries (C.& Eng. Dec, 1977), this item represents only a small 
percentage of the product cost. So, petrochemical firms can increase
substantially the wages of their labour-force without great alteration
in the price of their products. Therefore, the management of 
petrochemical companies is not pressed by the wages structure in 
the same way as managers of such companies as textiles, clothing 
and footwear.
(d) Training and Development
The specialisation of functions has reinforced the needs of training 
and development for many posts, especially, those concerned with 
managing, supervision and production, where high technology is applied 
or where it changes. Sometimes, the retraining of the overall labour 
of a particular unit is necessary due to new industrial methods and 
processes. This takes time and money. Training and development has 
been regarded as one of the most difficult challenges in the North East 
petrochemical pole. Regardless of some experts being trained by the 
parent company, there are many posts for which there will be a shortage 
of suitable applicants. We must ask how to get the applicants for 
those posts or, how to give unskilled workers the necessary skills to 
carry out these specialised jobs.
(e) Changing environment and customers
It is not only the internal changes that exert influences on the policies 
of a company. Changing labour legislation , trade union militancy, 
public opinion, the corporate image of the company, the establishment 
of new enterprises in the same site which may compete for the company 
labour force, are all objects of concern. A manager of human resources 
should keep his eyes open for the inside and outside environment. Here, 
a problem of maintenance of its labour is essential. In competitive 
markets, firms do not want to lose key workers to other industries or 
companies since they may take technology away with them. An important 
point is that the close location of the majority of the North East 
petrochemical companies at walking distance one from another makes 
changing jobs very easy for employees.
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(f) Integration and socio-technical system
The planning of human resources can only be effective if fully 
integrated into the whole planning system of the company. Thus, 
close links between the human resources planning department and production, 
finance, marketing, public relations, and whatever other department may 
exist in the enterprise should be accomplished. Some writers prefer 
the expression socio-technical systems,just to indicate that any change 
inside or outside the enterprise may influence the conduct of the human 
resources in the firm (Cornolissen, 1977)«
The supply of labour for the company is closely connected to the 
overall corporate objectives of the firms and to the environmental trends. 
The demand depends specifically on the company's proposed objectives, 
and is also connected to the environment where it is set.
Harbison (1975) came to realise that the concept of industrial relations 
systems illuminates the relationships among the actors in the 
industrialisation process - workers, management, government and society.
The system's external environment has a role to play. This industrial 
relation system, which is part of the broad political and managerial 
system of each nation, lays down the fundamental points of the complex 
web of rules relating to each partner in the industrial relation exercise. 
Industrialists, government, shareholders, unions, technology and foreign 
partners, consumers market, all take part in the game. Governments, 
however, through legislation have increasingly become the most influential 
factor in any industrial relation system. Here, then, human resources 
policies are as heavily dependent on governmental actions as they are 
on internal plans.
(g) Crisis of employment
The regional development and the provision of jobs being two goals 
of the establishment of the NPP, the importance of HRP is straightforward. 
As the lack of jobs in general is a serious problem in the NE, the
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underutilisation of. the available labour force is an intolerable aspect 
of the NPP. The full and rational utilisation of manpower is not only 
a problem affecting the -industrial sector, but also the whole 
community. As industrialisation and education tend to develop
together, the NPP might be a cell of skills development in the region.
The point here is not that the industries should turn into a university 
institution, but that the corporations, as every major social institution, 
have an educational role in society (Harbison 1975, Drucker, 1969).
They have no option. We dare say that for better or worse industries 
have assumed this role throughout history. The strategic importance 
of human resources planning in the NPP is, then, twofold: it is a 
leading industrial project in the region and it has to assume an 
education role.
5.2. The Place of Human Resources in Strategic Planning
The place of human resources in ntrategic planning varies considerably from 
industry to industry. The organisation of its internal structure 
has to obey, of course, the size and type of industry, the management 
philosophy and local pressure. Large companies in highly competitive 
markets under the pressure of public opinion and well organised to 
meet these environmental constraints, are likely to have the better 
organised HR units. What should be clear is that HR policies cannot 
be left for decision by the HR Department alone; they must be an 
integral part of the total strategic planning exercise of top management: 
as with all strategies they must be constantly reviewed and up-dated.
They cannot be taken without consideration of the external environment 
(the supply of suitable employees) as well as of present and expected 
future demands nor without the support of managers in every function and
at every level.
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Similar to other strategic issues, the policies on human resources 
should be the corporate work of a committee or a working party of 
directors who study the implications of the overall company's policies 
and state the human resource policies for implementation by the 
respective departments. This means that the HR Department is needed 
but it is there to operate within the strategy agreed from time to 
time. The level of such a Department inside the hierarchy indicates 
the importance management gives to the HR policies.
Moreover, human resources planning is a continuous affair often with 
a long lead time for adequate training and companies may not be able 
to cope with it unless they purposefully prepare their internal 
structure for that task. On no account, however, will the planning of 
human resources hinge only on internal factors but also on several 
others over which singular companies may or may not have control.
5.2.1. External Factors
(a) Population - Data on population, age mix, migration patterns, 
employment and unemployment levels, birth and death rates, distance 
travelled to work are all very important for planning and we have already 
analysed them in previous sections of this research.
(b) Infrastructure - (housing, health, social facilities, leisure, 
transport, etc). This item is of paramount importance, in newly 
developed areas, since labour coming from outside may want to know 
details of these topics.
(c) Education - The network system of education ' (universities, 
technical colleges, research institutes,etc.) must have an cutput adequate 
for the needs of the pole.
(d) Global Performance of the Economy - The performance of the economy 
as a whole is clearly a thermometer for the health of any industrial 
planning. An economic crisis cannot only cause layoffs and shortage in
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demand but also precipitate new waves of internal migration, which 
could put further pressure on the pole to provide employment through 
its down-stream initiatives.
(e) Training Facilities - What schemes, public or private, are 
there in the region for those who need additional training to carry 
out their jobs? Or else, what are the arrangements for the training 
of the new labour force? As the technical side, at Camacari, is 
overwhelmingly under the responsibility of the foreign partner, there 
are some contractual clauses by which he is responsible for the 
development, and training of manpower. It is very often regarded as 
part of the technological package but it does not relieve other partners 
from involvement in this important task.
(f) Other bonus for employment - It is a very common policy, 
nowadays, to give incentives to industries for the number of jobs 
they create in underdeveloped areas (Holanda 1975) Brazil does
not follow this pattern. Employment, however, is seen as one out of 
several criteria for a firm to receive tax reductions to set up 
branches in the North East. (BNB. 1979)
(g) Arrival of new Firms - The development of new firms in the region 
will certainly contribute to a shortage of skilled labour due to the new 
specialised jobs that could be created.
(h) Building-up of the industrial complex - The construction and 
equipping of the pole provides jobs for thousands of workers who will 
be unemployed when the building-up period finishes. The authorities 
should have drawn additional plans so that the eventual layoffs should 
not create an atmosphere of disillusion towards the pole.
(i) Technical Change - Some technical innovations oblige enterprises 
to change their policies completely, with reorganisation of their labour 
force, requiring training, redundancies, transfers. This can happen
in petrochemical industries by a change of the route of a given product.
(j) Global Statistics - There ia a scarcity, imprecision and
inadequacy of the statistical data available in Brazil and yet this is
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vital for manpower forecasts in the short, medium and long terms.
This makes the exercise of planning even more difficult.
(k) Wages and Salaries in the Market - Some surveys have shown
that wages are higher in the NPP than in other similar industries 
in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and that, even before the development of 
the NPP, wages and salaries were higher in Bahia than in Rio de Janeiro 
(SME (1972)). Other researches have confirmed the same trends. (COFIC) 
However, as the cost of living in Salvador is also higher than in other major 
Brazilian cities (SEPLANTEC) the attraction of skilled employees from 
other regions has become even more difficult. There is a hope that 
these wages, would tend to equalise after a few years of operation of 
the new industries. It is thought to be just a matter of stabilisation 
of the total labour market. That is only possible, however, if there
is a demand/supply balance in trained people for the jobs now seeking 
applicants.
(1) Institutions - Every country has its institutions to provide
services in certain fields of industrial organisation. These institutions 
deal with such important issues as loans, subsidies, tax incentives 
and industrial location. As early as in the first stages of their
projects the prospective enterprises need well trained managers able to 
speak the same language as the technocrats of those institutions and use 
their evaluation tools ranking from mathematical models to several criteria 
of social priorities. In this way, we can say that getting a project 
through the intricate web of bureaucratic agencies is the first test to 
measure the ability of managers.
5.3. Demand for Human Resources
The demand of human resources refers to the number of people the 
firms need today and will need in a future situation (Bryant & Niehaus,
1978).
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5.3.1. Petrochemical Profiles
In the case of new industrialization programs, when many new firms 
come to the labour market approximately at the same time.planners used 
to make use of similar industries profiles to see the total impact of 
the forecasted demand of human resources on the market. Derived from the 
Master Plans for each industry, the Setrabes has arrived at. the following
profile:
For the Basic Complex Camacari
Category of Labour %
Executives 2,62
Technicians & Professionals 7,20
Operational Staff 53,15
Administrative Support 
For the transformation (downstream) industry
57,03
Executives 3,0
Technicians & Professionals 8,0
Administrative Support 5,0
Skilled workers 25,00
Unskilled workers 59,00
Present researches confirm these data. In effect, a study based on 
1748 industries all over Brazil has arrived at the profile on the 
next page.
Because these profiles are for the chemical industry in general, the 
percentage for each groups has a wide variance. The percentages for the 
North East present desproportionate shares derived probably from the 
higher proportion of newly created petrochemical concerns on the overall 
chemical structure. According to the SME (1972) the basic complex was 
expected to have needed by 1979 some 8,000 technicians of a medium level.
1 ncl udin.i
Table n.5.1 V - 14
Profile of the Human Resources employed by the Chemical Industry.
Employee North East 
%
Rest of Brazil 
%
1.Professionals
Chemical Engineers 1.3 2.8
Other Engineers 1.7 2.2
Chemists 0.7 0.5
Other 4.1 4.2
2. Technicians
Chemists 2.1 2.9
Other Technicians 6.4 12.4
3.Skilied Labour 31.9 47.1
4.Unskilled Labour 51.8 27.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Source: Percentages worked out from research by ABIQUIM "INDUSTRIA
QUIMICA BRASILERIA" (1979).
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operators, supervisors, machanics, electricians and laboratory personnel, 
among others. As for higher level labour, the same estimate suggested 
that a total of 310 chemical, electrical and mechanical engineers would 
be required for the basic complex (COPEC 1974).
(a) Differences in Profiles
If we combine the equation and the profiles above, we will find that 
the percentage for technical and professionals seem to be very high 
in comparison with developed countries, where that share falls down 
to approximately 4%. - Canada, Japan, USA. In Latin America, however,
it is generally very high (UN/ECLA - 1966). There are some hypothetical 
reasons for these differences, derived especifically from the ineficiency 
of the educational system which does not produce a work force in balance with 
needs: There are too few craftsmen or tradesmen in contrast to a fair
supply of the highly trained or educated categories.
Other reasons are:
(i) The industries may be employing over-trained men for less skilled jobs;
(ii) Industries may be employing university educated people who could 
not find proper jobs to do less skilled tasks, due to a shortage 
of medium-level skilled workers;
(iii) The medium skilled workers are not sufficiently prepared to do 
certain kinds of work; then the industry make up with over-skilled 
labour;
(iv) University educated professionals accepted less skilled jobs 
while waiting for promotion
Some industries have, however, a very low percentage of professionals 
in relation to the total workforce. An ECLA study found that in Peru 
skilled labour represented about 15% of the total labour in the chemical 
industry, compared with about 25% for metal manufacturing machinery.
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A similar picture emerges from a companion ECLA study dealing with 
Argentina, where the chemical industry employes a smaller percentage 
(12 to 15%) of skilled labour than the seven other industrial sectors 
analysed ( UNIDO 1966a)•
(b) Proportion of Professionals
The number of professional of course, depends upon the kind of 
engineering process developed, the level of automation, quality 
control, product characteristics and upon the precision and compexity 
of the required auxiliary services. The chemical industry, generally, 
has a high percentage of Technical and Professional manpower in comparison 
with other manufacturing sectors. (UNIDO 1966a).
The most important point here for our study is that the chemical 
industry, though employing very little labour, seems to save on 
management»which is another scarce factor in developing countries, if it is 
compared to other industries which use labour-intensive techniques for 
export-oriented products (Morawetz 1973). Seeing this problem in the NE 
a Brazilian planner in an interview has stated that to use labour 
intensive industries in that environment, they would need either a 
slavery structure or an organisation similar to the Roman Army, because 
the North East is completely without managerial staff at all levels, 
and labour intensive industries require a high proportion of supervisors, 
middle managers etc. Both the Army and slavery need staff for 
coercing people and maintaining production. On the other hand, capital 
intensive industries with highly technological plants give rise to a 
small labour force in general. However bigger the ratio of managers and 
supervisory staff to total personnel may be in those companies, this 
ratio does not compensate the actual loss of labour in lower ranges
(Woodward, 1965).
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Table No. 5.1 A
Forecast Demand of manpower in the basic comlex
Category Total in the period 
1975/1980
1978 1979 1980
Executives 223 10 io io
Technicians and
Professional 542 31 31 31
Operational
Support 4.984 236 236 236
Administrative
Support 2.029 74 74 74
Source : SETRABES.
The figures on the last three columns represent the additional 
requirements needed per year as they were originally forecast.
The figures on the first column are the total demand for those 
categories in the period 1975/1980.
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SENAI research using different methods has forecasted 26.000 
and 27.500 employees in Brazil for 1981 (SENAI 1977). These 
figures are very pessimistic for the present development of the 
petrochemical industries in Brazil. The petrochemical complex 
at Camacari alone would have 50% of that figure (see chapter 5.2) 
which leads us to believe that the number would be much higher.
Table No. 5 .2.
Jobs at Camacari and in the RMS including companies 
that are not on stream yet (Situation at Oct.1979).
Location Firms in Operation Firms under construction 
and approved projects
! TOTAL
Firms Jobs
____________ i
1
Camacari 24
r~
12
i
I
í
!
36
!
!i
15,599
Simoes Filho 
and
Candeias 6 1 7 3,565
TOTAL 30 13 43 19,164
Source: Secretaria da Industria e Comercio/BA.
Table No. 5.3
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Profile of the workforce in petrochemical 
industries according to the research undertaken 
by SETRABES.
Occupations
Skilled workers 
Engineers (Total)
Chemists
Mechanics
Electricians
Production and Maintenance 
Administration and others
TOTAL
: Data from the Project
( yi '
Sources Setrabes - 1972.
Data were obtained from the projects of firms to be established in 
the NPP. Similar data were obtained in a research among 7 firms 
(6 petrochemical and 1 that could change to utilise petrochemical 
feedstocks) giving for skilled workers - 40.3%, Administration and 
others 29.0% and Production & Management 71.0%.
As the North East region has virtually no experience of large scale 
industrial petrochemical programmes, the figures referring to the gross 
availability of labour does not offer a clear explanation of the exact 
nature of demand/supply. An additional effort to specify each 
occupation content should be made. Let's suppose a demand of 50 
maintenance technicians for the pole. The most important information, 
that is,'maintenance technicians for petrochemical equipment', is missed 
from the figure. The importance of this detail is paramount, since we 
cannot study the demand/supply of labour without a clear specification 
of functions. In a way, most posts of the production area have specific 
requirements which the market is not able to provide. What the market can 
offer are candidates with a basic technical education who can probably 
quickly be turned into petrochemical maintenance experts. The training 
of someone with no technical background would be much longer and less 
certain. Following this line of argument, most candidates for vacant 
posts would require additional on-the-job training. The SENAI research 
(1977) has pointed out the most important posts in the industry with an 
additional indication of the training requirements. Unfortunately, the 
hard core data of that research was not published and an expensive national 
survey on the demand and supply of labour for the oil and petrochemical 
industries is kept filed in the SENAI and in Petrobras.
(b) Flaws in the Forecasted Studies
All the preceeding forecasts have some shortcomings. They were drawn from 
the original Master Plans of each industry, which were prepared to get the 
company's constitutional papers through the governmental Agencies for approval. 
Even if you think that those plans are strictly precise on the demand of
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5.3.2. Characteristics of the demand of human resources in the NPP
(a) Lack of Experienced Labour
v - n
Distribution of Key Posts in the Oil and Petrochemical Industries
Table No. 5.4.
Key Posts Total Oil & Petro­
chemical Industries
Petrochemical
Operational
Area
Engineers (Petrochemical 
Processing)
143 143
Equipment Engineers 1,101 156
Production Foremen 256 O
Petrochemical Processing 
Operators 3,777 2,017
Instrumental Control 
Operators
(Material Output, Flows 
and Stock Control) 994 179
Analysts 893 279
Instrumentists 531 243
Mechanics 1,659 479
Electricians 787 253
Metal Workers 717 123
Welders 525 122
Maintenance Workers (Greaser) 181 65
TOTAL 11,564 4,059
Source: SENAI (1977)
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labour, there is an element missing; the labour turn-over, which happens 
to be high in this type of industrial complex at underdeveloped sites. 
Furthermore, to produce a good forecasted demand requires experienced 
people working in the field inside each enterprise, especially when 
the operational areas responsible for roughly 70% of the total number
of jobs are headed by managers with no regional expertise. Technical 
knowledge alone is not sufficient to forecast the demand of labour since the 
personnel requirements vary from country to country, region to region in 
accordance with cultural values, education, productivity levels, skills 
and so on. Any of these items can change considerably the output of 
labour at the plant (Farmer & Rich, 1965, Kindleberger 1970).
(c) Newly-built Industrial Complex
Another difficult problem is related to the priorities given to a green 
field industrial complex. Regardless of described objectives written 
down in common meetings and agreed upon as policies for companies in 
the pole, the whole effort of the organisations is directed just to put 
the company on-stream. Managers are aware that if any problem occurs 
in the production line that would endanger the functioning of the company 
and the whole planned scheme would come to a halt. The expectations in 
every corner is, then, to see the industry running on, diverting the 
attentions from other important points that can be put off for a while.
whatever priority they may properly deserve.
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5.4.1. Different Forecasts for the Supply of HR
To start with, let us look at the following tables 5/5 ¿b 5/6 which 
reveal forecasted studies of the supply of Human Resources in the pole 
since 1972. We cannot expect the local labour market of an industrial complex 
built from scratch to be able to provide specialised employees requested 
by the industries. Furthermore, the public network system of education 
is not responsible for the detailed preparation for all the individual 
skills required in any business. The formal education system prepares 
the professional technical or craftsman with the required general tools 
and skills for a range of given jobs. The education system provides 
only the skills and the tools to carve-in the wood! the business gives 
further training on the peculiarities of the wood they have to use and of the 
furniture they want to produce. The SME made an analysis in 1972 of the 
previous output of professionals and technicians in Salvador and also 
forecasted the supply of labour to the pole. It predicted an insufficient 
supply of medium-skilled technicians, but pointed also to deficits in 
Chemists, Engineers and highly Skilled workers. (SME 1972).
The main flaw in the SME research was the assumption that 10%, 20% or 
30% of the basic chemicals would be processed in the pole. Using those 
assumptions, they predicted that 9.000, 18.000 or 27.000 new jobs would 
be created. Those figures came very short of being realised and today 
the pole processes less than 5% of its output in Bahia, so the employment 
forecasts are quite wrong.
The SENAI research (1977) , being undertaken much later, could provide 
a better analysis of the supply and demand of labour. It concluded there 
was no indication of relative or absolute scarcity of supply of the 
professionals for the oil and petrochemical industry in the period 1977-1981.
5,4 The Supply of Human Resources at Camaceri
That conclusion was drawn from the table No. 5.5.
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5,4 The Supply of Human Resources at Camaceri
That conclusion was drawn from the table No. 5.5.
Demand/Supply of Professionals (Brazil) and Technicians 
(Brazil and North and North East) in the oil and 
____________ Petrochemical Industry._______________________
V -
Table No.5.5
Employed Global Supply 
(1976-1980)
V VDemand
(1977-1981)
Professionals Brazil
Electrical Engineers 2,578 166
Mechanical & Civil 
Engineers 7,934 48
Chemists 1,172 130
Technicians Brazil
Chemists 5,332 129
Mechanics 5,065 144
Electricians and 
Electronics 5,451 1
North and North East
Chemists lOO 53
Mechanics 234 80
Electricians and 
Electronics 528 - ' -
Source: SENAI (1977).
x About the concepts of Professionals and Technicians 
See 5.7.
xx Petrochemistry is supposed to have 1/lOth of the Global demand.
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Actual Sources of Skilfull labour working in the Oil and 
Petrochemical Industries in the NE. (Average of the 
____________ period 1977-1981).______________________ ___
Table No. S.6.
Posts Regular
Courses
Senai
In
du
st
ri
es
De
ma
nd
Su
pp
ly
Petrochemical Processing 
Operators X - X 312 -
Instrumental Control 
Operators (Material Input, 
Safety and Pollution Controls) _ - X 40
Instrumental Control 
Operators (Material Output, 
Flows and Stocks Control). - - X 34 -
Instrumentists - X X 61 -
Electricians X X X 56 1,811
Mechanics X X X 166 770
Metal Workers - X X 40 ■ -
Welders X X X 31 1,181
Lathe Operators X X - 6 693
Fitters - X - 3 274
Source: SENAI (1977)
x regular source
- no source of that particular worker
Table No. 5.6
Actual Sources of Skilfull labour workir 
Petrochemical Industries in the NE. (i 
______________ period 1977-1981) .________
Posts Regular
Courses
Senai
Petrochemical Processing 
Operators X .
Instrumental Control 
Operators (Material Input, 
Safety and Pollution Controls), . .
Instrumental Control 
Operators (Material Output, 
Flows and Stocks Control). - -
Instrumentists - X
Electricians X X
Mechanics X X
Metal Workers - X
Welders X X
Lathe Operators X X
Fitters - X
Source: SENAI (1977)
x regular source
no source of that particular work«
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Table No. 5.6.
Actual Sources of Skilfull labour working in the Oil and 
Petrochemical Industries in the NE. (Average of the 
______________ period 1977-1981)._________________________
Posts Regular
Courses
Senai
In
du
st
ri
es T 3
§
1 Sup
pl
y
Petrochemical Processing 
Operators X _ X 312
Instrumental Control 
Operators (Material Input, 
Safety and Pollution Controls), _ _ X 40
Instrumental Control 
Operators (Material Output, 
Flows and Stocks Control). - - X 34 -
Instrumentists - X X 61 -
Electricians X X X 56 1,811
Mechanics X X X 166 770
Metal Workers - X X 40 -
Welders X X X 31 1,181
Lathe Operators X X - 6 693
Fitters - X - 3 274
Source: SENAI (1977)
x regular source
no source of that particular worker
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Those professionals were expected to be the scarcest in the NPP.
Indeed, previous studies have over stressed this point, with sufficient 
ground for worry. Employees at this level are responsible for the 
maintenance and operation of very expensive equipment, on whose correct 
functioning the entire complex will depend. The situation is very similar 
for the supply of technicians - people with secondary education. Data 
especially for the North and North East give further support to that claim 
(Table 5.5)
Contrary to the SME research, which forecast a deficit of up to 50% in 
the supply of medium-skilled technicians, the SENAI study was more 
convincing in its arguments that there would be no absolute scarcity in the 
supply of this labour in Brazil as a whole, but, only some shortfall in 
their supply for the NPP. They have, however, rightly insisted on proposing 
different categories of these employees indicating some posts for which 
complete instruction would not be given in the schools but who would 
require extra courses that should be developed by the employers. We 
will come back to this point when studying this category in more detail 
further on in this chapter.
The most inaccurate point, however, in the original forecasts was made 
for the semi-skilled labourers. The SME study was cautious, indicating 
an impossibility to forecast the demand/supply of this class of workers.
They pointed out, however, that the education system was able to attend 
to the prospective demand of the pole, implying, therefore, that no 
shortage should be expected. But the SENAI research detected several 
types of jobs for which there were no candidates being prepared by the 
education system. The industries then would have to assume that education 
and training role with significant effort. Table 5.6 shows that the 
supply of some strategic jobs in the NPP could be a problem.
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5*4.2. Some Characteristics of the supply of human resources to the NPP.
There are some characteristics of the petrochemical pole at Camacari 
which might well exert influences in the supply of labour.
(a) Newly built Industrial Site
First of all, we must bear in mind that Camacari is a newly-built 
industrial site and, therefore, any suitable scheme for on-the-job 
training cannot be fully accomplished. Firms which have other branches 
in Brazil, notably in the South region, may well send suitable trainees 
to their factories in Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro to learn their skills 
in established undertakings. This is possible because the number is
small. Other foreign partners have no alternative than send some 
technicians abroad to similar plants where they can undertake an 
effective training in the parent company. Due to the costs of air 
tickets, accommodation and the like, this can be done only with a small 
proportion of the labour force, ideally well educated so that they can 
form a cadre to set up skill-training at home. Furthermore, costs 
of training are inserted in a clause for technology transfer or technical 
assistance which means that the country will pay for it. The whole 
problem seems to be reduced to the famous vicious circle of developing 
countries: not sufficiently trained labour force and lack of financial 
resources and technical means to train it. The main question, then, is 
if the training provided by foreign companies under the programme of 
technical assistance is the best way to tackle this problem.
(b) Costs of Training.
If the cost of training is already very difficult to assess at any 
single firm, it is much more difficult in a complex such as the NPP, 
where many Institutions operating in the education and training of each 
category of labour (list on the next page) have divergent methods of
accounting.
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Institutions devoted to training of different levels 
of employees in the RMS.
Table No. 5.7
f
Category
----- --------------------------------- i
Institutions
Managerial Staff Universities 
CEPED/CENDRO 
Federal Ministries 
COPENE
PETROBRAS/CENPEQ 
Universities/Schools
Technicians Centec
Technical Colleges 
Petrobras
Skilled & Semi-skilled Labour Petrobras
On-the-job training programs
Technical Schools
Senai
Pipmo/other Institutions
Source Direct Research
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A research undertaken by COPENE has arrived at the figure of $US 
9,000,000 as the total training costs for all the programs in the NPP.
That figure would give us:
Total investment______ - $US 3,500,000,000.00 - 0,26%
Training costs - $US 9,000,000.00
Training costs are 0,26% of the total investment. That figure is
ridiculous, since it included only direct costs involved with wages 
and salaries. Even if we put the indirect costs in a ratio of 1/2 
the percentage would not be much higher. It goes contrary to the 
general belief that industrialisation in underdeveloped areas has to spend 
much money on training of labour. (Myrdal, 1957 ' Hirshnan 1958,
Friedman, 1966).
(c) Collaboration and Competition
Collaboration and competition between firms may speed up the process 
of human resource planning. Competition may compel firms to take steps 
not to lose key labour for their competitors. Collaboration leads 
companies to adopt similar approaches in many fields such as recruitment, 
training, wages, transport subsidies etc. A key factor in all these 
agreements is the physical location of the pole - companies are clustered 
together outside the town - which make the site a fertile field' for both 
cooperation and distrust. In fact, there have been some agreements in the 
NPP regarding the sharing of training costs, on pay policies and on 
recruitment. Firms had to reach a compromise on not persuading employees 
to change sides or there ’.’ould have been an unbearable struggle for skilled 
labour in the market, regardless of whether they are working next door or 
not. Of course, it is very difficult to get firms to stick to these 
agreements until there is at least a demand/supply balance in the area. 
These arguments, however, should not be made at the expense of 
the labour force and used as an excuse not to raise pay levels 
when they are needed in the absence of competition or even
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to compel employees to remain in a single firm, by limiting the 
possibilities for them to get a job elsewhere in the pole, which 
goes against a sound practice of fair human relations policies.
It is a restriction of coirmon freedom to forbid labour to change 
firms and not allow each employee to choose what he sees as the most 
suitable jobs for him.
5.4.3. Conclusion and Recommended Strategy
Taking that the human resource policies are of strategic importance 
for the NPP (5.1.1.) we have to study what strategic decisions the pole 
should adopt to overcome its main weaknesses in the human resource 
field. This is better explained if split into parts corresponding to 
specific categories of labour (see chapter four). As we have already 
mentioned in the general introduction to this chapter, we have also 
given a special attention to entrepreneurs since they were expected 
to have further opportunities for their activities with the 
establishment of the pole, since entrepreneurship is one of the 
major objectives of the pole as expressed in the adoption of the 
"tripartite" formula. There are some general issues that could well be 
applied for the overall human resources in the pole. Here specific 
policies should be taken in order -
(i) to have a better understanding and if possible seme control 
over the external factors affecting the performance of 
planning (5.2.1.)
(ii) to improve the internal organisation of the companies in 
the field of human resource policies, .
(iii) to increase cooperation among the enterprises of the pole,
(iv) to reinforce corporate agreements among all the technical 
colleges, schoo)3, universities and institutes of training to 
improve the quality of supply,
to provide training for those jobs where supply in Brazil 
not only in the NPP, is short of the demand, e.g. skilled workers.
(v)
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(vi)
(vii)
to obtain agreements among the firms in the area which may 
need the same kind of workers; to standardise training, agree on 
numbers to be trained to what level and reduce poaching of skilled 
people by one firm from another.
to set up and support an R & D Institute capable of absorbing 
and creating advanced technology essential to the pole.
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5.5. Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship is at the root of any industrial development.
Economists seem to be agreed upon the important role entrepreneurs 
have in the economic development of any region. Staley and Morse (1965) 
reviewed and stressed the significance of small entrepreneurs in 
developing countries. Bauer and Yamey (1957) related the progress 
of a society to the degree of entrepreneurship it has. Max Weber (1977) 
saw the entrepreneur as a key actor in the performance of economic 
development, while Kilby,(1971) sees entrepreneurs playing a key role as 
adaptors of modern technology. While writers seem to have been agreed 
upon the importance of entrepreneurs in industrial and economic 
development, there is a great controversy on the exact nature of their 
role.
5.5.1. Introductory concepts.
The word was introduced by Cantillon, R (1756) from the French verb
"entreprendre" (to promote). The etymology gives an initial
functional emphasis to the concept. It also means to take in hand.
So the entrepreneur is the one who takes in hand the elements of
enterprise, that is any undertaking. For a brief example, Watson, (1972)
"the firm is personified in the entrepreneur, who 
exercises ultimate and decisive control over the 
activities of the firm: The entrepreneur brings 
the firm into existence and takes it out" (pp.40).
In this sense there is no entrepreneurship in the NPP, since it cannot
be "personified" in a single person. Should this concept be
expanded to include groups of entrepreneurs, organisations, government
branches, instead of a unique creature, it would have made more sense
in our case. So, the first problem lies in the exact concept of
"entrepreneur"one may assume. In my opinion, there is a tendency to
over-stress his role in organisations. The entrepreneur, sometimes,
seems to be a mythological figure such as Hercules opening the Gibraltar
columns to separate Africa Lrocn Europe. Perhaps this is a consequence
of our culture which has overemphasised the individual role in 
society. As our economy is becoming more complex, and organisations 
have occupied virtually all places of human innovation, the role of 
entrepreneur is obviously reduced. His role is similar to that of 
the inventor. Both were very important at the beginning of the 
industrial revolution. As invention today is coming out from 
organised laboratories, rather than from individual efforts, the 
inventors as such have almost disappeared; similarly the entrepreneur 
as individuals are becoming scarcer. Invention today comes mainly 
from professional teams working together for established organisations. 
Even important individual contributions to the invention process are 
inside or with the collaboration of a bigger group. Our environment 
with so many government regulations, social ethics for business, market 
restrictions, communications, make the rise of entrepreneurs very 
difficult. And much more difficult when the instrument the government 
use to foster entrepreneurship is an industrial pole whose units have 
no grass roots at the region. The innovation process need not be 
about a product but also about such things as marketing, distribution 
chains, raw materials or the link between these or other undertakings 
of an enterprise. Maybe the use of alcohol in place of petroleum, 
for instance, could be a fertile soil for entrepreneurship.
Another concept of entrepreneurs, very similar to this mythological 
personality, is related to the classic theory of the economic man.
Ket de Vries (1977) stated, however, that the entrepreneur 'bears no 
resemblance to that mythical creature of economic theory, the economic man'
5.5.2. Schumpeter's entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs says Schumpeter (1939) are :
Individuals who carry out innovations;
Individuals who.may but need not be inventor of the process they
introduce;
- come from all classes and therefore do not form a social class;
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Are leaders but need not be owners of the capital.
In a later paper, he introduces some complementary notes to that 
concept. First, he relates it to the environment in the sense that "every 
social environment has its own way of filling the entrepreneurial functions". 
Second, the entrepreneurial function need not be embodied in a physical 
person and, in particular, in a single physical person" (Schumpeter 1951).
As an example, he quotes the entrepreneurial function of the Department of 
Agriculture which had performed successfully its task of teaching new 
agricultural methods in the U.S.A.
This complementary contribution, which is essential for the 
understanding of his thoughts can lead us to assess the entreprenuerial 
function of the NPP from another angle. The assumption is that the NPP 
can foster entrepreneurship in the North East if it manages, as an 
organisation, to make an effective impact in the regional industrial 
structure or if it can perform a role of a teaching organisation 
similar to the Department of Agriculture in Schumpeter's example.
The effect of this entrepreneurship, however, could be measured only 
after the pole consolidates its structure and that takes time.
Moreover, we need to be careful not to claim that the pole is giving rise to 
entrepreneurship in the North East, unless we can see real entrepreneurs 
coming out of the region as a consequence of the social impact of the 
industrial complex. This does not mean that there is not an inherent 
entrepreneurial role in the NPP. A role may or may not be 
performed even when it exists. Time will tell whether the regional 
organisation has succeeded in the role or not. It seems to us that a 
wider concept is required to explain "entrepreneurship" in our society.
Of course, there is not much point in arguing about the advantages or 
disadvantages of the "entrepreneurs" as they existed at the time of the 
first industrial revolution, since our present environment has changed
their nature ( Farmer & Richman 1965).
A broad concept of entrepreneurship includes as entrepreneurs not 
only those starting new business but also technocratic employees 
who become inventive and innovative agents inside their own 
organisations (Harbison & Myer, 1959). It is unfair to say that 
Rockfeller, for instance, was the only entrepreneur in the Standard 
Oil. All those men who have brought the Standard Oil into Exxon 
Empire were entrepreneurs as well. In addition an entrepreneurial 
function is the foundation of many successful government companies 
throughout the world.
As the idea in the NPP is to get a mixed economy running smoothly, 
we have to admit that any of the parts can have an entrepreneurial 
function. The point is very straightforward. When there is an 
entirely private sector economy, the entrepreneurs are theoretically 
individuals or private companies. But, when the government has a 
great stake of the economy, it should also act as an entrepreneur.
Admitting that foreign partners and the government are getting along 
well in this particular function, we should look for the third partner 
in that pole: the private entrepreneur.' Who are they and where do they 
come from? As there is a specific purpose to develop the human 
resources of the region we admit that a failure in not having regional 
or local entrepreneurs would unmistakably be a serious blow for the 
whole planning process.
5.5.3. The Managerial Approach
Schumpeter has also given room for another interpretation of
entrepreneurship, that we may call the managerial approach. That means
what some writers identify as the fourth dynamic element in any economy: 
the big "four" instead of the traditional big three - land, capital, labour 
and entrepreneur.(Myrdal 1957, Montjoy 1963). This theory implies 
that, without entrepreneurship all the other elements capital, land
and labour - would remain in a latent rather than in an effective stage.
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The complex nature of our society has, again, put some constraints 
on that argument. As entrepreneurship now is occurring in an 
organised way, we can identify it as combination of labour and 
capital in some cases. Entrepeneurs were also very often related 
to some products or services. Those who picked up products and 
services with bright future had achieved more success - Rockfeller,
Ford, Hilton etc. A growing market was always at the root of 
successful entrepreneurship. Many times, however, the entrepreneurs 
based their success on comparative advantages which put them ahead 
of their competitors. Those advantages would be derived from 
technology, new invention, reduced labour costs, massive production, 
very often new production methods, to say nothing of discovering new 
applications and markets for well known products.
There is also another important element. Many entrepreneurs have been 
pioneers on their own businesses. That takes great risks, but also 
is a clear advantage when the business is successful. Those who 
simply copy somebody else's patents, models etc. can be caught in a trap - 
long or even everlasting dependence. A counter-argument that might 
be well used here is the development and growth of industries in 
countries such as Japan, Korea and Italy, that use products and 
technologies developed elsewhere. I do not think that this argument can 
be used in favour of entrepreneurs in the North East, for many reasons. 
Petrochemicals require so much capital and skills that inhibit any 
serious domestic challenge to the foreign companies which establish 
factories in the pole. Furthermore, the technical (technological) 
management of the firms at Camacari are under the leadership of the 
foreign partner. So, it is very difficult for us to recognise 
domestic entrepreneurship where no sign of local innovative and independent 
steps are taken. When there is no great economic advantage, such
as those derived from inventions, technology, cheap raw material or 
cheap labour, the entrepreneurs have often opted for safe products and 
services» they know well beforehand.
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In the case of the North East, It Is very difficult to foresee 
how the petrochemicals can attract or give rise to local entrepreneurs, 
even if many incentives are offered to attract them. Why should prospective 
entrepreneurs put money into petrochemicals, when they do not feel in the lead 
nor have significant advantage in terms of technological skills, labour costs 
or even return on capital investment? Moreover, petrochemicals are not 
their traditional business. So they continue to put their money in other 
fields, even in the property market, that could have returns much higher 
than petrochemical activities.
It is also a bit odd to identify the holding groups, banks and investment 
agencies as local entrepreneurs. Of course, we have to admit that one 
of the recent development of business is to have entrepreneurial management 
rather than rely only on the spontaneous appearance of this 'rare species' 
called entrepreneurs. Admitting these hypotheses, the individual 
entrepreneur of the region will not benefit at all from the establishment of 
the pole. Either, the entrepreneurs are the large companies based outside 
the region, or they are from within a few large group already operating 
locally. On any hypothesis, entrepeneurs will not be horn at the site.
5.5.4. The Behavioural Approach
Social scientists have tried to specify some qualities an entrepreneur must 
have. Prominent personalities in this study are McClelland (196],1975), 
Collins and More (1964) Ket de Vries (1977), Dayley (1971). In spite 
of many disagreements about the origins, motivation and personality of the 
entrepreneurs, some factors are generally recognised important for the 
entrepreneurial function. These qualities are described as a high need 
for achievement (or power), a strong motivation to success, a desire for 
autonomy, an above-average risk-taking propensity and an urge for leadership. 
(McClelland 1961) Others see entrepreneurs as people under stress,
who very often come from minority groups that
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might have special motives to go on their own way, fighting for 
survival against heavy odds. Immigrants, minority and racial 
groups are among leading entrepreneurs. This leads to the assumption 
that social background may have an influence in the entrepreneurial 
personality. But to some it appears that the entrepreneurs really 
emerge when there is an environmental turbulence (the reactive model).
Ket de Vries (1977) makes an attempt to describe the entrepreneurial 
function according to this last model (see the next page). In Brazil, 
this behavioural theory has a wide acceptance. Indeed, the appearance of 
the southern entrepreneurs is closely related to immigration and minority 
groups. The appearance of many European immigrants had such an impact 
on Brazilian management that in several interviews I had with prominent 
personalities at Camacari that factor was always mentioned. It is not 
unusual to hear that the lack of entrepreneurs in the North East is a 
consequence of the region not receiving these migrants, and that the 
appearance of regional entrepreneurs might be dependent on another 
environment turbulence in Europe, USA or Japan, which would provoke new 
waves of immigration to Brazil. Of course, this is an extremist, rather 
churlish, approach. It does not seem that migration is the cradle of 
the thousands of entrepreneurs that have appeared in countries such as 
Japan, UK, France, Germany, etc. Some are obviously indigenous 
It seems that the history of industrialisation does not fully 
support the behaviourist approach. In fact it is not sufficient to 
explain the first industrial revolution in the UK, though in some areas 
of enterprise for instance, banking, migrant jews were the source of 
Western Europe entrepreneurship. However, the European entrepreneurs 
generally were not men belonging to minority groups, neither was the industrial 
revolution the consequence of an environment turbulence. Also, in Bahia, 
research carried out by Brandao (1974) studied the origins of local 
entrepreneurs and executives in great depth. The results do not lend any 
support to the behaviourist theory. Notwithstanding, a certain degree of
migrant influence was clear in the Brandao studies. Many entrepreneurs
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PsychodYi}am±c_forces_±nfXuencing_the entrepreneurial function.
Perception of 
rejection High Perception and Control
ENTREPRENEURS
Anger Hostility Identity Confusion
and Guilty Identification with the
agressor.
The 'reactive' model (guilt-ridden, rebellious, impulsive, deviant in 
their behaviour with inter-personal problems, non-acceptance of the 
existing structures, in difficulty with authority, denial, projection 
reaction formation as defences. (de Vries, 1977).
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had foreign ancestors (parents, grand-parents or great-grand-parents).
Even those who were a remotely relative of European immigrants, 
praise themselves as being of European descent. There were cases 
both parents and grand-parents were genuinely Brazilians, but with a 
great-grand parent (father or mother) being European. The executive 
or the entrepreneur considered himself, in that case, as descending 
from European families. Brandao called that a case of "cultural 
aliention" that is, even genuine Brazilians prefer insisting upon their 
immigrant origins to being taken as a traditional Brazilian 
family. Facts such as those described by Brandao have contributed to 
a tendency to ignore a great number of entrepreneurs who were born in 
the region, but prefer to deny it for social status. They also help 
those who believe that entrepreneurs in Brazil are necessarily related 
to European or other immigration.
We do not follow this line. Any society has its own entrepreneurs, 
depending,of course, on the resources on which the entrepreneur can operate, and 
on the way the economy is organised. Bahia had a successful entre­
preneurial business community, before the beginning of this century. Why 
cannot it have them now? If there is an answer, it seems to lie in 
the way the environment is organised and not in cultural values or 
otherwise. Each culture or each country can have its own entrepreneurs. 
(Schumpeter, 1951).
5.5. . Recent Trends in the Study of Entrepreneurship.
Based on the previous concepts, especially on the behavioural and 
managerial approach, there has been an emphasis on the training aspects 
for entrepreneurship. University Business Schools and writers have 
been recently developing studies on entrepreneurship. De Vries (1977),
Eggens (1977), Kierulf (1975), McClelland (1961), Timmons (1975),
Collins and Moore (1964) , have commented on recent trends.
Burke (19b8) in a specific study of the NE of Brazil reached the
conclusion there were potential entrepreneurs capable of being
trained to start businesses on their own, while Buchele (1972) has
found sufficient evidence throughout worldwide experiences that
entrepreneurship can be developed:
"Entrepreneurs can be produced and those new 
entrepreneurs start new businesses that can 
survive. It is possible, also, to stimulate 
existing entrepreneurs to greater efforts, more 
rapid growth of their businesses" (p.63)
This widely accepted trend in entrepreneurship studies seems not to
have made a strong impact in Brazil and specially in the planning of
the NPP. In fact, there are no reported efforts aimed at promoting
the development of new entrepreneurs in the NPP, or elsewhere in
Brazil.
5.5.6. Entrepreneurship in the NPP
An analysis into the composition of shareholders and leadership of 
the enterprises of the pole, indicates the extent to which regional 
entrepreneurs were attracted by petrochemical industries. See 
Table No. 5.8.
It seems that government plans, when referring to entrepreneurs - 
"empresarios" - really mean capitalists or people with sufficient 
economic resources, what differs significantly from all the previous 
concepts we have discussed.
From table No. 5.8, we can easily conclude that the participation
of local entrepreneurs in the pole is insignificant. Furthermore, the 
participation of two bank groups really reinforces the claim that the 
absence of regional entrepreneurs is largely due to the economic nature 
of the business which is highly capital intensive. There is, however, 
a strong possibility of the appearance of entrepreneurs in the service 
and engineering industries in the pole. The most important companies 
in this group are those related to the Engineering Process and Assembly 
Production. Despite this possibility Table No. 4.4 does not
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Firms which have regional shareholders in the NPP.
Table No. 5.8
Firm Shareholder % Nature
CETREL State of Bahia 40 Government
CEPED 30 II
METANOR Desenbanco 0.331 •1
PRONOR r Petroquimica da Bahia 
1 Banco da Bahia
33.3 Private
C.Q.R. Henrigue Lage 6.64 Private
DETEN Luciplan 15.0 Private
POLIALDEN Banco Economico 33.3 Private
POLITENO Nordesquimica 13.3 II
Source: COPEC Situacao das Empresas
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show many local enterprises in this sector; regardless of any 
sound reason that may be presented, local entrepreneurship is, then, 
restricted to minor services such as the provision of meals and 
transport.
We may conclude, therefore, that the basic complex and its upstream 
companies have made no contribution to the emergence of local 
entrepreneurs. So, up to this point the NPP did not attract the local 
community as far as entrepreneurship is concerned.
5.5.6.(a) Entrepreneurs for the Transformation Industry.
Any hope of entrepreneurship, therefore, is placed on the downstream 
industries. The initial forecasts were to turn a minimum of 10% 
of the petrochemical production into feedstocks for other end-consumer 
goods. The present situation is that less than 5% of the pole output 
is actually processed by downstream industries. This factor by itself 
reduces greatly the availability of opportunities for eventual 
entrepreneurs. If we take the average forecast of twenty per cent, 
the result would be even more striking. There are a lot of alleged 
economic reasons why new firms do not want to establish factories in the 
NE now. The main ones being the idle capacity of some sectors 
of the down-stream petrochemical industries already settled in the South despite 
that region having its own consumer market. . In fact, the prospects for 
a sudden increase of firms in the pole is really very gloomy since the 
plastic industries and other downstream industries are already running 
at idle capacity in the South East. Those industries are firmly established 
in that region, where, in Sao Paulo alone,they have more than three 
thousand factories employing over 100.000 people. Public authorities, 
however, have recognised this problem and created other Units to tackle it. 
Propar, for instance, is a public company established specifically to 
foster the establishment of industrial companies at Bahia. It is worth 
realising that Propar as far as its constitutional documents say, was
Table No. 5/9 V-44
Proposed Industrial Units for the N E (Plastics)
PRODUCT Technology Investment 
US$ M
PVC wiring and cables High 30.0
Polyethylene Bags Low 3.6
Plastics Medical Articles Medium 6.6
Flexible laminates of PVC Low 31.3
PVC sheeting and flooring Low 4.9
HD— Polyethylene Furniture Low 0.6
Domestic items for Polyethylene Medium 1.5
Polyethylene & Polypropylene tubes & connections Medium 0.5
Sheet and film made of PVC for packaging Low 5.0
Agglomerated tanks & laminates of polyester High 8.9
Grinding wheels, emery clothes, abrasives. High 1.0
brake linings & clutch discs •
Phenolic & melamine laminates Low 2.0
Flexible foams High 2.5
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not directly related to the pole; the circumstances under which
it was created, however, indicate that the pole is the reason behind it.
The establishment of Propar in 1975 was very late in comparison with 
other institutions at the pole, (see section 4.4.2), which indicates by 
itself that getting local business participation may not have been the 
main concern of the authorities when the pole was set up. Furthermore, 
Propar goes on pursuing very weak policies in its attempt to foster 
entrepreneurship. It has gone along with previous policies adopted at 
Camacari and that envisaged the attraction of Southern enterprises, 
instead of the creation of new local ones. Of course, Propar as a 
public company of the State of Bahia is restricted to its role of fostering 
industrialisation in Bahia and not in the whole Notth East region.
A good way to verify the opportunities of entrepreneurship in the NPP 
is to look for those products that can advantageously be produced in 
the region, without jeopardising the industry of the South. We assume 
that there is no point in planning the opening of an industry for the 
closure of a similar one elsewhere. There have been some studies on these 
topics and they suggested the units on tables numbers 5.9 and 5.10 for 
the whole North East. In principle, only some of these 
industries will be established at Camacari, since the designation of all 
industries for only one site would raise strong political opposition, 
especially where there are other economically alternative locations. 
Furthermore, these industries are market oriented and need to be located 
near their respective markets, not only in Salvador. But even assuming 
that all these units were set up in Bahia, the restrictions on entrepreneur- 
ship will lie in its technical side and on the amount of investment 
required. Entrepreneurs tend to go into markets and products they usually 
know well, or alternatively into those sectors where they can find 
significant advantages. As the raw materials in Bahia are sold at the same 
prices as their counterparts in the South, it does not seem that there 
are many clear advantages left.
\
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Proposed Industrial Units for the NE, (Middle/low technology) 
(Elastomers)
Table No. 5.10.
Elastoners Industries Investment (1977) us$m
1. Rubber Goods for Industrial and
naval Utility 74
2. Rubber goods for housing and
building 78
3. Rubber Goods for the motor vehicles 63
4. Rubber goods for personal usage by
workers in the production line areas 59
5. Rubber hoses, belts etc H 4
6 . Rubber glues 38
Source : CLAN/SUDENE
US$ 1.00 - CR$ 16.00 in 1977
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There is a point, however, which seems to favour a petrochemical 
complex. Its range of products and subproducts is extremely high.
Many of those products needing only simple changes to turn them into 
new consumer goods, e.g. packaging, others, such as paints and varnishes 
require quite a difficult production process. The point, then, is to 
find out which products can be produced in the region and which require 
relatively simple technology and do not need high investment for its plants. 
(Table No. 5.9). The range of products, low technology and investment 
have made the plastic industry so fragmented that one may believe in the 
impossibility of planning for it. It is difficult even to say precisely how 
many industries in this sector we do have in Brazil, since some units may be 
classified as backyard and handicraft type units.
A study by Sudene (1977) suggested that planning 
for those small companies would be a useless task and that it should 
not deserve any degree of priority. This points out that the development 
of entrepreneurs had not been considered when such a recommendation was 
made. If there is a sector rich of opportunities for eventual 
entrepreneurs it is in the small scale industries that can be developed 
in the North East. Of course, entrepreneurship cannot be planned in 
strictly mathematical or quantitative approaches, which goes against the 
concept of entrepreneur, but it is possible to work on providing such 
conditions that the appearance of entrepreneurs for those small units 
is more likely.
5.5.7. Conclusion and Recommendations
Whatever concept of entrepreneur we adopt, there has been little 
done in the NPP for his appearance training and growth. Taken in its 
traditional sense, (Watson 1972), the room for entrepreneurship in the NPP is 
small. In the later Schumpeterian sense, we may reserve a special role 
for the NPP itself as an Institution capable of teaching entrepreneurship, 
though does not mean that it has fulfilled its capability. The success and
adaptation of the pole can also prove to be an entrepreneurial 
activity, according to Harbison (1959) .
The NPP, however, has found great difficulties in attracting 
new entrepreneurs due to the nature of its business (strange to the 
region) and to the amount of skills and knowledge it requires. In 
fact, the analysis made of the composition of shareholders and leadership 
of the enterprises of the pole shows that local entrepreneurs are not 
involved at all. Even the presence of some regional capitalist groups 
inside the pole (Banks, for instance) does not prove the raising of 
regional entrepreneurship, by the simple fact there is a difference 
between that concept and the notion of ownership. Not only at the basic 
complex but also in its upstream peripherals (assembly engineering plants, 
maintenance service and so on) the presence of Local entrepreneurs is at 
a minimum level.
More hope for entrepreneurship lies in the development of downstream 
industries. This, however, has been facing some structural difficulties 
due, especially, to the small percentage of the petrochemical feedstock 
processed in the NE, the remainder being exported elsewhere in Brazil or abroad, 
to a lack of specific know-how, to the already firm establishment of those 
industries in the South East, to the small size of the regional market and to 
the absence of policies aiming at fostering entrepreneurship in the region.
Instead of being entirely devoted to the planning of a 'small 
number of companies of reasonable size', operating units involving huge 
investments, producing manufactures with a considerable degree of 
added value, all the agencies responsible for fostering the industrialisation 
of the North East should pursue policies aiming at the creation of suitable 
conditions for the appearance of entrepreneurs.
The role of the pole is to create the right atmosphere for 
entrepreneurs to begin operating. It is not a question of infrastructure 
only. Policies intended to provide suitable labour, to encourage regional
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investments, to back small scale petrochemical using firms should 
also be present. A survey made among small enterprises at Salvador 
has shown the local entrepreneurs were never consulted or even taken 
into account in the implementation of the North East petrochemical pole. 
Bearing in mind the new role of entrepreneurship performed by the pole, 
as we have stated before, it should have a catalyst function to encourage 
small entrepreneurs. This encouragement requires steps in the following 
line :
financial credit - unfortunatety the incentives the Federal and 
State Government give to these small businesses are much smaller than 
those provided for the basic complex. New financial encouragement, not only 
in terms of tax reduction or tax holidays or low cost factories, but also in 
guiding and assisting new potential entrepreneurs in financial management and 
in the raising of ..capital, must be made available.
Market orientation - the real advantage of a complex lies in the 
existence of markets where it can place its products. A careful study 
of market trends should always be a guide for future entrepreneurs.
Technical cooperation - A centre for teaching labour skills required 
for new units and for the transfer of simple technology is indispensable. 
Financial resources applied in this sector are well deserved.
Special incentives for those firms already set up in the area - an 
eloquent indication of the low priority small firms receive in Brazilian 
regional planning was the lack of communication between Public Authorities 
and the small firms during the initial stages of the implementation of the 
basic petrochemical complex at Camacari. In effect, an up-to-date survey 
of those firms has only recently been made.
At last, we conclude that, as far as entrepreneurs are concerned, 
the North East petrochemical pole has not made a significant impact on 
the traditional local entrepreneurs up to present time. It is a bit 
churlish to say that the North East Petrochemical Pole does not offer 
entrepreneurial opportunities due to its capital-intensive nature. We
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may believe on the contrary that more and more entrepreneurial 
functions may arise from a large and integrated system such as the 
NPP. The problem is only how to develop a mentality of entrepreneurship 
and provide conditions for the appearance of those who may turn business 
opportunities into reality.
What we can say is that the petrochemical complex has not yet provided 
structural conditions for the arrival of small entrepreneurs. We may expect 
that the pole, as a leading industrial complex, has effective conditions 
for performing by itself the function of entrepreneurship in the latest 
Schumpeterian concept, that is, the role of fostering entrepreneurs.
To do that it needs to give a high priority to small units that can be 
set downstream of its basic complex. This, however, has not been the case.
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THE MANAGERIAL STAFF 
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5.6.1. Concepts
The term 'management' is well enough known and does not 
require a major elaboration here. We have just to state that we are 
dealing with the managers from the middle to the top of the hierarchy 
of a company. We are very close to Drucker's (1969) concept of 
'Executive':
"I have called 'executives' those workers, managers, or 
individual professionals, who are expected, by virtue 
of their position or knowledge, to make decisions in the 
normal course of their work that have significant impact 
on the performance and results of the whole.... Every 
knowledge worker in modern organisation is an executive 
if, by virtue of this position or knowledge, he is 
responsible for a contribution that materially affects 
the capacity of the organisation".
Mintzberg (1973) has a broader concept by which 'the manager is 
that person in charge of a formal organisation or one of its subunits.' 
Although he found that "managers jobs are remarkably alike" (Mintzberg 
1973) he also pointed out important differences derived from the job 
itself - the level in the hierarchy and the function supervised 
and stated that 'there is a considerable evidence of role specialisation 
by function'that 'moving down the hierarchy, the jobs become more 
structured', and that'the top managers job is more concerned with 
strategy-making of a broad nature. At lower levels the work is more 
focused, more short-term in outlook'. The literature backing this 
point is very extensive, but as we are dealing with business policy 
and strategic decisions these differences are sufficient to justify our 
dealing with the middle and top managers only.
The problem is that the philosophy behind foremen and other low 
ranked managers involved in operations is completely different from those 
dealing specially with the decision-making process. In this sense, 
it would be wrong to put together top managers,divisional managers, 
supervisors, and foremen and deal with them as a monolithic group.
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Taking the organisational diagrams interviews and information 
straight from the companies in the NP^ P (especially at the Basic 
Complex) we have found that the total number of managers is smaller 
than the profiles would suggest. From the profiles (section 5.3.1.) 
the pole would have approximately 560 'Executives' including those 
companies under project (table 5.2).
Excluding the bigger companies such as COPENE, NITROFERTIL, 
NITROCARBONO, ISOCIANATOS, COBAFI, DOW QUIMICA etc., the majority 
are companies with few executives, less than lO on average, which 
makes the total fall short of five hundred. This is explained partially 
by its high technology. Industries using a less capital-intensive 
technology would have more managers. As management is a scarce 
factor in underdeveloped areas this may well be a good reason for using 
the petrochemical industry on NE Brazil. That confirms M rawetz (1973) 
finding in his research on Columbia's petrochemical industry about the 
management saving nature of that industry.
5.6.2. Management Development
On talking on this subject, the question 'can management be taught?' 
is often raised. The literature on management development is generally 
very sceptical about the way teaching courses on management are run, 
but in one way or another, the authors point to difficult sort of 
knowledge or skills that can be taught. Torrington (1976), for instance, 
states that 'the development of managerial resources should be one of the 
main activities in an organisation'; Drucker (1969) finds that effectiveness 
for managers can be learned; Mintzberg (1973) relates the efficiency of 
managerial training and development to the right selection of the candidates. 
Most important of all the arguments is that the existence, growth and 
acceptance of management courses by the business world is a support to 
those who firmly believe that suitable courses can contribute to the im­
provement of management. Moreoever, the making of business policy 
decisions and the nractice of management deals with the process of learning, 
planning and forecasting that require knowledge, techniques
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and skills that have to be learned by continuous study and not only 
work experience. The existence of managers who come into the 
profession by means of marriage, birth, work experience, natural 
leadership and wealth, does not deny the modern common practice of 
accepting Schools, Institute, Universities and the like
for the training of management. What is in debate is the ability 
of those above-mentioned bodies to teach management effectively, how 
to teach it, what to teach and so on. * Copeman (1959) comparing 
different managers in the USA, Britain and West Germany, has shown that 
even many capitalist managers - 'capitalist' here meaning those who 
own the company they work for or who have the majority of its shares - 
have also received professional education. Of course Universities 
are institutions of education and instruction, but there are some teaching 
activities that can be better performed by industries or even by 
specialised Agencies such as CEPED/CENDRO. It is a fact that universities 
traditionally are academic institutions and tend to look down on 
vocational training. They are devoted to education rather than training.
The Universities are responsible, however, for the development of
general skills, the provision of present and future managers with an
overall understanding of their profession, the handling of management
techniques, etc. On the other hand, there are some selected fields
where both training and education are embraced together for managers as
for other professions. What is wrong is to alienate Universities
or any other educational institution from the development of the community,
under the assumption that they are only for general purposes, having
nothing to do with the specific development at Camacari. There is,
however, a straight and close relation between education and training
and management development. Badly educated managers require more effort
from their trainers and they also will need more rigorous development programs.
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Time is another very important point. As the Universities are 
geared to long-term courses undergraduate and postgraduate programmes of 
one to four years, their courses are not designed to serve the specific 
requirements of particular industries in the first place. These requirements 
are dealt more effectively with medium-term courses, where industries 
can release their employees for part-time attendance - or in the case of 
short-term courses even on a full-time basis.
The principal courses preparing managers for the petrochemical 
industries (IBP and CEPED courses) were made at this medium-term with targets 
of 120 hours tuition on a part time basis. There is no reason, however 
why these courses could not be run in conjunction with the local 
universities. In fact the wide range of subjects and the continuity 
required in the process of training demands the close cooperation among 
all the Institutes of the local infrastructure of knowledge, if it is 
to be a success.
5.6.3. Management Courses
Despite some ups and downs, this sector has received great 
attention from the planners of the pole especially by the promotion 
of courses, conferences and seminars open to those already working 
in the petrochemical industry.
Bearing in mind what we have written in the previous pages about 
the necessity of using all the resources of the region for a full 
development of the pole, the jettisoning of any important Institution 
from the process can be prejudicial if not in the short, at least, in the 
long run. But both the universities with their respective departments 
of Social Sciences - Economics, Business etc - are kept apart from the 
major industrial development at Camacari, There is no valid excuse for 
that, since management for petrochemicals is not a special case. What 
makes it different at Camacari is the large scale of the project, not 
its nature. So, there is no point in keeping the local Institutions
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of Education apart from the development of the pole, especially 
if we think that Management Development cannot be a once-for-all 
training but is spread over a long time.
In the following page, a scheme is proposed of some subjects 
that should be considered in a managerial development program in the 
NPP. The pattern is based on the literature about this point, on 
the realities of the NPP as shown in chapter One and Two and on the 
nature of petrochemical industry (chapter Three).
The problem is that time is not available to provide effective 
general courses for all the managerial staff of the companies in the 
pole, since the roll of subjects is too broad for a short term course 
and the industries need their staff and so cannot release them to 
participate in long term courses. Of course, all that range of subjects 
(see next page) is not under the responsibilities of a single executive. 
They should be separated into small and related groups, according to 
the functions and level of the manager. A line manager is certainly 
more interested in the technical side and operations of the industry, 
than in the structure and philosophy of government agencies, such as 
the CDI, SUDENE and BNDE. Those aspects, however, are becoming 
increasingly important for the top executives of the "pole", since they 
often need to make major decision on policies that involve those Agencies 
which back the pole financially. They need to be prepared to deal with
them.
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Scheme: Some Aspects to be considered in a Management
Development Program.
Knowledge of Aspects to be considered
- petrochemical 
industry
- Management
- Environment
Its characteristics, products, 
technology dependence, technology 
absorption, production processes, 
marketing
Organisation criteria, traditional 
management functions.
Analysis and evaluation of projects
Physical: infrastructure
general means of transport, 
accommodation, provision of 
facilities for workers, 
etc.
The linkages of the ind­
ustries and its effects on the 
whole project
Political:The North East dev't:
Stability, possible changes of 
policies, alternatives to be 
followed in case of changes, the 
policies of industrial de­
centralisation.
Internal: shareholders 
consumers
Historic reasons of the pole.
Institutional:
Parent companies 
Shareholders 
Government Agencies 
National Financial System 
Government Incentives 
"Macro" and "micro" economic trends 
of the economy.
Skillsi
Analysis
Judgement
Social____________________ ___________ __________
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(a) Knowledge
The content of a course must be based on the knowledge of the 
industry they are dealing with, its environment, the forces behind 
its existence and the overall characteristics of the market, that 
is to say, the contents of a course should be based on the main objectives of 
the managerial function but with an industry bias. Ansoff has described those 
Jfunctions as being (a) resource management,(b) structure system management, (c) 
operational management, (d) external relations. He warned, however, 
against the top management involving in truly operational areas. We 
agree with Ansoff in that the knowledge of the industry is necessary, 
but not for the higher executive to take over operations functions. The 
course should be used for a better and more understandable coordination, 
for evaluation of the operating units and also for the whole analysis 
of the business in its environment (Ansoff , 1968). In other words, Ansoff's
arguments point to the need of a common general knowledge that can be 
complemented with a more specific knowledge of the industry. The 
general knowledge is how to manage and the speciality varies according 
to the industry.
Due to the relatively recent arrival of the petrochemical industry 
in Brazil, where there is no specific region or class that can be 
considered specialised in this field, the only option to obtain managers 
was to have people from different backgrounds and give them intensive 
knowledge of the petrochemical industry and its managerial requirements.
There is not the option of having a manager and then training him for the 
industry or, the other way round, having a specialist and afterwards 
giving him managerial training. The only available correct approach 
is to take advantage of the available human resources and afterwards 
give them a uniform training comprising managerial knowledge plus specific 
insights into the petrochemical industry.
(b) Skills
The skills are the abilities managers need to perform their 
functions. The knowledge only is not sufficient. It is necessary 
to know how to put it into practice and that is a skill. In 
general terms, we can say that a skill is required for the application 
of any single area of knowledge. A Finance Manager, for instance, 
can be an expert in finance. His function, however, requires from 
him besides the knowledge, the ability to interpret different 
environmental variables that may affect the performance of his firms, 
to take part in the executive structure, to make decisions, to exert 
leadership and so on. His success will hinge on his ability or skills 
to use all the knowledge he has to make the correct decisions in the 
right place at any time. So each manager needs skills in his normal 
functions cf planning, controlling, organising, decision making and 
motivating.
What are, then, the skills required for the managers at Camacari?
The answer lies, again, in the analysis of the functions of the pole 
managers. Managers have to deal with public authorities - BNDE, CDI,
SUDENE, Ministry and State Secretariat for Finance and Taxation etc - 
they have to make decisions on administrative and 'macro' and 'micro-economic' 
issues, to interpret the environment and trends and to motivate their 
own subordinates. The priority should be given to those skills most 
important for the manager's job. Roughly speaking, there are as many 
skills as the roles a manager has to perform.
In summary, the skills required by the pole can be classified in 
three basic groups: (i) analysis - to understand the problems as they 
arise, to select the right technique to be used, (ii) judgement - 
to choose among several possible decisions and (iii) social or interactive 
that relates to leadership, communication and ability to work in group.
A planned strategy to develop these skills must combine techniques 
to teach both knowledge and skills to managers of different levels in
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the hierarchy.
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(c) Behaviour
Besides knowledge and skills, we may think about the proper behaviour 
of the manager in his work and outside. This has been a major subject 
in the seminars designed for 'executives' at the petrochemical industries 
in the NPP. The behaviour of managers can be a crucial factor in the 
coming years, when the society acquires a more active voice in the affairs 
of the pole. Camacari has been criticised on the ground that its 
planning and implementation was carried out without the necessary minimum 
of local participation, and this must call for a more close pole/community 
relationship in the future.
5.6.3. Management Development Practice in the NPP
After writing about the nature of management development courses let 
us say something about the perceived effectiveness of those courses at 
Camacari. A study undertaken by CENDRO (see two following tables) has 
presented us with useful information about the value the participants have 
given to those courses. The study was based on an evaluation of the courses 
by the participants mainly but also by other persons involved with the 
management development programs.
The comments began by criticising the way the groups were selected.
The participants have found the groups were too heterogeneous (people with 
different academic and work background), and the majority stated that this 
condition was hampering the development of the course.
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Table No. 5.11. Opinion of the Students about their respective groups 
in The Management Development Programs.
Composition of the Group Percentages
Seminars Courses
a) Homogeneous - adequate 30 8
b) Heterogeneous - adequate 30 23
c) Heterogeneous - Inadequate 29 54
d) Not declared 11 15
Source: CEPED/CENDRO -
The majority of those attending to the seminars found them 
adequate, notwithstanding diverging on their perceptions of the 
structure of the group (hemogeneous or heterogeneous). These categories 
refer to the academic background and work experience of the participants. 
The participants of the courses, however, found the structure of their 
groups inadequate for the kind of program they were attending.
The criticisms were also directed on the contents of the course.
(Table No. 5.12).
YTable No. 5.12.
Main criticisms made by the Participants to the Management 
Development Courses in the NPP (The percentages are not 
mutually exclusive)
Criticisms Percentage
Inadequacy of the learnt knowledge 15.0
- Superficiality of the subjects discussed 46.0
- Absence of specific managerial aspects 30.0
- No faulty aspect
_ ________________________________________________________________________
23.0
Source: CEPED/CENDRO -
These criticisms are very important, since they were made 
with those who attended those courses and seminars after the events 
took place. The proportion of those who are unhappy with them is 
excessively high. It seems that the attempt to cover many subjects 
and develop many skills has led to heavy criticisms as shown in 
Table No. 5.12. (See also the contents of The Management Development 
Program for Petrochemical companies, that were given in Salvador in
the next page).
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--ana, ;e:nent Development Program for Petrochemical Companies
Introductions Chemistry ( 6 hours)
- hydrocarbons
- Main organic compounds and their classification.
- Processing of oil and derivatives.
Basic Instruments ( 30 hours)
- Financial Mathematics,
- Profitability and Investment Alternatives
- Accountant and Balance Sheet Analysis
- Economic and Financial Planning of the Firm
- Organisation.
Financial Aspects.
Petrochemistry (24- hours)
- Characteristics
- Main sectors of the petrochemical industry (Basic products,
intermediate products, plastics, fibres, elastomers, 
detergents and other products and inputs).
- The petrochemical industry in the World, in Latin America and
in Brazil.
- Raw materials and the strategy of their utilization.
Projects of the Petrochemical Industry (59 hours)
- Basic conce.-ts on petrochemical projects.
- Incentives for the in.lementation of the Brazilian petrochemical
industry.
- Marketing aspects.
- Locational aspects.
- Tecimical aspects.
- Investment estimates
- Financial schemes
- Production and Commercial costs.
- Profitability estimates.
Case Studies.
(Program of the IBP - Instituto Brasiieiro de Petrdleo).
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Taking the two tables together. It can be seen that the majority of
the participants were dissatisfied especially with the courses
but also with the structure of the seminars. That
indicates that those activities have not fulfilled their objectives.
Furthermore, as they were just a discontinuous activity - the courses
were held in 1974, 75,76,77 - but cancelled in 1978, there is a very
important gap to be filled. Effective training cannot be held at
occasional basis, let alone, development and education programs. Here,
another strategy should be built on a mixture of short,medium and long-term
bases, which are proposed later on under section 5.6.5.
(a) Costs
The following diagram of the financial resources provided for the 
realisation of management development programs points out that the 
problems have begun since the early stages of planning. Those who 
really pay for the training are not the firms, but the government.
This casts some doubts over the interests the firms have in the courses 
and also on the necessary support of their top management.
Table No. 5.13 Resources for petrochemical courses provided
________ by CEPED (CR $ OOP1 )____________________
Sources years
74 75 76 77 78
PNTE (CEBRAE) - Federal Gov 978 1.742 1.820 4.300 .945
SME - State Gov. 50 50 50 - -
Participants (Firms) 50 612 1.525 2.802 3.835
Source: Field research - Cendro.
It is a well known fact that no management development program 
can succeed without the backing of its own organisation. Although 
it can be argued that the organisations did not need to pay, because 
the funds were already provided by other sources. That is not true, 
since a development program for petrochemical management was cancelled 
in 1978, because the PNTE/CEBRAE refused to subsidise the course, on
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the grounds that their main policies were to support development 
programs for small and medium companies, but not for the medium-large 
companies of Camacari. The companies did not cover the costs.
We are not saying that the success of a course depends on the amount 
of money the companies spend on it. The point here is a lack of 
commitment of those companies to the petrochemical management courses, 
and also an absence of clear objectives of those training programmes.
The objectives of individual managers could not have coincided with 
the aims of the planners of the training programmes. There is no 
management training without coherent, continuous and top backed plans.
In some way, the internal analysis of the firms' general objectives may 
draw the basic lines regarding its programs for managerial development.
So, management development is not an independent variable in a company.
It is an inside part of its philosophy, of the beliefs of its board,
its participants such as the government agencies, the banks and multinationals.
Managerial development starts at the board which has not been the case
at Camacari.
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(b) Technology Transfer to Local Managers
The objective of a production department of any firm at 
Camacari is above all to absorb the new technology that is 
required, together with its proper function of making goods.
Looking at the way the functions are distributed among the 
shareholders under the tripartite policy, we realise that the foreign 
partner has generally the control of the production department. In 
fact, the performance of this sector can be regarded as a thermometer 
of the companies, which should always pay close attention to its 
developments and results, since it has a catalyst function to promote 
new interactions among the regional research and development 
Institutions. Even, if a foreign manager is better qualified to head 
the department due to his technological background and his knowledge 
and skills, the r e g i o n a l  manager would have more advantages in his 
relationships with the environment. He is better placed to promote 
cooperation and interactions with the network of education, research 
and development.
Motivation is an essential factor in the performance of any job, 
so one should ask if the foreign executive is the most motivated man 
for this technological transfer. That is very doubtful, since they have 
no major interests in the region other than to finish their work and 
dash off again on the way back to their own countries. Further 
research, however, is necessary to find out the linkages between those 
executives and the North East region. Researchers elsewhere on this 
• subject ’ have already shown that they are not always trusted by the 
local with whom they have to work. Their major loyalty is towards 
their parent company (Vernon 1971, Servan-Screiber. 1968j : ir.elo, 1973)«
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Meanwhile, studies on the absorption of technology by the 
pole firms have shown extremely poor results. Probably, it is a bit 
early to assess this topic on conclusive terms, let alone, to measure 
the influence foreign managers had in this slow absorption. However, 
the prospects of technology transfer do not look good. It is 
sufficient to verify the proportion of professionals and other technicians 
who have been offered effective training. We will make further analysis 
on this item in the following headings about the professions and the 
skilled workers. This does not mean that training by itself brings 
technology, but that is, at least, an essential step to it, which can be 
drawn from the very nature of the contracts of technology supply made 
with the multinationals. An analysis of the the contracts for technology 
transfer of petrochemical firms at Camacari have indicated that the items 
"technical assistance", "provision of technical knowledge through personal 
training and instruction into the technical plans, diagrams and models" 
are among the top objectives of a contract of technology.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the management of these projects 
of transfer of technology should be effectively monitored. The Ministry 
for Industry and Commerce in Brazil through the INPI, an Agency which 
cares for the registration and performance of those contracts, has 
concentrated its efforts on the problems around the purchasing of the 
technological process which is an important but not sufficient step.
There is a need for additional efforts to analyse the process and 
evolution of those contracts. As technology is becoming an important 
item in the imports/exports balance of any country, its acquiring and 
management deserves a careful approach.
As the trend in the modern world points to the need for continuous 
exchange of technology among different countries, developed and underdeveloped, 
these acquisitions must be brought under a rationalised process.
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5.6.5. Strategies
From the problems discussed in the previous section, it is clear that 
another strategy has to be devised to prepare the right Brazilians to ocaupy 
managerial functions in NPP. in spite of the fact that the public 
authorities have shown some concern towards the preparation and training 
of the managerial staff, the measures taken up to now have failed at 
least in two grounds:
(i) they have been only short-run therapy and have ignored longer 
term strategies and,
(ii) they did not involve the educational and scientific infrastructure 
in their attempts to develop the managerial strategy of the pole.
A shift in those policies is the first priority of of a new strategy in 
this field.
(a) Short-term Strategy
Short-term programs remind us of the most pressing needs of the 
pole. Where you begin an activity which is unfamiliar and you do 
not have much experience in it, you need at least a recipe of how to do it, 
when and what for. That should be the goal of short-term courses, 
conferences, seminars, meetings, everything that can be made to improve 
the performance of the present managerial staff of the .pole.
Their needs are far more specific and practical. In this situation, a 
survey of the most vital problems should be urgent and permanently 
made in order to prepare the best way to cope with them. From the 
analysis and evaluation of projects, the institutional framework of the 
Federal and State Governments are topics important for all the managers.
A common mistake in the strategy adopted at Caroacari was the provision 
of medium-term courses - 3 to 6 months in length - for short-term problems. 
These problems require small groups dealing with the specific problem and
i
intensive teaching. The main obstacle here is how to prepare those 
courses, to select the groups. We dare to say that the problems related
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to their work are easier to cope them all the work undertaken to 
prepare the previous courses of petrochemical management for a wider 
audience.
(b) Medium-term Strategy
The medium term strategy is based on the development of programs 
envisaged to attend the needs of the pole in the next three to six 
years. As the local environment is not mature enough to provide 
all the requirements of high level executive programs, that could be 
complemented by on-the-job training programs, and also courses run 
by the firms in conjunction with the local Institutes to be attended by those 
people interested in the petrochemical business.
The large companies, especially the State-owned enterprises, such as 
Petroquisa, Petrobras and other companies outside the area could provide 
a good ground for cooperation. This program, however, should be made 
on a continuous basis, with frequent short courses, for instance. A 
combination of an intensive course including the teaching of the hard 
core knowledge an executive needs to have and stages on industries and on 
Government units would be more recommended than the middle length courses 
that have been given up to now. An important point in this program is 
a new emphasis on the "macro" economic and managerial problems' of the 
pole, that were not sufficiently developed in the previous courses.
In an organisational structure similar to the one established at Camacari, 
the managerial staff must be sufficiently trained to understand the 
regional needs, the role of the Federal, State and Municipal Governments, 
especially, those Agencies that were involved in the planning and 
implementation of the pole (SUDENE, BNDE, CDI, etc) and that provide funds 
for the infrastructure and also for the capital of the firms. Besides, 
these aspects, the managers also have the classical administrative 
functions they should know very well.
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Although the companies have already chosen their staff, they should 
pay close attention both to their own employees and to potential 
outside managers to include in their programs. In one way or another, 
there must be a program to develop new managers for the NPP, even due 
to the needs for the down-stream industries the pole urgently needs.
The serious obstacle for a common program here is that each company has 
its own set of problems.
Assuming that the companies have selected a hard core of good 
potential managers, a medium-term strategy can be effectively developed 
by running new regional prospective managers as Assistants, trainees or 
the like without power and alongside the senior Managers. These new 
potential managers can in this way have a learning practice in a work 
atmosphere that can be complemented by short or medium-term courses of a very 
specific nature.
A useful idea is to form groups of representatives from 
different companies with similar responsibilities to have a common 
training program in the specific questions of management. The 
program should continue with on-the-job training of the participants 
in their own companies and, at a later stage, another common program 
in "macro" questions that concern them all.
(c) The Long run strategy
The training of managerial staff has no easy and quick solution. 
Effective and serious work can be made only in the long run. The idea 
is to develop the infrastructure of knowledge, involving all possible 
institutions in this field. Particularly important is the involvement 
of Universities and all other Institutes of Training.
There are a lot of ways to put these suggestions into practice.
One is to pick up students with different background and give them 
specific knowledge of the petrochemical problems at their own area 
of study. That is to say, Chemistry students could have one-year practical 
study in industries, the same could be applied to the different branches
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of Engineering, to business, economics, etc. Another idea is to create 
post-graduate courses for those already involved in the business of 
petrochemicals. These courses involving all the infrastructure of the 
area would provide a substantial basis for future executives for the 
companies. We cannot expect that the executives would come out from these 
programmes, ready to take their jobs as managers. The point here is that, 
on a long term basis, the efforts would create an appropriate climate for 
the development of executives. A selective recruitment is a requirement
for good training in specific technology, particularly at the top 
hierarchy of business. What cannot be expected is to have managers 
emerging from an environment deprived of a fertile field for them to grow 
their roots. Moreover, besides the companies already in operation at 
Camacari, the pole has also the function to attract new downstream 
industries to it. The future strategy then is to put emphasis 
on every field of knowledge, not only on the technical ones, 
that could lead to the appearance of those men who will be competent 
to run both the basic and the downstream and supporting firms in the 
coming years.
5.6.6. Conclusion
Despite the comparatively small number of managers needed for capital- 
intensive industries such as petrochemicals the firms at the NPP 
have not applied substantial financial resources needed for the managerial 
development programs. The Government has given support to some 
development programs , but this is not enough. The firms must play a 
major part in the exercise.
Due to the problems involved in the contracts of transfer of 
technology, where there is generally a heading for technical assistance, 
it is very difficult to assess the effective amount of resources the companies 
are putting to acquire for themselves their respective know-how. The training
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of new managers in new technological processes, however, seems to 
have received a blow under the present composition of the Managing BOard 
of the different companies in the NPP, where the technological areas are 
under the control and responsibilities of foreign managers, who could not 
give the interest or priority to this transfer of technology.
Also, the courses of Managerial Development Programs held at Camacari 
have come under heavy criticisms from everyone involved - participants, 
companies and finally from the Government Agencies which have now withdrawn 
their support refusing to give more subsidies to them. The implementation 
and operation of the pole is, then, requiring a change in the managerial 
development strategy which should stress the strengthening of the 
infrastructure of knowledge, involving all possible institutions in this 
field in the long run.
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5.7. THE PROFESSIONALS AND THE TECHNICIANS.
"The kind of activity carried out by the whole range of technician 
engineers and other technicians is basically very similar with a 
wider area of overlap between the two levels than had been expected. 
For example, there is little evidence to indicate that the 
activities of planning evaluation, control, etc, are any more within 
the scope of the technician engineer than of his counterpart at a 
lower level. Nor does the former spend substantially more time on 
supervisory activities. Similarly, the technician engineer does 
not spend very much less time on the relatively simple activities of 
measuring, testing, inspecting, etc, than does the other technician." 
(Roberts 1972).
5.7.1. CONCEPTS
To state that professionals are those people with university 
degrees and technicians those who have completed the Second level of 
Education (Secondary School) or have an equivalent degree is an 
over-simplication of the concepts of professional and technician.
We are very cons cious of the weaknesses of those concepts but we have 
allowed them because we will deal with this education tool as an 
important element in this section. Furthermore, there is another 
category between the technician and the professional, that is called in 
this paper technologists, who are holders of degree equivalent to a short 
University program - two to three years in length. Of course, much more 
can be said about professionals and technicians.
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Basically, there are many more differences between the intellectual 
and conceptual content of the liberal and scientific profession and 
the skill base of the technician who is concerned with the application 
of technology. By and large, the professional is educated, the 
technician trained; the professional is expected to have a broad 
liberal University education, the technician to have been trained to 
a required level in narrower skills; the professional work is non-routine, 
while the technician is tied-up to specific operation (Toren,1975 
Harbenstein,1963, Charnock,1977). In the first category,we are dealing 
generally with the traditional liberal professions,such as Economists«Engineers, 
Doctors and so on. In fact, in the past the concept of professional 
included only the Church, Medicine and the Law, but today there is a 
broad movement to consider as "professional" many new occupations that 
are already accepted as such or that are claiming that status. There 
seems to be two contradictory movements: one which admits a growing
number of 'professions' in our society; the other which stresses 
a continuous deprofessionalisation. Charnock has made a thorough analysis 
of the concept and its evolution, applied especially to the notion of 
a Bank Manager as a professional. Harbenstein made a study on the new 
occupations that deserve the status of 'professional'; Etzioni (1964) 
introduces another category called 'semi-professional.', while Bell (1974) 
visualises a society with a significant role for the professional an d 
the technician. Millerson (1964) examines several definitions of the 
professional concept trying to extract its main characteristics.
On the other hand, Hickson & Thomas (1969) foresee a decay in
professional!sation by the elimination of conflict between the professional 
and the bureaucracy; Hughes states that 'professional' is no more 
than a 'symbolic label for a desired status, while Harbenstein sees it 
as simply a 'status claim'. Hertzberg (1968) sees some relationship between
the professional claim and the search for money and status, and 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) are against generalisation on this concept 
since it varies according to the environment where it is immersed.
These attempts at defining the concept 'Professional' or 
identifying its characteristics show that there is not a unanimous 
view on this point. They also show that other occupations not 
included here as professional, such as the managerial staff discussed 
in the previous section, could also be classified as professional 
(Thomas,1976, Drucker,1952, Nichols,1975). There is no use in arguing 
for or against these concepts, but only in justifying our over- 
simplication as an operational tool for this work.
According to the categories we have used here, this group is not 
the critical factor in the pole as far as supply and demand are concerned 
(See 5.3 and 5.4). This does not mean that the problem is over. On 
the contrary, it is argued that the importance of this group stretches 
far beyond the simple question of supply and demand, since the professionals 
are virtually responsible for the main task of absorption of technology 
and their qualifications can be much more important than their numbers.
They are an important part in the process of transfer of technology.
The strategic importance of this group should be measured in relation 
to the bulk of knowledge they represent. They are responsible for the 
development and application of technology, making it available to the 
technician, who is unlikely to have the knowledge to initiate or 
understand the implication of the technology from first principles.
While the technician has the "know-how" to put a plant into operation, 
the professional must have the "know-why" that plant is going into stream. 
The "know-why" is then made available as "know-how", a limited, more 
easily learned segment of the whole broad technology. In this operational 
sense, professionals may be very unskilled, unable to perform the skilled 
individual tasks as effectively as the technician.
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The very notion of technology transfer implies that the local 
technical-scientific staff are not capable of performing a particular 
function without outside assistance. But it also requires from the 
same staff a latent capacity to learn a possession of the necessary 
general skills and a very good background for the specific know-how 
they need to learn. Technology is not a simple problem of individual 
training; it involves a determined enterpreneurial policy and the 
support of many Institutions for Research and Development.
In this section we are dealing with the policies on both the 
professional and the technical groups and the parallel Institutions which 
are behind them.
5.7.2. The Professional Group
The implementation of a petrochemical complex reminds us immediately 
of the high level of Chemists and Engineers required to conceive of 
its processes and put it into stream. In effect, there is a reference 
to this problem in the majority of the technological contracts written 
by the Brazilian Government with the foreign holders of the technology. 
Some of those professionals come directly from the parent companies which 
set up a branch in the pole; others are recruited by the company where 
they are available and sent to different plants for company-specific 
training, which is the crucial problems for those professionals.
(a) Universities of Salvador
The Universities of Salvador have the capability to supply the pole 
with the required workforce. Those Institutions, however, are not 
specialised enough to help them with specific training. Of course, I do 
not refer to the peculiar skills of each industry, but to the specific 
requirements of the petrochemical business, that theoretically could be 
taught at the University. But on the other hand, the "Universidade 
Federal da Bahia" had introduced some subjects designed for those who 
wanted to pursue a career in the petrochemical industries. The response 
of students was insufficient for the Bahia University to feel encouraged
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enough to proceed with similar proposals. It could be argued 
that the University has introduced those subjects to the wrong people, 
offering at the wrong time a first degree wherever these specific and 
more specialised subjects are better taught at postgraduate courses.
The first undergraduate degree - is intended to provide the 
basic scientific foundations of a subject, such as Chemistry or 
Biochemistry; A second degree, to build and specialise on those 
foundations, such as the chemistry of molecular changes into hydrocarbons.
From that point there arises the whole question of applying the 
research knowledge of a whole group of scientists to the development 
of the scientifically feasible to the practically possible in real terms.
The putting together of such a group of development scientists, and making 
it work is not likely to happen at a University but rather in a more 
practical and entrepreneurial environment in which University and 
industries cooperate. For a University whose adaptation to the industrial 
requirements is considered to be poor, the failure in putting on the petro­
chemical course was a serious blow. The Brazilian Universities, as in the Third 
World in general, are heavily criticised, from the point of view that 
they prepare people for the academic world only and not to the realities 
of the labour market. Beyond those criticisms, the pole must be 
aware that the University does not have a tradition in the petrochemical 
technological process and, therefore, it is not ready yet to spearhead 
the job of training highly skilled professionals with key posts at the 
industry.
(b) Specialised Institutions
On the other hand, firms need the support of the scientific 
infrastructure of the academic world in order to be able to get together 
to turn theoretical and practical research into results and products.
Instead of the University, this task could be fulfilled temporarily by 
other Institutions. The CENPES, even without being physically in
Bahia, is considered in this study since it belongs to PETROBRAS whose
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subsidiaries have most of the work at Camacari. Moreover, it has 
a section CENPEd -BA in Salvador. The CENPES is open not only to the 
parent company, but also to all the companies of the PETROBRAS pool.
CENPES is by far the most important centre for petrochemical 
research in Brazil, by any standard of comparison we adopt. It has 
more tradition, more financial resources; more important and above all, 
its main function is in the area of oil and petrochemicals.
The main influence of CENPES in Bahia was felt in the agreement 
jointly signed with the Universidade Federal da Bahia for the preparation 
of Chemical Engineers.
As regard to CEPED, it was founded to promote research and development 
in Salvador and also to serve as a basis for the local industrialisation 
programs. But its main centre devoted to training - CENDRO - lacks 
resources to embark on a large scale training program for
the pole. Moreover its main resources for that purpose come from the 
Federal Government via CEBRAE/PNTE, a program set to encourage training 
executives, especially in the small and medium industries.
There are several Institutions devoted to the training of the 
professional people required by the pole. However, they are short of
resources to accomplish that function. The solution seems again to lie 
on close cooperation among all the Institutions at local and national 
levels. A surprising point, however, is that instead'of pursuing policies 
of cooperation and of strengthening the already existing Institutions, 
there has been an attempt to create another University, namely the 
University of Camacari.
(c) The University of Camacari
The arguments put forward for the need of that Institution were 
based mainly on the pole itself. The University would be an instrument 
of research, development and teaching new techniques, and it would help 
the transfer of technology. As the industrialisation process was already 
on its way, there would be a need for a higher education Institute to
prepare its workforce
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The project argues that the factors favouring the creation of the 
University of Camacari has called attention to three tenets that should 
be necessarily observed:
(i) the expansion of the formal education and training system to 
improve and widen the opportunities of learning;
(ii) modernisation and qualitative improvement of those systems to 
cope with the technological expansion of the pole;
(iii) Régionalisation of the location of Universities to take care of 
the demographic demands and the specific requirements of each 
region.
Of course, we can agree with those three tenets without favouring 
the creation of a University at Camacari. Even the régionalisation of 
locations could be reached without that University. Camacari is part 
of the Greater Salvador and the regional policies for major issues that 
involve the metropolitan population should not be regarded under the 
narrow local (Municipal) point of view. Salvador has already two 
Universities and Feira de Santana - the second biggest city in Bahia 
has its own University only approximately 60 miles from Camacari. The 
idea of régionalisation of location and of widening the opportunities of 
learning in Bahia instead of favouring Camacari, would drive any new 
University away from it because there is already more opportunities and 
universities in the RMS than in any other part of the State.
The strongest argument seems to lie on the peculiarities of the 
industries settled at Camacari. It is argued they need specific courses, 
that could be better provided by an Institution devoted exclusively to it.
Of course, at the pace the petrochemical pole is developing, it will require 
more specialists to meet its own needs. Here again, the problem is two-fold. 
First of all, the specific requirements of the petrochemical industries would 
be hardly attended by the University that must have a broader scheme devoted to 
research and development. Secondly a University should not be a simple 
training Institute. It has general aims to perform that go beyond 
the teaching of specific skills for a particular
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industry. But an advanced section or department of the existing 
University or with CEPED to build up postgraduate studies and 
research in specific areas of petrochemicals is a better possibility.
A decentralised department might get the required commitment to get 
along with the development of the pole and its needs of Research and 
Development for the industries. An input of money and teaching staff 
from within or outside highly trained both academically and industrially, 
could keep the department firmly on the ground, without facing higher 
costs of Administration of a completely new Institution.
The project for that University proceeds with a statement of the 
facts that could lead to its setting up. The main facts reported are 
commented below:
c.l. An Alleged existence of adequate resources for the installation
of the University, laboratory, libraries and human resources such 
as teaching staff, researchers, teaching assistants and lecturers, 
administrative and technical staff, maintenance of basic courses 
at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels.
One of the common fallacies of those proposing the creation of Universities 
and Research Institutes, in underdeveloped areas, is the belief that 
the availability of adequate Installations, is sufficient to justify the 
installation of a higher education Institute. Even other institutes 
with good technical record, and with good support and background, such as 
CENPES, very often have difficulties in operating those hardware sets.
The Key area here is the quality of the personnel who could work for the 
new University, or Institute. However, the Municipality of Camacari has 
undertaken a survey at the town to show the existence of professionals in 
the area to back the formation of a new University. (Tables No. 5/14,15 and 
diagram No. 5/1).
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Table No. 5.14.
Professionals working at Camacari with Postgraduate Degrees.
Courses Master Phd
Chemical Engineering 19 2
Civil Engineering 1 0 + 2 -
Economics 05 -
Business Administration 04 -
Agronomy 03 -
Medicine 0 3 + 1 -
Electrical Engineering 01 1
Mechanical Engineering Ol -
Chemistry 0 1 + 2 1
Architecture 01 -
Accountancy Ol -
Nursery Ol -
Physics - 1
Psychology Ol -
Source: Municipality of Camacari
Note: Numbers preceded by + refer to spouses with a respective
degree in the given course
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Diagram: 
No. 5.1.
V - C2
Relation PhD/Master Degrees of the Postgraduates 
who work at Camacari.
Table No. 5.15 People who can contribute to the University
based on the population forecasted.____________
Year Population Assuming that 5% of the population
________________________________________ can contribute to the University.
1977 85,400 4,270
1979 123,815 6,191
1981 147,776 7,389
1983 189,502 9,475
1985 259,022 12,955
Data worked out by the Municipality of Camacari — Project for the
University of Camacari
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That should be followed by a research into the willingness 
of those professionals to either change their jobs or work as 
part-time lecturers. Even so, the mere existence of highly-educated 
people in industry does not mean they could undertake a University 
job. Teaching Engineering, for instance, is different from working 
as an Engineer. The knowledge could be the same, but the skills 
required are distinct.
A survey of the spouses of those living in the area makes no 
reference to their professional lives»which diminishes their significance 
as far as working is concerned. They could have been working already or 
even may be not interested in University posts and fully engaged with 
children.
c.2 Demand not fulfilled by the already existing Universities which 
have no physical conditions for their expansion.________________
An unfulfilled demand is not sufficient to justify the creation of 
a University at Camacari, since this problem is common all over the 
NE (Chapter One). The requirements of the labour market are better 
justification. The actual number of jobs created at the NPP is not 
big enough to support the running of a University. Moreover, as the 
existing Universities have physical difficulties in expanding,, so the 
logical solution would be to provide more resources for their expansion 
instead of creating another institution.
C.3 High percentage of professionals with high education degrees, 
graduates. Master and PhD's who put together, could reach more 
them 1.000 by 1980, added to a considerable number of researchers 
and other professionals of higher education at the CEPED._________
The point here is that CEPED is already a State-owned Research 
Institute that could be strengthened in its activities. Why, then, 
duplicate efforts in making another research centre, if there is already 
one? The University of Camacari is an initiative of the Municipality, 
but one that will require more funds from the firms. There would be, then, 
two Institutes in similar fields and a clear diversification of resources.
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It seems to be more a local vanity than a simple necessity.
C.4 The existence of the CEPED which has good stock of industrial
equipment and research.__________________________________________
Many arguments for the University are based on the existence of
CEPED as a research centre,which may lead to the assumption that the
new body would be a dependent Unit.
c.5 The Integration University/Companies could open new sources
of wealth and expand the market and provide the State with 
new entrepreneurial opportunities.__________________________
I do not think that the best way to expand markets or increase
entreprenuerial opportunities is via the foundation of a new University.
c.6 Additional Claims
- The demand of the working class for skills while the industrial 
dynamics require an additional supply of qualified labour at alL levels 
to keep up with industrial development.
- An area has already been reserved for the University Campus;
A University at Camacari would also meet the demand of the neighbouring 
areas to the RMS.
That project concluded by saying that all those facts put together 
justified the creation of a University by the Municipality of Camacari.
d. Appraisal
I do not think that the arguments in favour of this new Institution 
are strong enough to justify the high investment it requires, especially 
when there are other institutions already working in the same field and at 
various necessary levels. It would simply be a dispersion of funds for 
investment which are already scarce. Moreoever, if the main problems 
of the industries at Camacari, as far as manpower policies are concerned, 
are not related to the higher education level, there is no sense in 
founding another University when the present ones are sufficient to attend
the demand
(e) New Strategy.
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It is proposed that a good strategy for the professional group 
has other options. Instead of founding new Institutions, the emphasis 
should be put on cutting out the weaknesses of the present ones. In 
particular the fundamental courses in Chemistry, Mechanical and 
Electric Engineering and Management should receive special consideration.
An example of this is shown in the course of "Petrochemical Engineering" 
given by the Universidade Federal da Bahia in collaboration with CENPES.
It has been running for f<w years with the following results:
(see table No. 5.16).
Other attempts made by the 'Universidade Federal de Bahia* to 
persuade more students to choose subjects leading to petrochemical 
activities have not been successful. Probably, the main cause is that 
students, for some reason, lack motivation during their respective courses, 
and so drop out. The percentage of those who do not finish their courses 
is particularly high and this is prejudicial to a country which has so many 
problems of education. A full research should be made into the causes 
of this high percentage of drop-outs.
However, it is essential to stress that there are professionals 
available but they lack specific skills of an applied nature so courses 
should be run to make the existing technically educated people more 
suited to the available jobs, which are highly demanding of specialised 
petrochemical knowledge. This is an indication that long term courses are 
not essential. Ch the contrary, emphasis should be put on collaboration 
among the industries and the teaching and researdh institutions for the 
promotion of specific courses and researches directly applied to their 
respective jobs. As a result of such an agreement, new resources would
be available for:
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- Reorganisation of the traditional courses related to petrochemical 
activities;
- Introduction of post-graduate courses for specialised subjects 
in petrochemistry; such as Engineering of Petrochemical Processing, 
Petrochemical Equipment Maintenance and so on.
Strengthening of all Research and Development Institute with 
special reference to CEPED that is located just in the COPEC area, being 
already the best equipped Research Institute in Bahia and
- A long-term program for large scale training of scientific and 
technical staff for those Institutions.
5.7.3. CENTEC
Running almost at the same level as the traditional university 
courses, the CENTEC is a new education centre fully designed to prepare 
staff for the local industries. It is situated in Salvador where it 
gives short post-secondary courses leading to degrees very similar but 
less academic and more vocational than those given by the university.
Centec's objectives are the development of courses for technologists 
("tecnologos") at high level to deal with the peculiarities of the regional 
labour market. CENTEC accepts the cooperation of Universities and other 
bodies and Institutions with an interest in the field. Of course, the 
idea of the CENTEC is part of a total reformulation of the Brazilian 
University- system, which is outside the scope of this research. Our 
interest lies only on the relation between CENTEC and the pole at Camacari.
Founded in 1976, by the Federal Law n.344, this Centre seems to be 
an important step towards the supply of specialised labour to the region. 
Its first years of experience, not sufficient for a definitive evaluation 
of its performance however, cast some light on the role it can play in 
the future. All the firms which were asked about CENTEC, especially 
represented by their Personnel Officers, have shown entire approval and 
satisfaction with it. They believe that the CENTEC can make a definitive
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contribution to the human resource development in Salvador.
On the other hand, the feelings among technicians and students 
of that centre were completely different. These people find themselves 
in a situation where they neither truly belong to the university sector, 
nor to a second level of education. That is particularly important 
for the students looking for a job - they will probably have problems 
of lower wages and fewer incentives in a wage structure which overstresses 
the academic background of workers.
There is also a serious problem of status with both the professionals 
coming from longer courses and the public in general looking down at 
the mere technicians or at these technologists coming from courses 
shorter than those run by the Universities.
The idea of these courses was to provide postsecondary education 
that was short in duration and essentially non-academic, that is to 
say, essentially applied knowledge, whereas the traditional system
of education offers 4 or 5 year courses intended to turn out candidates 
for the liberal professions, such as Doctors, Engineers, Economists and 
so on. The industries have many jobs for people with high education 
but not necessarily with one of these standards of liberal qualifications. 
These courses could be designed especially for the industries with their 
multiplicity of specialisms which require different levels of skills.
Perhaps, it is the need of the industries which made them welcome 
the CENTEC, whereas the prospect of leaving the University or a similar 
Institute without a liberal profession demotivates the students. Apart 
from this fact, the possibilities of promotion seem less bright for 
those with a "technological" qualification. In the way they stand up 
to now, technologists are a new rung in the educational ladder, with 
which we have dealt in Chapter 1.
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The main difference between a university's leavers and the 
technologist lies in the character of the instruction they receive.
The University is designed to give a general background and to 
produce professionals able to carry out research to develop their own 
field of knowledge» besides having a critical understanding of society.
The training and education of technologists is directly related to the 
execution of their jobs.
In a way, the arrival of the CENTEC seems to have filled a gap in 
the preparation of manpower for Camacari. It can supply those technologists 
to the industries that truly need them to put their initial operations 
on stream. Really at that stage, the main problem is how to give 
a start to the industrial plants, how to make them work. At a latter 
stage, the need for research, development of new products would 
require other employees than technologists. But at the first spot, 
the urgent requirement is in the operational side, the field of how-to-do 
that is exactly where the technologists are inserted.
Looking at the programs and courses developed up to now in that 
centre, the following profile emerges.
Table No. 5.17 Courses Run by CENTEC
Courses
Petrochemical Processing 
Petrochemical Maintenance 
Telecommuni cat ions 
Special Graduate Courses
- Teaching Staff
- Electricity
Special Courses for Teachers
- Civil Engineering
- Chemistry
- Electricity
- Mechanics
Length (hours) 
2,600 
2,600 
2,600
3.600
3.600
Students
36
36
36
18
18
Source : CENTEC
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"This is not merely a matter of new occupations being 
created although this is an important factor in the 
situation in all industries. The jobs now being 
identified and designated as technician jobs have 
been done in these industries for a long time past; 
it is only now that the industries are beginning to 
accept that the people doing them are technicians, 
and to think of them and describe them as such (p.39).
The advance of technology making the technicians' jobs more 
highly skilled, needing better education all the time, is a strong 
factor in this new acceptance of the technician. Technicians have 
to be specialised in their own piece of technology and well motivated 
and prepared to up-date their knowledge constantly within their general 
skill competence. The old idea of Taylor (1947) that all jobs can be 
split up in such a way that relatively unskilled labour can do their 
routines is being superseded by technology. Training and retraining 
again and again throughout the working life is now essential.
5.7.4. (a) Training of Technicians in Brazil is no exception to this.
The situation in Brazil is no exception to this. There are people 
who are employed in specific jobs which require a great variety of 
skills, for which training is not offered in the market. When a specific 
function is well defined, its responsibility established, its contents 
analysed and the skills that it needs are specified, the educational 
network system might well provide the necessary supply. But that is 
not the situation likely to appear in the initial process of industrialisation. 
There the functions can be defined for the personnel manager and for the 
specialist in project evaluation. Nevertheless, it is a long way to go 
from the plans as they are proposed to their effective implementation. 
Moreover, the functions most likely to receive special attention are 
those which, are accepted as requiring, more knowledge - the professions,
but not the technicians. So it is not surprising that Camacari has
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problems in supplying skilfull technicians for the industries, especially 
when there are still problems in defining the exact content of each one 
of those functions. In spite of the fact that the Brazilian Ministry for 
Labour has publicised a classification of functions, which is a 
useful guide for planning, it cannot include the peculiarities of all 
occupations in every single industry. For instance, the SENAI study, (1977), 
that we have commented upon before, on the supply and demand of labour 
had proposed some modifications in the contents of some petrochemical 
functions.
These make the work of training and formation of those technicians 
even more problematic. The insistence on the educational requirements
for technicians, however, over-emphasises the role of instruction for 
those occupations. A great proportion of the technicians in industrial 
jobs in different parts of the world has got its respective jobs and 
acquired the skills to perform them without having the present required 
background. That is valid not only in Brazil, but in other developed 
countries as well (Roberts, 1972).
In fact by legislation, the First and Second level of Education should 
give the students a technical background, a trade or a craft as it 
envisaged. However, problems related either to the equipment of the 
schools or even to the preparation of teachers,mean this attempt at giving 
school-leavers a speciality for work does not necessarily allow them to go 
straight into the labour market.Lack of equipment and of trained staff are not 
the only problems of Secondary Schools in Camacari. In effect, there are 
some schools with brand new equipment for technical courses which are 
not running smoothly. Students have shown a complete lack of 
motivation and the number of drop-outs are extremely high, over 50%.
Moreover, the State Secretariat for Education did not produce up to now 
a specific plan for education at Camacari.
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The most serious problem in the running of those courses was in 
supplying the teaching staff on the experimental disciplines in petro­
chemicals. In fact, CENTEC had to call assistance from the 'Faculdade de 
Ciencias Aplicadas de Sao Bernardo dos Campos', in the
Greater Sao Paulo (Metropolitan area). This reinforces our previous 
point emphasising the need for close cooperation among all the 
Institutions operating in this field. Furthermore, the need of a 
Faculty from outside the Region reveals the weakness of the local 
teaching units, which should be a pointer for a broader scheme of 
cooperation. The preparation of petrochemical manpower in Brazil 
as a whole could, then, be organised in centres around the present and 
future industrial poles. Sao Paulo, as the traditional centre, could 
lead the process by selecting fields of specialties for each centre.
The key point here is that Brazil cannot afford to waste financial 
resources in scattered efforts for the preparation of petrochemical 
manpower, when the solution lies in a national scheme.
5.7.4. The Technicians
Technicians occupy an intermediary position between 
the qualified Engineers, Scientists, Technologists etc and that of the 
skilled manual workers or even tjhe foremen. They are by no means manual 
workers, through their functions imply more "execution" than "decision" 
actions. Even their decisions are bound to operational tasks not to 
strategic issues.
It is broadly recognised that a whole range of technician careers 
are developed together with industrialisation. Technicians developed 
their skills in work situations and many times in on-the-job training 
programs. That seems to have been a general pattern. Oi this subject. 
Professor Roberts (1972) said that until the 1960s, the terms "Scientists, 
Technologists and Technicians" were used without a clear-cut demarcation 
line of their respective meanings. He quoted a report of the Committee 
on Technicians Courses and Examinations to illustrate his point.
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Probably, if all the efforts dedicated to the creation of 
the university of Camacari were diverted towards the improvement 
of the Secondary Education, and to the training of technicians, the 
contribution to the overall problem of manpower planning at Camacari 
would be much greater. Even so, the Municipality has an important 
role to play at the bottom of the education hierarchy (see the next 
chapter).
5.7.4 (b) Levels of Technician
There are two levels of technicians which are not always well 
distinguished, regardless of having different levels of responsibility.
Our task, however, is easier since we know the industrial posts as 
they exist in Camacari nowadays and how they are classified. The first 
level of technicians corresponds to approximately 8-year-schooling, 
whereas the second level requires three years more. We call them the
craft-skilled manual workers and Technically Qualified Operators•respectively. 
In this section, we are concerned with the technicians at the second-level 
(11 years), leaving the first-level and the skilled manual workers to be 
dealt with in the section 5.8
The first technicians are exactly those who are currently being 
prepared by the "Escola Tecnica Federal", in a joint agreement with 
the pole. The objective of that agreement was basically the training 
and formation of Chemists, Electro-technicians, and Mechanics.
Table No. 5.17 gives the figures of the results attained.
V -
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Table No. 5.17
Courses and Enrolments at the "Escola Tecnica Federal - Bahia" 
________________ (1975-1978)_______________
Courses
1975
years
1976 1977 1978
Chemistry a 4 4 4
b 160 160 160 -
Instrumentists a 2 2 2 2
b 80 80 80 80
Mechanics a 4 4 4 __
b 160 160 160 -
Electro­
technicians a 4 4 4
b 160 160 160
Source : Escola Tecnica Federal
a number of groups
b N. of students enrolled in the courses
These are registration numbers, seeing that only 50% of the total 
have actually finished the three-year course and gone to look for a job, which 
could make the problem of supply an on-going one. The outstanding 50% are
divided among drop-outs, others who have entered the university and 
those who simply have finished the course but decided to abandon their
careers
b.l Approval of the Program
i
Going from the analysis of the courses offered to a list of the 
posts at the pole, some discrepancies may be found. Some of the posts, which 
require this complete secondary level instruction (11 years) are not being 
prepared for by the educational network system. These are posts 
for which additional training is required besides the formal instruction 
at the colleges. A roll of these posts include: Maintenance Technicians, 
Equipment Inspectors and Technicians of Industrial Security.
Here, the enterprises have no option but to prepare their own 
employees, since these occupations require specific knowledge that can be 
better provided by their own companies. Nevertheless, this fact poses 
a heavy burden on the human resources departments of each company.
They have to carry out an extra program of preparation of technicians.
The need for these programs of training and creation of the labour 
force have increased by the fact that both the labour turnover and the 
trainees who drop out tend to be high in the pole. In a labour market, 
where there are no problems of supply of good labour, the companies 
can embark on similar programs of training without extra fear of losing 
a great percentage of the trainees, but that is not the case at 
Camacari this means that the preparation and training of a labour force 
could only be a solution in the long run, since the market can be 
satisfied in the short term only by a program of intensive and very 
highly specific short-or medium programs of training. A full scale 
technician is developed only under an intensive on-the-job training 
that may last for years. Therefore, we can expect the problems of 
supply and demand of technicians cannot be solved in the short run but 
needs at least a period of five years.
5.7.5. Proposed Strategy
In the short term, there is not much to be changed, since at this 
level, the policies are aiming at satisfying daily needs. In fact a whole 
range of activities has been undertaken, which has in some way relieved
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the pressure from the industrial complex. The problem is more 
serious when we consider the medium and long—terms strategies.
Here, some decisions have to be taken to avoid double efforts in 
isolated fields or the waste of resources on non-essential issues.
A study must be undertaken to verify the impact of the consumer-end 
industries to be settled in the pole. By the data already available, 
the tendencies are for an even stronger pressure on the secondary 
education rung. In contrast, as we have seen, efforts have been 
made to found a new university at Camacari. However, the recent 
installation of CENTEC and the reinforcement of the technological 
departments at the 'Universidade Federal de Bahia can theoretically 
fulfill the supply of manpower to Camacari without the need to create 
another University.
5.7.5 (a) Medium-term strategy
There must be some changes in the strategic policies envisaging 
the improvement in the supply of profssionals and technicians to the 
pole, as well as in the training facilities.
As for the high level professionals, priorities should be given 
to (i) the introduction of specific courses at postgraduate levels 
to attend the particular needs of the NPP, (ii) to the infrastructure 
of the R & D Institutes to help the industries in the absorption of 
new technologies and to the development of an independent know-how 
and (iii) to the development of joint efforts among all the Universities and 
Institutions in the region to draw a scheme to supply the pole with the 
required professionals.
As for the technicians, emphasis should be put immediately (i) on 
the question of a Technical School at Camacari to meet the demands of 
those technicians for the pole and surrounding towns, (ii) on a plan 
to improve the secondary schools preparing staff for the area (Local 
Government) and, (iii) on the development of the companies Personnel
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Departments and Research Units for the mostly highly specified 
needs not shared with other Units of production.
5.7.5. (b) Long-term Strategy
A long-term strategy must consider, not only the regional 
but also the national problems of the petrochemical industries.
Here, planners should take into consideration all the Institutions 
that have similar objectives, regardless of their location in Brazil.
As petrochemistry is an area with thousands of products and therefore 
different specialties it would be advisable to have specialised R & D 
Institutes in those regions where the petrochemical Industry has its 
poles. There is no use in spending resources in parallel researches.
Sao Paulo as the traditional industrial centre has already some advantages 
in this field.
A coordination of these training activities of all the petrochemical 
companies and other Institutes at the national level is strongly 
recommended. So, efforts already made at Centres such as CENPES, CEPED, 
will not be wasted.
This coordination could be made for all kinds of specialised 
training, not only for the high level professions. The main advantage of 
such a policy would be the sharing of training techniques for many 
specialised jobs such as Maintenance, equipment inspection, control of 
valves and compressors, heating etc.
It will also relieve an extra burden of work from the shoulders of 
each company or Institute to plan the contents and execution of the 
occupations, common to the majority of petrochemical companies, which 
are the main source of technological research, but need the cooperation 
of all the Institutions relating to R & D. The idea here is, then, 
to direct those efforts into the living organisations. It is much more 
difficult to make all organisations work together than to found 
scattered Units at different places, but this must be done when resources
are scarce
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3 - 3 * SKILLSD WORKERS
s,<-- <id workers are a varied and broad category of any industry.
'r^ njPr‘i5e3 jobs with completely different contents, which .take 
a .cramcn program of training virtually impossible, with many of these 
3P'Sl— a_i— es trained in short and specific courses, specially bv
-.ne— icb training" programs. The profile taken from the oole
indicates that the percentage of these workers at Camacari follows 
the average pattern of around 40%, found at Abiquim and Setrices,
Researches See 5.3.1.' The importance of the group, however, is not 
only derived from that figure of 40% but from the quality of the tasks 
they have. In effect, the 'unskilled workers form a similar share of 
the total workforce, but they perform less skilfull tasks with no 
strategic functions, compared for instance with processing operators.
Table Mo. 5.6 indicates that the original network system cf 
education dees not prepare these types cf workers. The burden cf the 
work falls then on the firms themselves and cn private Institutes, 
especially 3EMAI. The lack of trained workers coming from the network 
3yscan of education is explained by the failure of new legislation to 
be effective in the Brazilian schools. They are intended to give 
to the school-leavers of the First and Second level of education in specific 
skills to help them to face the labour market. This reform, however, 
is only on the paper, because of the absence of specific courses at each 
level. An analysis of the courses available at Camacari is a clear 
indicator of this difficulty. Some of these workers, such as Welders 
and Smiths could have specific teaching at schools since they are common 
to a variety of industries. The absence of any specific course at Camacari 
costs additional efforts to the enterprises, since they have to give a whole 
course, instead of a short program on the peculiarities of each trade in 
the industry. Effectively, this main task of preparing this type of 
workers belongs to the local government according to the division of the 
Utilities among the different levels of the Brazilianeducational respons
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5.8. SKILLED WORKERS
Skilled workers are a varied and broad category of any industry.
It comprises jobs with completely different contents, which make 
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Government (Chapter six).
As there is no probable solution to this problem at the short 
run, the firms have to bear the onus of the training of new workers. 
Fortunately, there are some posts for which supply matches demand 
due especially to some trades and crafts that are prepared on job­
training programmes or on work experience. The declining cycle of the 
construction industry in the pole, for instance, can release some trades 
and crafts such as welders to work in other kind of jobs. Taking the 
SENAI study as a guide, there are five trades and crafts, important for 
the petrochemical industries, for which there is no regular course at the 
market:
Instrumental controls Operators (Inputs, Safety and Pollution control);
Instrumental Controls Operators (Output, Flows and Stocks Control);
Fitters;
Lathe Operators, and 
- Welders.
From these five, two (Fitters and Welders) are provided by the local 
labour market. The real problem, then, is reduced to the operators 
especially designed for petrochemical industries and to Lathe Operators. 
Thus the solution to the supply problem of skilled workers does not 
seem very difficult. In these situations, a little imagination and 
spirit of initiative from managers could well sort out the arising problems. 
In effect, when the education system is not able to find a solution, the 
managerial structure has the obligation to give an answer, if it is 
possible, using the means offered by the existing system.
A possible solution lies in agreements similar to those made between 
the pole and the "Universidade Federal da Bahia" and "Escola Tecnica 
Federal" to which we have referred earlier on and designed for higher levels 
of education. The reasons why this solution has never been applied or 
discussed are probably related to the non existence of a specific 
technical school at this level and to the arrival of SENAI at the area
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with a theoretical capacity to cover the trades in higher demand. As 
the majority of this skilled labour could beprepared in courses of 
less-than one year in duration, an agreement during the last year of 
this first level between selective local schools, SENAI and the pole 
could prepare the workers for which there is no supply in the market 
at the moment.
Notwithstanding the age of 14-15 at which students used to finish
the first level of education has a direct influence on these prospective
technical courses. In this period a job or a career is not yet a
main value for the students. Some families also do not believe that, at this
early age, the children should make their career choice with a high danger
of embarking on an unsuitable future. After all, education is to provide
a broadly based learning for life. Firms also prefer to make agreements
at the second level, when, besides educational considerations the students
*have also got rid of their military obligations.
This means that firms should be very careful in defining their strategy 
and tasks when recruiting their workers after only the first level of 
education. SENAI which has a national wide experience in this field 
suggests that the family background of the students (or trainees in the case 
of any industrial agreement) must be taken into account (Castro, 1974) .
They have realised that descendants from families of liberal professions 
or from middle class skilled blue-collar workers very rarely embrace an 
industrial job willingly or successfully. They finish their courses and 
instead of getting a job, prefer to pursue their studies further on the way 
to a University. *
* Military service is compulsory in Brazil at the age of seventeen 
for a period of one to two year service in the Armed Forces.
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In the long term,the pole has to think of preparing a steady 
and efficient labour force with on-the-job training programs for the coming 
years. A skilled worker is shaped at the plant, doing his job, much 
more than at the college. In this way, we can say that an efficient 
skilled welder, for instance, requires much more than a one-year basic 
course. He requires long experience at the specific plant where he 
has his job.
For the short and medium-term as an urgent therapy, a combination 
of educational incentives, agreements and on-the-job training programs 
can provide the pole with the work-force it needs in a relatively short 
period of time. Given the short duration of these courses and training 
programs and the evolution of the pole, we can say, in less than five 
years from the start of its operation if the exact policies were applied.
The above combination of incentives, agreements and on-the-job 
training programs can be made with an understanding of the already existing 
Institutions operating in that field such as the Municipal Government, 
the State Government - SETRABES and Secretary for Education, the 
Federal Government - Ministry for Education, PIPMO, and independent 
organisations such as SENAI.

103V -
General Conclusion of the Chapter
There is no doubt that the human resources policies are of 
utmost stratetic importance for the consolidation of the industrial 
complex at Camacari as a pole. The pole ideal requires a strategy 
based both on the traditional internal elements of a corporate plan 
for manpower, and on the external factors relating to environment 
issues.
Notwithstanding the widely accepted tenet that new industrial 
ventures in underdeveloped regions require a substantial increase in 
the investment on human resources, especially on training new skills, 
the firms at Camacari do not seem to have spent very much on this 
issue. On the contrary, the extra burden on training has fallen on the 
Government network of education and training, which has failed to 
respond adequately to the challenge for the reasons set out.
Regardless of whatever controversies there are on the studies 
of demand and supply of labour for the industrial complex, the supply 
has been more effective than could have been expected at first glance, 
especially for the professional level. The capital-intensive nature
has played a role in the minimisation of that supply. There are
however, some peculiarities in the relationships between the pole and 
different categories of labour not necessarily related to the demand and 
supply aspects that deserve our special treatment according to each 
category of human resources.
While the simpler skillful manual workers have not been a serious 
problem for the NPP, other categories require an improvement or change 
in the policies adopted up to now.
In spite of the failure in terms of entrepreneurship up to the present, 
the NPP does offer several entrepreneurial opportunities, since more and 
more business chances may arise from a large and integrated petrochemical 
complex. The problem is basically how to develop a mentality of
entrepreneurship and provide conditions for the appearance of those 
who may turn business opportunities t-- realities. To do that 
the NPP needs to give a high priority to small units that can be 
settled down-stream of its basic complex. This, however, has not 
been the case.
The entrepreneurs in particular have not found in the NPP a fertile 
field for their growth. It has been very difficult to attract potential 
entrepreneurs due to the nature of the business, and the amount of skills 
and knowledge it requires. A cross analysis with the composition of 
leadership of the NPP points to an almost complete absence of the regional 
entrepreneurs. Even the local capitalist groups which take part appear 
solely as capital providers and not as entrepreneurs extending the nature of 
the industrial development in new and original directions.
The down-stream industries which could provide more opportunities 
for entrepreneurs are developing slowly and in a pattern which again 
favours outside groups. Here a change of policies is necessary 
intended to back the small consumer-end companies, based on petrochemical 
feedstocks by providing them with financial credit and a market 
orientation, technical corporation, to provide encouragement for those small 
number of companies already settled in the area (See 5.5.6).
As for the managerial cadre»despite the savings on the number of 
managers for capital-intensive industries such as petrochemical companies, 
the firms at the NPP have not applied sufficient financial resources in 
management development programs. This task is undertaken mainly by the 
Government.
Management Development courses specialised in petrochemical 
industries held for the NPP, have come under strong criticism by 
participants, industries and finally by the Government. However difficult 
it is to assess the exact amount of resources companies are putting into 
their development programs, new strategies for the long and medium-terms 
aiming at integrating the regional resources with the managerial staff 
of the pole are needed and proposed. The development of regional
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management has received an initial blow in the face of the dominance 
by foreign managers of the biggest department (Production) of the 
pole companies.
As for the Professionals and Technicians, the picture is not very 
different from the two previous categories. There have been 
attempts to overcome the weakness of the market supply with short-term 
measures. In terms of University leavers, there is no shortage of 
professionals for the pole; a shortage, however, is felt for some 
technically qualified operators for which training is not yet offered 
by the market and the efforts to close that gap are far from the 
required ones. While the main efforts at Camacari have been to create 
a new University instead of improving the already existing institutions 
which are able to meet the market demands.
Considering the development of the petrochemical industries not only 
in the NPP,but in the whole of Brazil, the most sensible strategy is 
not simply to increase the output of Engineers, Chemists and the like, 
but to strengthen the whole Brazilian Research and Development 
Infrastructure of knowledge in petrochemistry. As the pole is a 
national strategy, so must be the development of highly professional 
teams in this field, which must be made with strong regional participation 
in proportion to the share of the NPP in the national production 
of petrochemicals. Brazil then will have its own access to both existing 
and new technologies, and those able to operate them, without having to 
import both technology and those who can put the industries on stream with 
a viable future.
What is wrong is the neglect of the corporate development of a total 
workforce in favour of the foundation of another University. At this 
particular stage and with the requirements of the down-stream industries 
which require more technicians than traditional professions we argue for 
a change in the priorities of the local government in favour of the 
development and training of these technicians that are now and will be so 
badly needed at the pole.
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Due to the strategic importance of the human resources in 
the integration of the pole to the regional economy, there would 
be hardly widespread effects unless the participation of the several 
categories of manpower, especially the entrepreneurs increases in the 
NPP. After all true progress is made with local cooperation; it 
cannot be imposed on a community. If the objectives are regional 
and social development, it is fully time to change policies to 
persuade, to listen to, to involve the whole local population in 
the efforts to consolidate the pole.
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6.1. Introduction
As a small community and primary raceiver of the first impact of the 
pole, Cama^ari can be a thermometer of the socio-economic effects of the 
petrochemical industrial complex. As a government-business venture which 
has some major objectives, the development of Cama^ari is an initial guide 
to find out the commitment of the Authorities to raach those goals.
It i3 very common to find in underdeveloped regions, large scale 
projects which benefit the population living outside the area and have 
little impact on the local communities. Many hydro-electric dams are clear 
examples. Hie involution of the business theory (Drucker -1964, Ackoff- 197Q 
Blake & I.louton - 1969) today backs the hypothesis that the industries have 
an effective obligation to that population. According to our initial hypo­
thesis, they are responsible at least for the problems they create. If this 
is valid for industries in general, it is much more for the IIP? that is also 
a government undertaking.
If v/e look straight into chapter 1, we will remember that the main 
problems of the KE was shown in comparison with the major social objectives 
of the pole. So, this chapter should perhaps be dealing with that entire 
region, but in fact, concentrates on the local community of Cama<jari. There 
are good reasons for this. First of all, the fact that the pole is almost 
wholly located in the Municipal area of Camagari} secondly, an analysis of 
the effects on this core will demonstrate the capacity of the NPP to exert 
its influence on the whole region, and, thirdly, it is at Cama$ari that the 
main direct and tangible influences of the 1». can be measured.
6.1.1. Physical Location
So far the WPP consists mainly of the basic com lex at Cama§ari since 
the down-stream industries are 1 laving a slow and late arrival due to the
reasons previously discussed in 2.4.5 (a) and 3»9«3. Also, as we have
already discussed in 2.2. in the literature on growth pole and on concen -
tration and decentralisation of industry, it is over-ambitious to cx. ect a
single industrial pole to have a major impact over a region with more than
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1.5 m square kilometres. Moreover, there is some evidence that the effects of 
these poles tend to be concentrated in a small area.
6.1.2. Influence of the Pole
How small is the area of influence of the pole on which we should 
concentrate is another problem to sort out here. In theory, a single Llunici- 
pality should not be treated on its own, separate from the notion of conur­
bation. However, the RI.IS is hardly a Metropolitan Area in technical sense 
(see 1.4; and the CCPSC area being wholly situated at Cama^ari, v/e are right 
to limit our analysis to that Municipality only. As a Federal development of 
that size ought not to have its effects so localised, we hope that by 
concentrating on the local policies and effects, it will be possible to 
estimate the NFP capacity to have wider influence on (i) the HMS, (ii) the 
State of Bahia and (iii) the whole HE. '.Then it is necessary, however, we 
will also make further comments on those variables that are related to these 
last three areas.
6.1.3. Tangible effects and accountability 
Obviously it is on the Municipality of Cama^ari that v/e can find the
most tangible effects to measure the impact of the pole. The industries and 
services are there, and the l.uncipality has also taken advantage of infra­
structure v/orks such as the communication network system, housing, schools, 
roads, ports, railv/ays etc. V/e will attempt to discuss to v/hat extent the 
NPF has changed the entrepreneurial skills of the community and how far the 
pole has encouraged those changes. Our analysis will start with these 
tangible aspects, because the intangible ones are more difficult to measure 
or observe at first sight. Then we v/ill make comments on policies of 
centralisation and decentralisation of the pole, on its infrastructure, 
migration and the functional aspects of the local government, such as 
housing, education and health. Another important aspect is related to the 
regional linkages created by the input/output network from the pole, together
with the traditional industries and the problems related to the unskilled 
workers of Camacari.
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Behind these comments lie our assumption that business is accountable 
to its shareholders and also to many other groups not directly working for 
them, -he 1IPP or the Basic Complex at Cama^ari is undoubtedly accountable 
to the local community as it had affected the local environment. So thi3 
chapter is an extension of the previous one, with the difference that here 
we are not solely concerned with labour. It includes the whole population of 
the area which is directly or indirectly affected by the arrival of the petro 
chemical industries. The unskilled jobs at the pole3*8 insignificant if 
compared to the number of new-comers to Cai.iaijari, who are only capable of 
undertaking unskilled jobs.
As the ole was set up as a regional development project with an 
explicit objective of hel; ing the region, Camaijari is entitled to expect to 
share in any benefit at least proportionately. Y/e can say, then:
(i) the pole is directly responsible for any local problems it causes as 
this is a ^eneral responsibility cf any undertaking:
(ii) the pole as a mixed government/business project should be even more 
concerned than a purely private undertaking that the local as well as 
the regional population shares in the benefits of the development.
6.2. Centralisation and decentralisation of industries 
Taking that one of the basic assumption of the pole concept.is to provide 
an industrial decentralisation at the national level, one may think that a 
similar decentralisation should be enforced at the regional level as well. If 
that is the case, the pole has started in a wrong way, since it contributed 
to an industrial concentration in the R!.!S, instead of promoting a geographical 
decentralisation of industries. It could be argued that the RTIS was the 
natural location due to the presence of the oilfields, of the refineries and 
the city services required by the industries. However, the power of industrial 
concentration is very high and one must be aware of the tendencies 
industries have to cluster together (3ee chapter 3) due to economies of 
scaj-e. These tendencies are even stronger in petrochemicals than in other
industrial sectors
*’ T -
Concentration effects have in fact attracted another croup of industries 
to Cama^ari, which have no direct relationship with the ]etrochemical 
industries, the so-called "Copper Complex" of Caraiba .ietais in contra­
position to the basic coia_lex of petrochemicals. They have been planned to 
be settled at Camaijari recardless of the copper nines being hundreds cf 
miles away at Sobradinho, which would be the natural location for that hind 
of industry, nevertheless, they have been planned to Camaijari under the 
arguments that among other reasons, that town can offer an excellent 
infrastructure, bui t for the petrochemical pole. On the other hand,
Sobrad nho is a small town at the dry highlands of Bahia which desperately 
needs new ecoao.; ic activities, -he business community of Sobradinho and 
surroundincs have been constantly asking for the reversal of the decision 
to locate that industry at Canagari, since it is traditionally settled near 
the mines due to the economies of transport. Furthermore, Sobradinho has 
plenty of power and a big reservoir of -..ater coming from the Sobradinho 
dam, that wou-d get rid of the industrial residues of the industrialised 
copper, which is of high . ollution potential. The single fact that Cama- 
<*ari was able to attract industrial activities that otherwise would be 
located elsewhere has proved that, at least, as far as the State of Bahia 
is concerned, Cama^ari has acted as a centralisation instead of decen­
tralisation force. In Kirshmam's words, it has more of a backward than a 
forward effect (Hirshman, 1958)«
6.3. Infrastructure
One does not have to be an acute observer to realise that Cana^ari 
has changed significantly in these last five years. Apart from the COFEC 
area built from the scratch, there are quite a lot of modifications inside 
the new town. New buildings, suburbs, bank branches, schools, roads, bus 
station, reorganisation of the town life in general, improvement in the 
communication system, new housing, skyscraper are all pointing out that 
the present rate of change is very high.
Diagram No. 6/l gives a rough idea of the improvement in different
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fields such as railways, new ports, telecommunication system and so on. The 
new Terminal for Liquid Goods at the Aratu Port, together with the main 
Port at Salvador and the Fetrobras Terminal (TEIADRE) ..*ake a definitive 
contribution for the import/export movement of cargoes to and fran the 
EI.:S. 3esides these Government built and operated Ports, there is another 
one privately owned by DC'tf .¿ufmica.
All these improvements, however, due to their nature are of limited 
effect in physical terms. They benefit Cama^ari in the first place and in 
the case of the communication system all the Metropolitan Area.
Anyway, investments are still coming into the area which will make 
the share of the total investment in the State of Bahia favour more and 
more the RMS. Is this a case of deliberate government policies which lead 
to decentralisation in national terms but higly concentration at the 
regional level? Or the government policies frustrated by the strength of 
petrochemical industries which prefer to cluster? The difficulties to 
attract third and fourth generation of petrochemical companies do not lend 
support to the second alternative. Furthermore, at the early stages of 
development the petrochemical industries do not have the strength necessary 
to be a 'puli' force for other industries. So, the concentration seems to 
be the result of intentional policies and the availability of an industrial 
infrastrueture that favours many other industries besides petrochemicals. 
The 'Caraiba lietais* Project is again a clear example of this case. The 
influence of Canaijari infrastructure, which can attract these non-petro 
cehmical industries into its sites, casts some doubts over the possibility 
of decentralisation of the petrochemical industries to other locations 
besides Bahia. In this case, the prospects for a truly North East 
petrochemical pole in the Ferroux's sense are very weak. The industries 
clustered at Cana^ari would be at the best a local petrochemical complex 
rather than a regional pole.
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6.4. Migration
Even before the im. lementation of the pole, the process of migration 
to Canajari had already started but on a s:.:all scale, probably derived 
from its proximity to Salvador. Several studies have indicated the trend 
of given populations, notably the migrants from the Reconcavo (roughly 
the area around the RMS) to move to Salvador. Migration specialists agree 
that the main reasons behind the movement of people to Salvador are due 
either to a change of the production system of the agricultural hinterlands 
or to a stagnation of its economic resources (Singer, 1973, Scuza 1977). 
According to such studies, the migration to the RMS would happen indeden- 
dently of the implementation of industries. The fact that the industries 
are capital- not labour-intensive is -puite independent factor of that 
migration, which would occur in ai.y case.
Accepting that migration occurs because of imbalances in the econony 
of the hinterland v;e have to explain why the migrants are attracted to 
Camaijari other than to other localities in the RES. Researches, including 
one undertaken by the Camaijari Housing Company (DZCASA) shew that the 
ex; ectation of jobs is the main reason behind those who move to Camaijari.
The pole, and the level of wages paid to its employees raises the expectation 
of higher living standards to the migrants than elsewhere. Another research 
v/as undertaken on a continuous basis since July-1977 hy the "Secretaria 
do Trabalho e Bern Estar (SETRABES)' and based on those people who attended 
at its reception posts (tables n. 6/l, 6/2, 6/3 and 6/4 and Diagram K.6/2).
The data being available only from 1977 onwards coincides with a 
bigger share of the migration from the places outside the Metropolitan area. 
It is natural that the first waves of migrants come from their ovn 
Metropolitan areas. The reasons are quite simple. They are the first ones 
to know about the pole; secondly, the firms make their initial recruitment 
campaign near their own market. In the first years of the building up 
period, the construction firms hired labour in the RMS and their 
surroundings, but afterwards, they have to traus. ort labour from as far as
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Diagram No. 6/2 - Origins of mii.xants and low income population to Cama5ari
in the period July-1977 to December 1978.
tligrants: 4,973
Low Incomes 5*213
Total: 10,186
North East (except Bahia) 
V//A Other places 
1 I Bahia
Source: SETRABES - Projeto Migrantes
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6C miles.
..hen the migration froir. more distant areas arrived at Canacari, the 
great bulk of job3 had already bee:, filled, which means that the firms 
were a l r e a d y  looking for semi-skilled labour, while the migrants were in 
their majority peasants without _r:dustrial experience. There were 
seme workers without industrial experience. There were, however, some 
workers with a little experience in the construction industry, which made 
easier their absorption. They were mainly people coming from '.aulo Afonso 
dam' and afterwards 'Sobradinho dam' builders, , ointing out, then, the 
influences of the large scale . rojects in the training of workers in the 
NE. This can explain part of th proportion of the workers coming from 
Pernambuco and Alagoas states, -he overwhelming majority of migrants come, 
however, from other areas at the atate of Bahia (Biagram no. 6/2 ar.d 
table he. 6/4/ without that construction or industrial experience.
The immediate managerial problem for the po_e is the level of 
education of the new immigrants now part of the population of Cama^ari.
The pole continues to be surro- nded by a population which came to that site 
looking for better jobs. In terms of adequate training for an industrial 
job at the pole, the educational background of that potulation make this
Jtask very difficult. Observe that more than 81^ . of them had not finasly, the 
Primary School (four years Instruction), that is required for any job at 
the pole. The industries are even becoming more rigorous on tki3 requisite 
due to the danger of accident in the chemical industries.
The classical question of labour versus capital intensive industries 
is not adequate here, 3ince the main problem is how to cope with the 
recently built industrial complex and afterwards what to do to ease the 
¡roblem of vnemploynent cf unskilled iranigrants and also the indigenous 
popu.ation of Cama^ari.
The problem is how to absorb new migrants when the old migrants and 
low income indigenous population are now -ookir.g for new jobs. ..s the
VT
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population cf Camagari is aore than increasing, scaring in the last few 
years (Diagram lie. 6/6), urgent solution is needed to fi.1 the gap 
between the growth of its population and the creation of new jobs. At the 
heart of the problem there is a short term solution that c u*d keep part 
of that labour force employed at the building sites during the construction 
period of the industrial complex. The peak of the construction eriod was 
in 19 7 7, after which a continouovs decrease in the number of jobs begun, 
with the present pros, ects of further redundancies when the works of 
'Caraibu i.etais' finish, "here are unskilled jobs scattered around different 
places but not in a number sufficient to rival the influx of migrants. It 
i3 at tills grey picture that v.e need to look at the performance of the 
government-business community at Canagari. As one of our initial 
assumptions stated that business is responsible, at least, for the :roblens 
it creates, an analysis of the performance of the local government and cf 
the pole is necessary to demonstrate the way the socio-economic problems of 
the community have been treated.
liable no. 6/l - Migrants ar.d Low Income Population by Instruction (Period
July 77 - December 1978)
Level Of Literacy Total migrants Low Income
Abs . £ eA c-A
Illiterate 5,051 50.38 •49-40 51.29
Unfinished Primary School 8,147 81.27 83.01 80.62
Complete Secondary School 787 7.85 7.44 8.23
Other Courses 64 0.63 0.43 0.82
Total ( * ) 10,024 • - -
Sources'SSTRALPS/ irojoto Migrantes'
( * ) As these numbers are not mutually exclusive, the sum of the 
parts do not coincide with the total.
"able lío. 6/2 igrant3 and Low Incone Population by sex and
Civil Status
(Period July 1977 to Becenber 1576)
Discrimination
T o t a 1 Migrants Low Incone
Abs. Z- £ £
S e x
Hale 6,99ó 68.7 87.7 50.6
Fenale 3,190 3 1 .3 12.4 49.4
1C,186 ico ICO 100
1j
Civil Status
Single 4,530 44-5 55.9 33.6
Harried 3,956 38.9 35-5 ' 42.0
Others 1,196 I6.6 8.6 24.4
Total 10,186 100 100 100
Source: SETRABES/Projeto Migrantes»
Table llo. 6/3 - Migrants and Lov; I:.cone Population to
Cam&ijari by Age Group.
(Period July 1977 - Bee. 1978)
»
•
! AGE GROUP
T 0 t a 1 Migrants L o t ;  Income
Population
ci
1
Abs. *
1
¡15 - IQ 1,628 I8.0 18.9 14 .0
i
• 20 - 24 2,894 28.4 33.6 23.4
25j - 29 1,927 18.9 20.4 18.5
3C - 34 1,153 11.3 11.1 11.6
35 - 39 832 8.2 6.8 10.5
40 - 59 1,384 13.6 8.4 19.5
over 60 160 1.6 0.7 2.4
Not declared 0.1
i Total 10,178 IOC# lOOfl IOC#
Sources SETRABES/Projeto Lligrantes
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An ideal and necessary approach to the problems would be the creation 
of unskilled jobs for the population. Those jobs should have been created 
at different stages to . bsorb part of the unemployed labour due to the 
downturn of the construction industries. The introduction of labour 
intensive industries would have been a possible solution. Ar.otier valid 
proposal is tie creation of jobs at economic activities different from the 
petrochemical ones, such as in service industries. The efforts to create 
jobs at that level can be measured by the Government expenditure or 
investment in projects aiming at creating those jobs. A careful look into 
the structure of the local government budget will cast some light into the 
whole matter (dee section 6.5)«
Apart from these semi- and unskilled migrants, there are the highly 
paid employees who came to work in the pole but are not considered here for 
tv/o reasons:
( i) they are not truly migrants but hired professionalsj 
(ii) they do not live at Car.ia^ ari, generally, but in Salvador.
If we take migration as an indicator of the pole influence, the data 
available show in strong terms that its influence on the III region outside 
Bahia is very lin.ited. It is restricted to a circle around the RI.!3 and 
surroundings only. Almost 8G^ .' of the migrants come from Eahia and there is 
no other State with a contr.ibution over 8J.'. Even if it is argued that 
nigxation is not essential for the pole, it implies that the catalyst power 
of that industrial complex is able to exert its influence only on a radius 
of few miles only. This in a region where migration has been a constant 
issue.
Admitting the sociological view that migration is a development 
factor in the sense that a region i3 wakening up from it3 sleep to cliange 
its structure, to put its population in contact with a different environment 
(Fac<5 1978), the contr.ihution of Camaijari to the social develo.ment of the 
region is reduced due to the lack of participation of the migrant force in
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Diagram No. 6/3 - Origins of the Migrants and Low Income Population from 
Bahia in the Period July 77 - December 1978 (>’» ).
Source: SS'L’RABDS/ Pro jeto Migrantes
Atlantic Ocean
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Table Ho. 6/4 - Origins of Migrants and Lov/ 11 come Population 
to Carcaçari in the ¡eriodo July - 1977 to 
December 1978)
Origin
Total Migrants
Z
Low In-
Abs. Z come Z
Bahia 7,953 78.08 68.54 87.19
* - - - * • - « --- - - - - - - -- ■ ■ -  - ----------
Alagoas 218 2.15 3.26 1.08
Ceara 262 2.57 3.66 1.54
Maranhao A3 0.42 0.67 0.19
Paraiba 88 0.87 1.11 0.64
Pe rnambuco 757 7.43 11.92 4.06
Piaui 189 1.86 3.36 0.43
Rio G. Norte 37 0.36 0.39 0.35
Sergipe 258 2.53 2.84 2.24
North East 
(except Bahia) 1,852_ _ _ 18.18_ _ _ 26.23 _ _ _ _10.52 _ .
Rest of Brazil 381 3.74 5.24 2.30
i'otal 10,186 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Setrabes/Projeto Migrantes
the ir.dnatrial life of the tov/n ar.d tc the 3mall radius of its influence.
..e can add to these points the fact that the indiger.eous population 
has also been kept apart from the development of the pole, since they are 
not involved in it, we have a gloor.ypicture of the social influence cf 
the pole on the local community.
6.5. Finance
There are puite a lot of indicators that can be used to verify the 
financial impact of the pole on the local community. First of all, it is 
necessary to see if the enter.rises are financially healthy to survive, 
pay the social taxes and be profitable. .Vithout these conditions, there 
would be a continuous running down into debt of the government which -would 
be obliged to keep on pouring money into those industries. It is of the 
nature of the business to be profitable, even if this profit is measured 
in ncn-quantitative terms.
.Vs assessment of the financial performance of these enterprises at 
this initial stage of operation has r.a.y short comings and is a bit 
difficult to make. The investments, generally, tend to be very high and the 
fixed assets tend to have a bigger share in the balance sh.eet than it 
would normally have in older firms. These facts put some industries in 
trouble as far as working capital is concerned. A more important point, 
however, is the pole capacity for generating revenues. Taking that the 
investment up to now totals in rough terms US3 3.5 billions, what is the 
contribution in terms of taxes for the local and State governments?
This analysis must differenciate between two facts. First of all is the 
general evolution of taxes from the pole; the second is the growth of the 
local government budget.
The State of Bahia is divided into ten 'Delegacies Fiscals' (admi­
nistrative units in charge of the collection of taxes). The pole is under 
the area of the 'Delegacia Suburbans', which comprises the industrial and 
suburban area of Salvador, Luuro de Freitas, Camaijari and oimOes .-ilho.
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The main characteristic of that Unit accordine to its Chief Executive 
('Delegado') is the size of its tax payers, 7/hose 117 bigger ones 
represents moi'e than 87/ of the total tax collected (Secretarla da 
Fazenda, 1311).
Table Ho. 6/5 Projected Solution of the Collection of IC1I by
year & Delegacia Cr3 OOCJs
f  — --- ■
Years
Capital
Dele^acias
Suburbana Ilheus Others Total (*)
1977 955 557 359 839 2 ,7 10
1978 1,033 930 389 892 3,243
1979 1,116 1,128 418 944 3,602
1980 1,190 1,128 447 997 3,762
1931 1,268 1,846 476 1,049 4,639
I9e2 1,347 2,016 505 i 1,102 4,970
The same table in percentages
1977 35.2 20.6 13.3 30.9
1978 31.9 28.7 12.0 27.4
1979 30.9 31.3 11.6 26.2
1980 31.6 30.0 11.9 26.5 . Oo
1981 27.3 39-8 10.3 22.6 H
1982 27.1 40.6 10.2 22.1
Sources Secretaria da Fazenda/3A - DSTiEF/SI.
(•*) The 3um of the columns doe3 not coincide with the total due 
to approximations.
The share of the 'Delegacia Suburbuna' in the collection of ICI.I is 
supposed to increase from 20 to 40/ in 6 years. Its position in relation to 
the total State revenue has changed significantly in the last years. From a 
mere 4/ 3hare in 1971. it jumped to 11.2 in 1976 and 21/ in 1979. with the
prospects of reaching 255 in the next for/ years. At the lon^ tern, the trend 
is for the Tele,sacia Suburbana' to provide around 4Of.' of the ¿tato revenue, 
what means that it will put the Delegadas of Salvador (Capital and cf 
Ilheus well behind (lata from the Secretaria da Fazenda/üahia).
As far as tax is concerned, the growth of the 'Delegada Suburbana' 
is unquestionable. It overtook not only the place of Ilheus and Salvador 
(Capital), which were heading the tax collection for many years, but also 
it beat the two main traditional economic areas of Bahia. Ilheus is the 
cocoa area - a traditional crop of the State - which was the main 
source cf income for Bahia for many years, when it yielded its .lace to 
Salvador due to the presence of the oil industry. These two economic 
activ-ties are definitely put to a second .lace, with the industrial 
program a sundry the leading role. A forty per cent of the State revenue 
is a clear indication cf the importance of the industrialisation of Bahia.
let us break that data now to verify the extent to which the petro­
chemical industries have contribute in taxes for the 'Delegada Suburbana'.
Table No. 6/6 - Collection of taxes (iCI.l) at the 'Delegacia 
Suburbana' by source and year.
year Total CIA c o r  e c OTHERS TOTAL
(Abs.) £ $
1976 3 9 8,465 4 0 .3 9 .0 5 0 .7
1978 9 2 9 ,5 2 8 3 6 .2 3 7 .8 2 6 .0
8rH1980 1 ,2 2 8 .0 6 5 2 9 .9 4 7 .8 2 2 .3
1962 2 .b l 6 ,1 0 7 2 4 .5 6 1 .9 1 3 .6
Sources ecretaria da Fazenda/BA - Delegacia Juburbana.
The share of the pole in the total revenue of the 'Delegacia 
Suburbans is increasing steadily. That sliare is even higher than it is
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Diagram No. 6/4 - Collection of IC1I at the 'Delegada Suburbana' by 
source in 1976, 1978 and projections for 1980 and 
1982. (Percentages).
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Diagram No. 6/4 - Collection of ICM at the ’Delegacia Suburbans* by 
source in 1976, 1978 and projections for 1980 and 
1982. (Percentages).
Diagram No. 6/5 - Evolution of Camacari Tax Revenue 
(1971 - 100 )
Source: Local Government.
Data are deflated
shown in table I.o. 6/6 and diagram l.o. 6/4 » since many petrochemical 
companies are geographically in the CIA area and not in the C01EC, reason 
v/hy their tax contributions are allocated to the first column in that 
table.
The first conclusion is t: at the advent of the pole has made 
fundamental clianges in the tax structure of Bahia. The fast growth of the 
'-elegacra auburcana* indicates that at least in financial terms the 
area where that Unit is located, especially the Municipality of Camagari 
has climbed many rungs in the city hierarchy in Bahia. in immediate 
conclusion of this change is that an arm of the export-import scale is 
leaning fast towards the manufactured goods. If this trend goes on, the 
State of Bahia will change from an exporter of agricultural commodities 
such as cocoa to manufactured products processed at the pole.
In effect, the ICM, a tax cn the movement of goods, si. iiar to the 
British VAT, collected at the po.e, will total the amount of US3 SCO millio 
by 1982. The ICM represents mor.- than two thirds of the State revenue and 
the pole v/ouid be the main source of that tax in the i.ear future. A series 
of criticisms made on this industrial adventure identifying it as a 
quixotesque adventure or a pharaonic enterprise is a non-sense. The pole 
has proved that it generates dividends for the State of Bahia. It pays off.
Admiting that these data are sufficient to prove the impact of the 
pole on the State revenues and t2;us on the investment capacity of the 
public sector after the full operation of the pole, other crucial 
problems remain to be solved. The increase in the revenues will mainly 
benefit the State of Bahia and the Municipality of Camagari. Very little 
is left, then, for the rest of the Ilorth East region.
The following point is to see how this grov/th in taxation has 
affected the Municipa ity of Comagari. This can be partially explained by
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the mechanics of the distribution of the ICU, that is collected by the 
State and divided between itself and the Municipalities, .'/hen there are 
government incentives, as it is the case at Can^ari, the share of the 
State is equally divided between the State and the ' DESEKBAliCO' (The 
State of Bahia Development Bank), which takes half of the percentage 
a-located to the State and hands it out back to the firms. The proportions 
are, then, as following:
State - 82f. - 50/ to the Treasury,
50/ to •DESENBAMCO'
Municipalities - 18/
In rough terms, we can say that the growth of Camaijari revenues 
(table n. 6/6 and 6/7) will go step by step with the increase in the I d  
of the 'Delegacia Suburbans' with two basic differences: (i) the Municipality 
has other sources of revenues and (ii) some petrochemical firms are outside 
the fiscal area of Cama^ari, what means that other Metropolitan Municipalities 
are having some advantages from the installation of the pole.
These figures put Cama^ari in a singular position. It is not the 
largest town in Bahia, but has now one of the biggest budgets. This is not 
an insignificant evolution. There is a clear indication that the pole has 
also affected the budget of the surrounding Municipalities of Simses Filho 
and Candeias.
These revenues have allowed Cama9ari a substantial increase in its 
investment plans that, if well managed, can change all aspects of the human 
life of the town. The nature of this cliange is closely related to the 
Government expenditure program. Kow is Cama9ari spending its resources?
6.6. Local Government
’.That are the ¡riorities of the local Government expenditure? Our 
initial analysis is based on the past government expenditure programs and 
on the priorities as expressed by Cama9ari plans. Apart from expenses with 
Administration and Hanning, where the wages of the Civil Service are
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T a b l e  !To. 6/7 - Total Revenue, Tax Revenue (Prices of 1971)
and Evolu t i o n  of the Tax R e v enue (1971 = loo^
Y ears
Total Revenu e 
( 0 0 0 's)
Tax Revenue 
(Prices -1971)
i
Evolution of 
the Tax Re­
venue
1971 2 1 0 0 0 1 , 6 1 8 100
1972 2,610 1,876 116
1973 3 , 1 2 1 1,834 113
1974 9,471 3,016 136
1975 35,923 5,765 356
1 976 10 4 , l 66 17,415 767
1977 170,5 24 20,354 1 , 289
1978 250,000 30 ,0 00 1,438
Source: Local Government of Canac.uri
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included (table n. 6/9), the areas where the Government have spent more are 
'Trans. ort' and 'Housing' and Urbanism' (physical town planning - roads, 
water etc. ). Education and Health come well behind, despite having 
increased substantially, having grown over 4 ,CGCf. and 2,7CC‘.' respectively. 
Social Security cane from 100 in 1975 to 10,306 in 1977. These values have 
grown faster than the population but their exact dimension should be seen 
in the light of the sectors of society which were effectively applied to.
The following headings are an attempt to understand the socio-economic 
policies of the local community as a consequence of the industrial develop­
ment. As the higher burden of this work is under the responsibility of the 
Municipality of Cana^ari, our analysis basically relies upon the performance 
of that local goverrxient.
Table Ko. 6/9 - Functions of Local Government Expenditure - Evolution 
in percentages - 1973 ; ICO.
Functional Areas
Y e a r  s
197 3 1974 1975 1976 1977
Adn 2c Planning 10 0 193 879 1,411 4370
Conaunications - 10 8 39 —
Defense & P. Security j  00 . - - 522 3.910
Education 10 0 1 3 0 288 3,74 5 4032
Housing 5c Urbanism 10 0 639 3717 . 4674 Z 101
Health • . 10 0 169 385 900 3731
Labour - - - ACO
Social Security 10 0 493 937 4866 1 Q306
Transport 10 0 2 8 1 516 39 r?58i
ReT« Development — — — 100 406
Total 10 0 305 3,048 3509 1 Q 292
Source: Local Government of Camaçari.
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6.6.1. Local Government : Social Security
A study jointly undertaken by the 'Secretaria de Minas e Energia' and 
the Local Government of Cama^ari has defined three areas of action in Social 
Security policies:
( i ) to guide and to prepare the migrants arriving at Camaijari;
( ii) to control the emergence of socially sub-standard areas (shanty-towns 
or 'favelas') and
(iii) to assure a larger participation in the benefits of the petrochemical 
complex to the local population.
Some instruments were available for the attainment of those objectives.
The main ones were:
- The Land Use Act which establishes the whole land referring to the COFEC 
area (Diagram No. l/6) as of public interest, which means that the Government 
has the right to expropriate land when it is in the interest of the general 
public and
- the new financial resources that would be available and directed to those 
functions.
The study proposed that the policies should be under the responsibility 
of a Committee where participants of both business and Government Community 
should have their seats. The same should be said about the financial resources.
A small glance at the performance of the Municipality Secretariat for 
Social Security shews that some actions in that direction have been taken.
They were deeply involved in the process of reurbanization and improvement 
of some ramshackle areas of the old poor of Cama^ari and lias developed some 
new efforts to guide the settlements of the newcoming population, through 
two schemes called 'PHOC' (Project of Guided Housing of Cama9ari) and 'CURA' 
(1'roject of Urbanisation and Recuperation of Areas).
The philosophy behind those projects is a distinguished feature at 
Camaijari today. The Land Use Act has allowed the Municipality to organise to 
a limited extent the new settlements avoiding the appalling shanty-towns
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so common in Brazilian cities. The PHOC is essentially a limited attempt to 
guide the new settlements in such a way that their future development can ^e 
promoted, controlled and monitored. The scheme is the sim lest possible. The 
Municipality designated some areas for new development and promotes the first 
signs of urbanisation, such as the delimitation of streets and the division
of land for new homes. The divided land comprises 10 m x 20m long, measuring
2200 m . The new owners receive the land and are obliged to build their homes 
regardless of the material used for that purpose, in a certain period of time. 
The Municipality has also a plan to give orientation and instruction to the 
new owners on how to build their houses and what kind of material to use.
And also they are advised that they cannot sub-let the new property or „uild 
more than one house in each piece of land. Six new settlements have been 
already planned and their occupation is virtually finished. The land is sold 
at cost price with pre-fixed monetary adjustments in very long installments 
and the ur anisation consists of, at least, street kerb, electricity, 
collective sewage (one for each group of four houses) and social 'nuclei' 
with areas for school and professional training and leisure, and a fountain 
with public laundry.
As the average income of this group> is very low, they do not .pay interest 
on overdue instalments and those who need have a year of repayment holiday.
The 'CURA' are projects of different nature but with a very similar 
philosophy. The objectives are the correction of old suburbs or of the 
initial unorganised settlements to give them an urban structure. The customers 
are generally people who have already been living at Cama^ari before the 
implementation of the industrial pole and whose level of income is not high 
enough to buy a quality home. In bare words, the 'CURA' projects are a kind 
of conversion of 'shanti-town' areas into something similar to a reurbanised 
area. Tho Municipality intended, then, to give some assistance to those areas 
and some orientation about the availability of new j o b 3  for the population.
It is a remote integration of them with the new economic activity settled at
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There are some arguments going on regarding these projects as the 
legalisation of disguised 'favelas'. In fact, nobody can say that the PHOC 
and CURA projects provide homes suitable to attend the minimum requirements 
as defined by the UN housing studies, lior can the areas be said to 
be fully urbanised. Against them, there are the facts that the newcomers 
did not always have jobs or even could afford to build those appalling 
houses. Other times, they lack the incentives to do it or the ability to 
build.
The projects, however, went ahead and, at least, do not resemble the 
formless pile of homes one nay see at the 'favelas'. Compared with those 
'shar.ti-towns' at Salvador, for instance, the IKOCs and PURAs are suburbs 
of advanced stage of urbanisation, at this stage. They need, however, 
continuous assistance not to be converted in 'favelas' of the same type. 
Unfortunately, the money that is allocated for this purpose is not sufficient 
and the future of this projects looks very gloomy indeed.
The other point is that many newcomers to those houses are homeless 
people who have lost their properties for the allocation of the COi-EC. If 
those people were better educated, or had a better standard of living, they 
might weli have fought for better prices for their properties. However, many 
of them are so resigned to their fate that even when the Social Service 
people went to visit them to verify if they were willing to move out, they 
have shown disapproval to what appeared almost to be expropriation, but refus­
ed to fight against it, I was told by several of the people whom I 
interviewed that they were deeply touched by this attitude which they were 
unable to cliange. Those removed people, of course, were not rewarded for 
their resignation as, generally, nobody benefits from the ignorance of one's 
rights. But on the other hand, there is no excuse for a public corporation 
not to pay to the poor, what they should have certainly paid to a 
millionaire if he was the owner of the disappropriated area.
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Another criticism is from the planning aspect. As Cama^ari is not an 
island, its planning efforts alone would not produce a great impact in the 
area if they are not in conjunction with the other municipalities of the 
RMS. One point is that not much greater assistance should be provided for 
one area only. Otherwise, it would attract much more people making a 
continuous assistance virtually impossible. Moreover, the basic question is 
not the provision of homes, but jobs. Some socioiogic studies have shewn 
that the extremely poor, who have not got a job, find it easier to live in 
the centre of big cities that at its outskirts, due to a number of facilities 
available at the centre. At Cama<jari, the lack of unskilled jobs and the high 
prices of land combine together to make the life of the poor more difficult 
than it was before the planning of the pole .
The other activities of the SEDES are the traditional ones that can be 
found at any organisation of that kind. They consist of sections devoted to 
the integration, social orientation of the community and its social Institutes.
The development of these functions at Cama<jari was also restricted by the 
limited area on which the Municipality can operate* Wien the pole is very 
widespread and the planning of the social services are restricted to the 
core region, it is clear that the more remote areas will suffer from the 
absence of those services. That is a problem that emerges in virtually all 
the fields of planning at Cama^ari.
Chapter Four has studied the planning structure of the pole and 
specified some disfunctionalities that could be derived from it. At this 
particular point, there is no way to an effective planning of the social 
structure and to the provision of social services to the pole, if the bigger 
burden of those responsibilities is left to just one Municipality, while the 
employees of the pole are spread over the whole metropolitan area. Even when 
we put the highly paid employees apart, considering only those who do not 
have the skills required to get a specialised job at the pole, we arrive at 
the point where the assistance should be limited, provided it is restricted
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to a particular area. Looking at the diagram n. 6/3 and table n. 6/ 4 , 
together with the overall population growth of the RMS, we know that other 
Metropolitan Municipalités are becoming net migration receiving areas 
(Souza, 1978 ). As the Municipality of SimoOes Filho, close to Camaçari, 
has another planned industrial district (CIA), efforts to develop the area 
should be brought together under the same coordenation for a unitary 
approach to the huge problems of industrialisation of Bahia.
That global approach should take into account the peculiarities of 
Camaçari as a small town where there is a process of social mobility, caused 
by a wave of new residents who come to share the town with the old population. 
In that situation, there is a process of social adjustments that could last 
for a period long enough for the place to receive and integrate the new­
comers .
There is the danger that the rising expectations of this new population 
is not fulfilled, in which case a process of réadaptation to the new 
situation is necessary. Fortunately, these expectations at Camaçari seem to 
be at least partially attained.
A research by the Municipality & Becasa (DECASA 19715 have shown that 
more than two thirds of that new population consider their new status as 
better than the previous one. In the same way, the old population see that 
the town is changing for better. This apparent satisfaction fails to take 
into account the fact that new waves of migrants always bring social 
frictions in many areas that are essential for a socially healthy urban life. 
New migrants change the balance of education, health, social interaction, 
sex and age, since the majority of migrants tends to be youngsters and 
males. The work of any Department devoted to social integration is, then, 
doubled. Besides, the normal problems of integration in any community, there 
are others derived from these newcomers (DECASA, 1977 5* Many old residents, 
for instance, had to change their homes and could not find new houses due 
to the high prices for renting. Prices at Camaçari and surroundings have
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jumped several fold. This implies a double attack on that populations 
unemployment and homelessness.
6.6.2. Local Gavernmeiitj_ jiou^ng 
..e strongly resist * the view that the provision of homes is a 
paternalistc attitude in terms of business. It could be so in a completely 
different environment, but not in a planned industrial com-lex, where, besides 
the development of the business itself, it i3 necessary the construction 
of the urban infrastrueture. It works against the development of the business 
to have an industrial site, surrounded by housing unsuitable for labour, 
where the workers have necessarily to come from other areas.
As far as housing is concerned, Cama^ari has already a big problem. It 
is becoming a worker suburb due to the unwillingness cf high income technicians 
and professionals to living outside Salvador (See 6.4 (i) and (ii) ). A long 
term project by the Authorities could probably convince some of those well 
paid employees to live at Camasari. The fact is that the pole has put a 
housing pressure on the market in Salvador with the predictable increase in 
land prices that is already one of the highest in Brazil nowadays, notwith­
standing Salvador being a Capital of a State in a poor region of the country.
The DECASA and Local Government research has rut the housing deficit at 
Camagari around 8 ,0 0 0  units in 1 9 7 8 , not including those already settled at 
the 'PHOCs' and 'CUHAS' projects. That high deficit in a small town put an 
effectively high pressure on land prices, primarily on the rent sector. This 
has even encouraged house owners at the town to move out of it to rent their 
homes. In 1 9 7 0 , 75/.’ o f  the dwellings at Camacjari were owner occupied with 
only 12 .^ rented. That explains the relatively independent nature of the town. 
'.Vith the arrival of the pole, it creates a deficit of over 1 2 ,0 0 0  units 
according to the Local Government. That is the reason why some technicians 
dare to say that the solution to the housing problem at Cama^ari consists 
of building another town.
In industrial terms, there are tv/o options to be adopted. Either the
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pole decides to subsidise the costs of transport for its work force to and 
from Salvador and other surroundings towns for an indefinite period of time, 
or it can join the efforts to encourage its employees to live nearby. The 
approximate subsidies for transport given by the industries at Camaçari are 
around US3 800 thousand yearly, according to the 'Secretaria de i.Iinas e 
Energia'. Fart of those subsidies to transport could well be devoted to thef
encouragement of em loyee to buy new homes at short distances from the 
industrial site.
The hard facts behind the housing policies at Camaçari are that the 
spread of slums inside the town with its social consequences does not 
benefit any major partner in the pole. A socially healthy atmosphere is 
necessary to allow the permanence of the employees at the locality and 
promote an environment able to favour the development of the skills 
required by the industries. Therefore, industries and government have to 
work on a scheme to improve the housing condition at Camaçari. Housing 
subsidies for the pole employees are an open and suitable way for it.
6-6.3- Lo_cal_ Government: Education
There is no better sector to understand the policies of a Government 
than éducation. It reflects the main philosophy behind the Executive power. 
It is also an indicator of the level and standard of development of a 
community.
The analysis on migration has , ointed out the low standard of the 
migrants who arrive at Camaçari. The majority of them (81.3?.-/ belong to 
those without a primary education, being also youngsters in general. It 
is immediately expected that the priority of the local government education 
policies would be that group.
Table H.6/10 gives the behaviour of the enrolments at the first and 
second level of education at Camaçari, since 1970. The third level is not 
included because there is no University Institute at the locality.
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Diagram No. 6/6 - Population Growth, Local Government Revenue
and Enrolments at Camacari. Index Numbers. 
1970 = 100
(Data are not corrected for inflation)
Source: FIBG3 - Anuario Estatistico do Brasil 
Local Government - Revenue 
DECASA (Projections of Population)
As far as the construction of new schools is concerned, the local 
government has built a dozen new schools comprising approximately 80 
school-rooms for primary education (8 first years) and has improved other 
schools for the second level. Compared with the increase in population, 
the increase in enrolments and the construction of schools is very short 
of meeting the actual demand (see Chapter 6/7). Here is the crunch of 
the problem. Camagari suffers from the low quality of its migration in 
a labour market that requires a relatively high level of skills. How, 
then can the meagre resources for the basic education be justified? If 
the government put money into industrial projects, it should also invest 
on its social infrastructure. Moreover, the single fact that Camagari is 
receiving great contingents of migrants requires even greater investment 
in education (*).
The other major institution at Camacari is the SENAI, a private 
organisation backed by industries, devoted to training of specific skills. 
It is building a school at the COPEC area, but its courses have been given 
at the old centre in Salvador and also in on the job training programs.
The local government has very little involvement on this matter. More 
realistically, its presence on industrial training is virtually nil. Both 
the private and public sector have been very slow to look for the right 
solution to the problem. It is well known fact that the local industries 
are nowadays recruiting some of their employees in the South East. If 
there's no alteration in the policies adopted in this sector, it is likely 
that these difficulties of recruitment for certain jobs will last longer, 
with the derived social and economic effects. And more serious yet is the 
fact that a retraction in the training of the basic skills can make the
(*) It is understood that migration, by being composed mainly of youngsters, 
singles and young couples, brings a group with high needs of education.
Diagram No. 6/7 - Population and Enrôlements at Camacari
(Abs. Numbers in 000's )
1970 1975 1980 1983
Sources Local Government/Secretaria de EducaçSo
DECASA - Projection of Population Growth.
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development of satellite industries even more difficult. However, some 
jobs of difficult recruitment in the pole are among those which require 
only the first and/or the second level of education, which should deserve 
more attention from the public authorities.
Unfortunately, Camagari is making that same mistake very common in 
underdeveloped countries. Instead of preparing the solid foundations of 
the education building, they preferred to start by the roof, that is, the 
insistence on the University project is detracting importance from the 
first and more emphatically the second level of education.
Table bfi0 Enrolments at Camagari
Years First Level Second Level Other
Sources
Total
Abs, %
1970 3,873 80 _ 3,953 lOO
1971 4,798 80 - 4,878 123
1972 5,767 168 - 5,935 150
1973 6,115 179 - 6,294 159
1974 7,019 200 - 7,219 183
1975 7,781 530 609 8,920 210
1976 8,796 736 1,559 11,091 241 '
1977 10,025 680 2,467 13,192 271
Source: IBGE (1970/74 and Delegacia Escolar 
PMC - COEN - 1975/1977.
6.6.4. Ecology and Environmental Protection
Any major chemical complex immediately raises the question of pollution, 
environment protection and the like. The official response at Camagari is 
that all measures required for these issues were already being taken
right from the beginning, such as the building of a central plant to treat
liquid effluents from the pole, a plantation of a new 600 ha forest to 
protect Cama9ari and its village Dias D'Avila and lagoons for the chemical 
resides. Furthermore, every single industry to be installed had to get 
a government licence with the assurance that its equipment will not pollute 
the environment.
In practice, however, some problems have appeared. First of all, the 
main task has been to get more industries rather than to select the few 
prospective companies; secondly, the government body responsible for the 
provision of anti-pollution licence is also responsible for the enforcement 
of the law; third, it lacks the appropriate equipment and trained staff 
in sufficient number to undertake that function.
The proceedings are very simple. The industries have to present a 
description of the equipment to be used for an examination by the CEPED, 
which gives a preliminary certificate for a provisional installation. The 
problem is, accorded to high ranked officials at that centre, that the 
Institute is not able to verify whether the industries comply with the 
requirements prescribed in that preliminary certificate. Moreover, as the 
difficulties of attracting industries to the pole are very high, it is very 
unlikely that any local Authority would take the risk of losing an industry 
due to ecological arguments. The short life of the pole has already proved 
the danger of pollution. Just on the first day that COPENE put its Central 
of Raw Materials on stream to test its mechanisms, the effluents killed 
several tons of fish in the River Jacuipe which meant that river was 
definitely condemmned to death. All the fishermen who have in the fishing 
waters of Jacui e their basic economic activities were unexpectedly out of 
work.
It was suggested that another Federal agency would find a suitable 
solution probably by retraining those fishermen for sea fishing*
Complaints about pollution are becoming more and more frequent.
Doctors have identified the growth of respiratory diseases in the area, 
the population of the spa resort in Dias d'Avila is complaining about 
strong chemical smell; technicians of the water supplier company are 
worried about the concentration of ammonia in some fields and also on 
the possibility of the contamination of the water table from which drinking 
water is obtained^
There is also the possibility that the effluents from the pole go to 
pollute the north beaches, what is already the case with beaches in Salvador, 
damaging again another industry of major significance in Bahia. It would 
be certainly a great mistake to build the pole in such a way that it comes 
to turn down the quality of life of the population by the restriction of 
its leisure area, besides affecting negatively the development of the 
tourist industry. It seems that the pursuit of financial profits and 
results is moving the pole away from the main tasks of modern organisation - 
its responsiveness to the needs of society.
6.7. Regional Linkages
One of the main findings of this work is the dependence of the pole 
on its ability to establish a solid network linkage in order to exert a 
major influence on the region. Without this network, there is no pole in 
the truly Perrouxian sense.
The diagram n.2.3. shows possible outlets for that network that would 
have its main arms on the arrival of petrochemical transformation industries 
of the third and fourth generation. The linkages cam also be expressed in 
up-stream industries to provide the inputs for the pole, or even a solid 
support for it. As far as the inputs are concerned, we have:
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Table 6.11. Source of raw materials - (% over the value of goods)
Years Local Rest of 
Brazil
Imports Total
1977 47,59 15,56 36,85
1978 64,37 17,03 18,60
1979 82,52 8,79 8,69 ioo%
1980 80,00 8,95 4,05
1981 76,32 13,48 10,20
1982 77,40 13,77 8,83
Source : Astec/SME
Apart from a decrease in the period 1980/81, the share of the local 
suppliers tends to grow. At one point, there was the question of the 
capacity of the Petrobras to supply raw materials over a long period, due 
to the shortage of oil in Brazil. The question is irrelevant due to the 
availability of natural gas in sufficient quantities, that would otherwise 
be wasted. Another main source of raw material is in the North East State 
of Alagoas, (section 1.2.2.) which improves even more the regional partici­
pation as the main supplier of the petrochemical inputs.
The data for the outputs, however, do not show such optimistic view.
The original plan fed the hope that up to 30% of the total production could 
be processed at the region. Actually, less than 10% of the output is being 
processed here, which means that the down-stream linkages are seriously lacking. 
This fact by itself is sufficient to deny the industries at Camacari the 
concept of Pole in Perroux's sense. They do not satisfy the conditions 
established at Section 2.2. The so-called pole is, then, reduced to a mere 
enclave for the production of raw materials for other regions. In economic 
terms, Bahia would be in a situation very similar to its earlier one, 
becoming an exporter of semi-manufactured goods instead of a producer of
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agricultural commodities, but not of finished goods. The notion of pole 
implies the development of the transformation industries for its products. 
There is another indicator which points out an improvement in the local 
purchases of the industrial products, but does not reveal the nature of 
the customers. Local purchases of the petrochemical products are supposed 
to increase from 13% in 1977 to 28% in 1982, meanwhile other states would 
buy only 70% in 1982 against 87% in 1977. The participation of exports 
outside Brazil is very low. These facts confirm our assumptions that there 
should be additional efforts to create new satellite industries around the 
pole for it to attain its initial objectives.
A slight improvement in the balance of payment of the State or even 
in the regional GNP would not be sufficient to fulfil the initial goals of 
industrial decentralisation, creation of an industrial pole, or even changes 
in the regional structure of labour. All these objectives are essentially 
bound to the development of the transformation industries.
The analysis of the government-business performance at Camagari leads 
us to a sad conclusion that the pole, however beneficial to the State of 
Bahia as a whole, was built at the expense of the local population. Many 
of them were removed from their expropriated homes and, finally, were obliged 
to cope with a successive jumps in the cost of living and prices, without 
being able to find jobs at the industrial complexes.
Even, the argument that the second generation of the indigenous population 
of Camagari will pick up the fruits of the present suffering of his parents 
is very controversial. Up-to-now, at least, that population has been an 
outside observer and wasn't considered at any major decision at Camagari.
There is no indication that a miracle will occur by which the descendents 
of an underpriviledged group could be turned into a net receiver of the 
benefits of the pole.
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6.8. TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL & UNSKILLED JOBS
Camagari was for some time a centre of ceramics and also had incipient 
agricultural and extractive primary activities, which have continued, but 
without a growth that could rival the pole. The ceramics industries have 
even gone into serious economic problems recently. Some of them have closed 
down.
The present demand for civil and industrial building can allow a steady 
development of the construction and civil engineering industry which will 
absorb part of the contingent of the unskilled workers at the town in the 
next few years. The construction industry being the main source for unskilled 
jobs, there should be a plan to reallocate those workers who are made redundant 
when the works of construction of the main units finish.
Other sources of unskilled jobs such as cleaners, sweepers are not 
sufficient to absorb the enormous contingent of unskilled migration. At 
present, besides some work at the COPEC area, and at the "Caraiba Project" 
a fast building-up of homes has made work for an additional number of people. 
Due to the growth of Camagari and of the RMS, many jobs may appear at some 
sectors which may arise to support that growth. Camagari, for instance, can 
develop a small but important sector of urban industries such as motor 
mechanics, food and light transport.
The region, however, needs many more jobs, that must be provided on a 
more permanent basis rather than the temporary vacancies at the construction 
industry. The solution is, logically on the development of labour intensive 
industries especially those related to petrochemicals. We must bear in mind 
the point raised at Chapter one, about political and economic pressures 
that could be put on the pole if it shows itself incapable of providing jobs 
for the population. There are many segments of the down-stream petro­
chemical industries which have a much higher labour/capital rate them the 
industries already set on the pole.
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The main difficulties to pursue policies with this aim is that the main 
bodies responsible for the development of the pole give more incentives to 
the basic industries than to a second plan for the encourgagement for the 
definitive consolidation of the pole. Even the creation of PROPAR is not 
sufficient to solve this problem. On the contrary, it is a clear demonstra­
tion that the snag is still present.
For reasons explained throughout this thesis, we cannot see a solution 
to the unemployment building up of unskilled workers at Camagari unless a 
change of policies takes place. If the purpose is to build a pole, the 
incentives should not be directed exclusively to the core, especially when 
it is not a traditional activity of the region, whose human resources are 
not automatically attracted to embark on this new and unknown sort of business 
enterprise.
According to initial expectations, Camagari would provide more than 150 
thousand indirect jobs, some of them being for unskilled or semi-skilled 
people. As this has not happened, and the firms coming to settle at the 
COPEC site are very short of the number originally forecasted, the committ­
ment of the main responsible authorities of the pole has to be even stronger.
From the arguments and figures in the previous pages, it is clear that 
the localisation of the labour force around the pole is of an utmost strategic 
importance for the industries. There is no point, at this stage, to turn 
Camagari into a working class suburb, Salvador and the sourrounding localities 
being the dormitory areas for the high paid employees.
From the business side, the housing of the workers at Camacari would 
save on several grounds. It saves on energy and on the costs of transport, 
it diminishes the physical and psychological stress of workers due to long 
journeys to work, it favours the development of the urban sector, necessary 
for the creation of service industries to support the pole. In the long term, 
the rationalisation of the movement of people could be of utmost importance
for the quality of life in any metropolitan region.
6.9. AN INDUSTRIAL LOCAL STRATEGY AT CAMAgARI
Camagari has two features which have to be highly regarded in any local 
industrial plan:
(a) the NPP is a government-business venture;
(b) Camagari is a small town inside a metropolitan region with a 
population of over 1.1 million, but one that is not fully 
integrated in terms of urban life.
The immediate conclusion is that there is not an isolated solution for 
the question. The problems of Camagari are in this way a local, regional 
and national matter for which both the public and the private sector are 
directly responsible.
6.9.1. A medium term strategy for Camagari
Looking at the organisation of the NPP as analysed on chapter four, 
there is clearly an overlay of authorities working on the same field, without 
a clear-cut demarcation line between their responsibilities. This has led 
to some discrepancies in the division of duties and responsibilities among 
the different authorities.
Furthermore, if the special status given to Camagari could have been 
justified at the beginning, that would not be the case with the slow inte­
gration of the Metropolitan region. Actually, the units responsible for 
the planning of Camagari and Simoes Filho, the COPEC and the CIA, are 
already requiring a higher degree of coordination. COMCOP is too big and 
dispersed to be an effective planning or operation unit. It's better placed 
for consultant tasks as it is now. CONDER logically should be the unit to 
set the guidelines for the whole area. But with a metropolitan region that is 
still a collection of scattered towns, it is strongly opposed to be the 
coordination body for the petrochemical sector. Besides that, any unit
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responsible for planning at the metropolitan level tends to be more involved 
with Salvador due to the scale of its problems, relegating the other towns 
to a second plan. Due to its proximity and relationships, the best solution, 
then, is an integration of the COPEC and CIA for the coordination of both 
the Industrial Complex of Aratu (CIA) and the North East Petrochemical Pole. 
That could be done with the participation of CONDER or a similar unit that 
tends to get in the long run a bigger say in the industrial planning at 
the metropolitan region. With the present rate of growth, one may expect 
that the main functions of the RMS in ten years time will be much more 
closely integrated than it is nowadays. If the present trends are steady, 
the public sector also will assume an even higher role in the economy, a 
reason why a corporate plan for industry will be more and more entangled 
with the planning for the public sector. The prospects, then, are for an 
increasing integration of the planning process of Camagari and surrounding 
areas.
As the fight for the establishment of the transformation industry based 
on petrochemical feedstocks continues, there is an urgent need to define 
which segments should be settled at Camacari and those that should be located 
outside its boundaries throughout the North East to consolidate its role as 
a regional pole. The work done by PROPAR has been of limited reach up to 
now. A further concentration of 3rd and 4th generation industry at Camagari 
could provoke an outcry in the remaining areas of the NE. Industries at 
other remote places fear that the location of industrial plants at the 
backyard of the NPP would be unfair competition. A balance, then, has to 
be reached, whereby Camacari should house especially industries destined 
to attend the market of Bahia and the heavy and intermediate products. At 
the same time, labour intensive industries using petrochemical or other 
feedstocks are urgently needed to provide jobs for the massive and growing
I
unskilled population of the RMS.
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The increasing population and social problems at Camagari requires 
also a change in the allocation of the taxes raised from the NPP, giving 
priority to social aspects rather than to the physical aspects of 
planning.
6.9.2. Long Term Strategy
The long term strategy at the Metropolitan region of Salvador is 
mainly the consolidation of the industrial efforts already undertaken.
I do not refer only to the petrochemical industries in the long run.
That could be a short sighted view.
One of the main problems of the industrial efforts at the RMS is the 
lack of definition of a specific line of industries that could be advante- 
geously located there. The NPP has only partially solved that point, due 
to the diversified nature of the down-stream industries that are based on 
petrochemical feed-stocks and the difficulties of attracting them.
The choice of these industries should not be based only on technical 
studies of financial profitability, unless the pole decides once and for 
all to give up its initial objectives. At this stage of consolidation, 
special attention can be put on those kind of industries that could provide 
more jobs for the thousands unemployed workers at the region.
There is a need for effective policies to consolidate some segments 
of business that could be based on the pole. Two sectors have appeared 
with good projects. The first one was the up-stream metal-mechanical 
business, which had already some tradition at Salvador on a small scale, 
and that received a real boost with the perspectives to supply small equip­
ment for the pole. Besides the "Projeto Caraiba" and an open demand for 
plugs, compressors, electrical appliances and the like which definitely 
creates a fertile field for the development of this sector. The second is the 
light services industries for the new population and employees.
As regarding the down-stream industries, it is time to concentrate 
efforts on specialised fields. The desperate policy of looking for 
whichever industry wanting to come to Camagari must yield its place for 
a careful build-up of an industrial strategy based on those segments of 
the petrochemical industry for which the RMS shows a natural inclination.
6.10. CONCLUSION
There is no denying that the NPP has changed completely life at 
Camagari, with additional influence on the adjacent towns in the RMS.
The town has increased in population, in income, trade, output and 
services. The Municipal budget jumped from 3 million to 25 million 
cruzeiros in historic values, which is by itself a valid indicator of 
the economic growth of that municipality. By its amount, the industrial 
output growth is proportionately significant also for the RMS and the 
state of Bahia (see table 6.6).
The growth of that town, however, has not been matching the needs 
of its indigenous population and unskilled migration. Study of the 
characteristics of the migrants and of the local government expenditure 
has shown this aspect.
The pole was intended to be a "nucleus" of regional development, but 
its linkages up to now are mainly at Camacari and
Even in terms of migration, the influence of Camagari has been restricted 
to an area close to the town (Table 6.4. and diagram 6.3).
The attainment of the NPP objectives requires, then, changes in the 
industrial policies pursued by the pole, on different aspects:
(a) more sustained expenditure on social policies at Camagari;
(b) integration of the planning efforts of the RMS;
(c) definition and selection of a strategy for the development of the 
transformation industry at Camagari, in the RMS, in Bahia and in
the NE as a whole.
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The material presented throughout this thesis, especially on
chapters One, Two, Three and Six, has shown that our initial propositions
(a) are right, since the development of the NPP had its immediate impact
concentrated on the Municipality of Camaqari and the RMS. Those industries
were not complementary to the traditional economic activities of the area.
In effect, a broad picture of the Ncrth East region indicates that a
highly concentrated technological industry with weak linkages will not
be sufficient to distribute the effects of the pole to an area of 
21.5 million Km , with over 32 million inhabitants and in great need of 
jobs, capital and new entrepreneurial schemes to counter its present 
social and economic weaknesses discussed in chapter One.
In fact, petrochemical industries can perform the role of a growth 
pole (Chapter Two) due to their rapid growth, dynamism, wide range of 
products and interrelationship with the other sectors of the economy.
The industries comprising the North East Petrochemical Pole have their 
core and other down-stream industries settled mainly at the Metropolitan 
Area of Salvador, giving little push to the spread of the transformation 
industries based on petrochemical feedstocks to other parts of the 
North East.
Being the leading industrial development project in the North East, 
headed by the Government, the North East Petrochemical Pole has strong 
social commitments derived both from the social responsibility any 
business has for the community in general but specially from its own 
strategy for consolidation. As the provision of jobs is expected to 
come mainly from the peripheral companies to be settled in the North 
East and there being no guarantee they will join the pole, the prospects 
of a major impact in the region are far from bright.
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The evolution in government policies to create integrated industrial 
complexes to erradicate the problems relating the lack of regional 
linkages from the previous industralisation programs has produced only 
partial results with the petrochemical poles. They have in fact a firm 
upstream regional connection with the oil industry, but fail to show any 
tendency to integrate with the traditional economic activities of the 
North East, especially in the downs-stream sector. So, the weaknesses 
in the planning of the North East Petrochemical Pole is not related to 
the pole structure itself, since the nature of the petrochemical industry 
demands that kind of structure (chapter Two;, but are connected with this 
failure to create linkages with other economic activities of the region. 
The pole plan stopped at the core industries, while a plan for regional 
development should have gone much further down to the consumer-end 
industries. It was unbalanced planning without regional participation 
and no priorities for the local enterprises. The most serious problem of 
the North East Petrochemical Pole has been the lack of priorities the 
down-sIream industries have received from the outset. The consolidation 
of the pole requires a change in the planning process with stronger 
backing for these peripheral units to come into the region, to grow 
and to overcome their main weakneses - a restricted quota of feedstocks, 
a prices and payment policy which leads to rapid deterioration of working 
capital, a poor regional market and the lack of local experience in 
producing chemical products from petrochemical feedstocks.
Pro ositions (b) are related to new policies that could turn a pole 
with weak linkages with the overall economy of the region into an 
effective tool of development. Again our study on chapter Three confirms 
that our proposition on (b.l) about the development of broad linkages of 
industries all over the region to consolidate and strenghten the 
industrial complex at Canw^ari and taking advantage of the existing
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human resources in the area is a necessary and urgent step. As one of theI
main difficulties for the development of those linkages is the lack of 
participation of the regional human resources in the initiation and 
implementation of the pole, this problem assumes strategic importance in 
the consolidation of the North East Petrochemical Pole. It is certain 
that the capital-intensive nature of those industries has minimised 
the problems of supply of labour in underdeveloped regions, so that 
the firms in the pole, contrary to the general expectations, no-t
have to invest a great deal to handle this issue. Nevertheless, an 
extra burden of investment especially on training and development of 
human resources has fallen on the government network of education 
which has failed to respond adequately to that challenge for the 
reasons set out.
Policies intended to create the right atmosphere for the development 
of the human resources (proposition b.2) have to take into account the 
lack of skills and knowledge of the regional manpower in the making 
of petrochemicals as well as the lack of experience of the regional 
entrepreneurs in this field. Entrepreneurs tend to develop a product, 
a service or a market, where they have experience, knowledge or new 
ideas to offer. Entrepreneurs cannot operate in setting up an economic 
activity they hardly know. They need incentives, understanding and a 
close participation in the works of the pole. Uiis can be a slow process 
but could be speeded up by the adoption of the right policies. The same 
can be said of the creation of skills and knowledge required by the 
different categories of human resources, which need continuous 
development to face the implementation, functioning and consolidation 
of the basic complex and of the down-stream industries. Throughout this 
thesis we have criticise several policies adopted in the human resource 
field but with a particular emphasis on the .resent need for global new 
strategy for the absorption of new know-how in petrochemicals, and for
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the development of new skills and knowledge rather than on the creation 
ol" new University Institutions, when the present ones are theoretically 
able to supply the Worth East Petrochemical Pole with the required 
manpower.
The short time lag between the planning of the various Brazilian 
poles did not provide sufficient time for a bigger exchange of experience, 
know-how and skills that would be made easier if the development of each 
new pole was planned as an extension of the previous ones. All these 
facts are crying out for a national strategy' in the development of skills, 
knowledge and know-how in petrochemicals.
Unfortunately, the scheme scheduled to create new technology and 
assure the domestic participation has not worked as it was envisaged and 
the 'tripartite policy' is not even the skeleton it should be. So, our 
proposition (b.3) about high cooperation among Brazilian domestic sector, 
multinationals and the Government did not prove right. That 'tripartite 
scheme' has neither proved to be an effective instrument of control nor 
has it a reliable tool to strenghten the Brazilian private sector in 
petrochemicals. Some other plans together with the improvement of the 
infrastrueture of knowledge and with the development of the human 
resources must be made.
Regardless of whatever changes the pole has brought to Camaijari 
and even to the Metropolitan Area of Salvador, it is clear that the 
North East ietrochemical Foie as a whole is far short of being a 
'push-force' of regional development. Its influence outside Baliia is 
minimal. Even if we take it that the financial resources derived from 
taxation can improve the image of Cama^arit a better structured local 
community would not be able to hide the weak impact of the North East 
Petrochemical Pole in the whole region. That is hardly possible 
because it is an integral part of the whole RMS and it is the RMS 
that needs to be improved as a whole. The reason is that regional
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planning goes far beyond the simple decision to build some basic 
complexes at a given geographical point. The planning of a huge 
industrial complex regardless of its linkages is planning for 
an industrial enclave, that may increase the amount of taxes paid to 
the Treasury, but it is incapable on its own of being the ’catalyst’ 
for a structural change. This planning is unbalanced, short-sighted, 
handicapped. The planning of a pole has to go right down to the 
peripheral units, to the transformation industries, to the existing 
economic activities, to the global involvement of the local human 
resources (from the entrepreneurs to the unskilled population) in the 
development of the pole. It is exactly here where the main sin of the 
liorth East Petrochemical pole overall planning lies.
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Annex N. 1 - Enterprises belonging to the North East Petrochemical
Pole ar.d locate in the RES.
1.
2.
4 .
5.
6.
7.
8 . 
9.
1 0.
11.
1 2 .
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
A - Enterprises in the COPEC area (in operation):
Start of
Name of the Firm operation
C0PEHE/CH.ÍAN - Central de -ar.utencjSo de 
Camerari S/A 1^74
COPENE/CEEAP - Central de ¡vlatérias Primas s/a 1978
COPEUE/Um - Central de Utilidades 1976
COi ElIE/CEIREL - Central de Tratanento de Eflu­
entes Líquidos S/A 1979
CP3 - Central de Polímeros da Bahia S/A 1979
CQJJINE - Cia. Petroquímica 1973
CIC-cL'IliE - Cia. de Industrias «Químicas do Nor­
deste 1968
COBAFI - Cia. Baiana de Fibras 1978
CQR - Cia. Química do RecCncavo 1979
CGFENOR - Cia. Petroquímica do Nordeste 1979
CPC - Cia. Petroquímica de Cama^ari 1979
EDN - Estireno do Nordeste S/A 1978
Etoxilados do Nordeste S/A 1979
FI3IBA - Fibras Sintéticas da Bahia S/A 1971
Isocianatos do Brasil o/A 1979
ilelamina Ultra S/A - Indùstria Oùimica 1975
Eetanor - Metanol do Nordeste S/A 1976
Nitrocarbono S/a 1979
NitrofÍrtil-NE - Fertilizantes Nitrogenados do 
Nordeste S/A 1971
Jobs
2,289
1,079
360
156
345
736
217
1 ,192
238
224 
700 
473
66
700
687
225 
208 
700
594
11.189
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(From previous page, 
19 . Oxiterio Nordeste 3/A - Industria e
11.189
Conércic 1978 270
20. Folialden Fetroquimica o/A 1979 554
2 1. Polipropileno j/a 1979 690
22. Politeno Industria e Comércic 8/ a 1978 474
23« Pronor - Produtos Orgánicos 3/A 1977 463
24. 3ULFAB - Cia. Su-foqulmica da Bahia 1977 100
13.740
B. Enterprises in the COPEC area Due to Jobs
(in implementation stage or with 
a proved projects)
start in
1. Acrinor - Acrilonitrila do nordeste 3/A I960 26C
2. Basf - -.uimica da Bahia 3/A 1961 134
3. Carbonor - Carbonatos do Hordeste S/A 1981 79
4. DETEN - Detergentes do Nordeste 3/A 1981 170
5. Diamond Shamrock do Nordeste 3/A 1981 79
ó. Empresa Brasileira de Catalisadores 3/A 198i 35
7. Empresa Carioca de Produtos .¿uimicos S/A
8. FENOLAC - Empresa Brasileira de Fenol e
1981 63
Acetona Ltda 1982 323
9. Fertinor - Fertilizantes do Nordeste a/A 1981 40c
10. :.:CA - Ultra Indùstria Química L.da 1982 51
11. Rhodia Nordeste 3/A 1982 151
12. Ultramold Resinas Sintéticas 3/A 1981 114
1.859
Fartial Total (A *■ B) 15.599
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C - Enterprises -n the RMS but outside the COPEC area
Start of
i.ame of the Firm Jobs
operation
1. Banylsa - Tecelagem do Brasil Z/k 1974 786
Location: CIA (Industrial District)
SimfJes Filho - 3A
2. C.C.C. - Cia. de Carbonos Colcidais
Location: CIA - Candeias-3A 1968 240
3. D o y /  Química S/A 1977 580
Location: CIA - Candeias-BA
4 . FAVA3 - Fábrica de Vaselinas da Baliia a/A 1974 4 2
Location: CIA - Simpes Filho - EA
5. PASKIN S/A - Indústri-3 Petroquímicas 1972 800
Location: CIA Candeias-BA
6. 3AFR0N TEIJIN S/A - Industrias ¿rasileiras de
Fibras 1972 937
Location: CIA - Sinioes Filho - BA
7. UHION CARBIDE do Brasil Ltda 1981 180
Location: CIA - Candeias - BA
3.565
Total (A * B + C) .... 19.164
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C - Enterprises -n the RI¿S but outside the COPEC area
-ame of the Firm
Start of 
operation
1. Banylsa - 'recelagera do Brasil 3/A 1974
Location: CIA (industrial District)
Simfles Filho - BA
2. C.C.C. - Cia. de Carbonos Colcidais
Location: CIA - Candeias-3A 1968
3. Dow química S/A 1977
Location: CIA - Candeias-BA
4. FAVAB - Fábrica de Vaselinas da Balda -/A 1974
Location: CIA - 3im~es Filho - BA
5. PASKLN S/A - Indástri.s Petroquímicas 1972
Location: CIA Candeias-BA
6. SAFRON 'iEIJIII S/à - Industrias Brasileiras de
Fibras 1972
Location: CIA - Simòes Filho - BA
7. UlilOH CARBIDE do Brasil Ltda 1,81
Location: CIA - Candeias - BA
Jobs
786
240
580
42
800
937
180
3.565
Total (A * B * C) --- 19.164
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Annex n. 2 - Guide to the interviews with managers of petrochemical
down-stream companies and transformation industries, 
held in the north East in the last monts of 1979» and 
beginning of I960.
1. Identification:
I.’ame of the Firm:
Address:
Year of Founduti. n:
Interviews:
2. ..hat are the ; etrochemical raw materials used in your company';
Discrimination i C E I G I li
3. ..hat do you think of the quality of the NPP products? 
what about supply, prices and payment policies?
4. Production Line;
Froduc ts Main markets
North East ! Rest of Brazil
t1
l
*
Are there new investment of Ljct.ansion irograms?
Details,--------------------------------
6. Are the foundation or the new ex[ansion programs of your company 
related to the establishment of the KPP?
v i I I - 19
7. Has the KFP brought any specific advantage for your company?
8. Labour
ir .rket ? '.That difficulty? For which occupation?
9. V.hat are the main difficulties in the creation and management of the 
pe irochemical down-stream industries in the l.'orth East?
Entrepreneurs?
Market?
Management 3kills?
Skilled labour?
Government Policies?
Others?
10. Has the government provided adequate incentives for the development 
of these now firms? Has your firm used the Government Incentives 
available?
11. Any other articular point do you want to make?
*
J.
X
